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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plus qa change,plus c 'est la m~me chose.'
The French proverb according to which the more something changes
the more it remains the same is more than a witticism. It is a
wonderfully concise expression of the puzzling and paradoxical
relationship between persistence and change. It appeals more
immediately to experience than the most sophisticated theories that
have been put forth by philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians,
and implicitly makes a basic point often neglected: that persistence and
change need to be considered together, in spite of their apparently
opposite nature. This is not an abstruse idea, but a specific instance of

1. Alphonse Karr, LEs GUtPES (Paris, Jan. 31, 1849), in Columbia World of Quotations
(1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/88/32088.html. Karr was a French journalist and
novelist.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

the general principle that all perception and thought is relative,
operating by comparison and contrast.
In 2003, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") 3 reported
that in the year 2001, parents across the nation relinquished custody of

over 12,700 children to the child welfare or juvenile justice systems
when they could not access or afford the mental health services they

sought for their children.4 The U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee subsequently held hearings,5 and the House Committee on
Government Reform embarked upon its own investigation. After a yearlong study, the House Committee reported even more alarming numbers:
During the six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2003 "nearly
15,000 incarcerated youth waited for community mental health services"
in juvenile detention facilities because of the unavailability or
unaffordability of appropriate community-based mental health services.6
A second set of Congressional hearings took place in July 2004.'
2. PAUL WATZLAWICK ET AL., CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM FORMATION AND
PROBLEM RESOLUTION (1974).

3. Effective July 7, 2004, after eighty-three years, the GAO changed its name. See GAO's
Name Change and Other Provisions of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, at
http://www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). According to the
Comptroller General of the United States, the new name more accurately reflects the mission of the
GAO, an independent, nonpartisan federal agency charged with "measuring the government's
performance and holding it accountable for results." David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question:
What's in a Name?, at http://www.gao.gov/about/rolIcal107192004.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2005).
In the text of this Article, the agency will be referred to by its new name, or as the "GAO." In
footnotes, however, the agency's name will be cited exactly as it appears on each document.
4. Specifically, the GAO reported: "State child welfare officials in 19 states and county
juvenile justice officials in 30 counties ... estimated that in fiscal year 2001 parents in their
jurisdictions placed over 12,700 children-mostly adolescent males-into the child welfare or
juvenile justice systems so that these children could receive mental health services." U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-03-397, CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD
PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING STATES REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PLACED SOLELY
TO
OBTAIN
MENTAL
HEALTH
SERVICES
4
(2003),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new/items/d03397.pdf [hereinafter GAO, 2003]. The GAO asserted that these

numbers were likely to be an underestimate of the scope of the problem because officials in several
states ("including officials of 5 states with the largest populations of children") did not respond to
the GAO survey. Id.
5. See Nowhere to Turn: Must ParentsRelinquish Custody in Orderto Secure Mental Health
Services for Their Children?: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th
Cong. (2003).
6. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Div., MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM,
108TH CONG., INCARCERATION OF YOUTH WHO ARE WAITING FOR COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES ii (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter INCARCERATION OF YOUTH].
Specifically, the investigation surveyed administrators of juvenile detention centers and asked them
to identify the numbers of youth incarcerated in their facilities with "mental illness," "who do not
need to be in detention," who are waiting for community-based mental health services, and who can

leave "detention ... as soon as appropriate treatment services become available." Id. at 3. The
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There are many other signs that large numbers of families have
been unable to access mental health care for their children and turn
elsewhere when they or others in the community reach their breaking
points. Many children in emotional crisis end up in hospital emergency
rooms.8 They remain there, or are transferred to non-psychiatric medical
wards, where they wait-sometimes for hours, sometimes for daysuntil the recommended services become available. Their appearances in
these settings are sufficiently frequent that writers have coined a phrase
to describe them: "boarder kids." 9 The stream of prospective patients in
emotional crisis into emergency rooms has taken its toll on the hospitals.
In July 2004, officials in Clark County, Nevada declared a state of
emergency because persons (children and adults) with symptoms of
mental disorders were flooding hospital emergency rooms.' 0 In response,
the Governor of Nevada released $100,000 in emergency funds to divert
these psychiatric patients to other treatment resources. The increase in
emergency-room use by those with mental health problems is a national
problem that affects significant numbers of children."
Reportedly, the wait for community-based mental health services
for children is months-long. 12 Beds in psychiatric hospitals and
residential treatment centers for emotionally disturbed children are in
short supply.' 3 Furthermore, many children admitted to inpatient
survey included admission to a mental health treatment facility among those services for which the
youth waited. Id The limitations of the survey data are discussed in note 310 supra.
7.

See Juvenile Detention Centers. Are They Warehousing Children with Mental Illness?:

Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter
Juvenile Detention Centers].

8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See, e.g., Alice Dembner, Acutely Mentally IIl Children Face Delay of Care, Study Finds,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2003, at BI; Kristen Lombardi, Boarder Patrol, WORCESTER PHOENIX,
July 7-14, 2000 (on file with author); Abigail Trafford, BoarderKids, On The Edge, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2000, at Z05.
10. See Mental Health Crisis Needs a Permanent Fix, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 13, 2004,
available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2004/jul/13/517164784.html.
11. See infra Part lV.B.

12.

See, e.g., Rafael M. Semansky & Chris Koyanagi, Obtaining Child Mental Health

Services Through Medicaid: The Experience of Parents in Two States, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 24

(2004); DeQuendre Neeley-Bertrand, Mental Health and Child Welfare: Waiting for Care,
CHILDREN'S VOICE, May 2001, available at http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0l05mentalhealth.htm;
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF, CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH IN THE
COMMONWEALTH 7-8 (2002) [hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF].
13. See CALIFORNIA INST. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL BEDS IN
CALIFORNIA: REDUCED NUMBERS CREATE SYSTEM SLOW-DOWN AND POTENTIAL CRISIS 14
(2001), available at http://www.cimh.org/downloads/AcuteServices ReportFinal.pdf; RONALD
W. MANDERSCHEID ET AL., HIGHLIGHTS OF ORGANIZED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN 2000 AND
MAJOR NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 243, 244-47
(Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., 2004).
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psychiatric units or in residential treatment centers for emotionally
professional
cannot
go
home-despite
disturbed
children
recommendations that they are ready for discharge-because of
inadequate mental health services in the community. 14 These children
are called "stuck kids."' 5 Despite all of the reported difficulties families
and children have getting in and out of such facilities, rates of admission
of children to inpatient and residential mental health facilities continue
to "skyrocket,' ' 16 revealing an exceedingly high demand for out-of-home
placements for these youth. And, there is one more place where troubled
and troublesome youth 17 seem go to in large numbers: away. Hundreds
18
of thousands of troubled youth run away from home or from foster care
or are "thrown away" by their families.' 9 These statistics constitute
further evidence that existing service systems are failing to address the
serious problems experienced by many of today's American families.
Yet, these signs of crisis are only the tip of the iceberg. Every year
hundreds of thousands of children experience an out-of-home placement
under the auspices of one of three primary child service and intervention
systems (that is, the mental health, child welfare, or juvenile justice
system). In fact, despite decades of policy initiatives aimed at reducing
use of institutions and other out-of-home placements for troubled and
troublesome youth, more per capitaepisodes of out-of-home placements
were experienced by children in the last decade of the twentieth century
than at any time since comprehensive data were first available (that is,
since the 1920s).2°
14.
15.
ENG.

ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 12, at 5.
See, e.g., Phyllis Hanlon, States Seek Responses to Address 'Stuck Kids' Situations, NEW
PSYCHOLOGIST,
Oct.
2003,
available
at

http://www.nepsy.com/leading/0310 ne cover_stuck.html;

Sandra

DeJong,

Whither

Child

Psychiatry?, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2001, at 8.

16. See infra Part IV.E. The term "skyrocket" is drawn from the title of my 1988 article
examining trends in admission of troublesome youth to psychiatric facilities. See Lois A. Weithorn,
Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40

STAN. L. REV. 773 (1988) [hereinafter Weithorn, Skyrocketing Admissions].
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NISMART: NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDIES OF MISSING,
ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN, RUNAWAY/THROWAWAY CHILDREN:
NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002).

19. Id.For a discussion of the concept of "thrownaway" children, see Gregory A. Loken,
"Thrownaway " Childrenand Throwaway Parenthood,68 TEMP. L. REV. 1715 (1995).
20. Paul Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments in America's Institutional Systems for
Youth in Trouble, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 74, 105 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,

2002)

[hereinafter Lerman,

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION].

Twentieth-Century Developments]; see also PAUL LERMAN,
THE
WELFARE
STATE (1982)
[hereinafter LERMAN,

AND
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This Article examines and challenges our legal system's
conventional patterns of response to troubled and troublesome youth. At
the close of this Introduction, Part II provides a brief overview of five
modem child service and intervention systems: the health and mental
health care systems, the child welfare system, the juvenile justice
system, and the educational system. Part III introduces the population of
interest-"troubled and troublesome youth"--a highly-diverse group of
young persons who have been removed from their homes or who are at
risk of such removal because of their own emotional difficulties, their
troublesome conduct, or their parents' challenges in maintaining a safe
or adequate home environment. While the term troubled emphasizes the
inner emotional distress experienced by these youth, the term
troublesome highlights the difficulties that their conduct creates for their
families, schools, and communities. 21 Part III examines these youth
"through the lens" of each of the health, mental health, child welfare,
juvenile justice, and educational systems. Despite the many legal
distinctions among these systems, ranging from independent statutes
authorizing state intervention to separate streams of governmental
funding, neither legal policy nor practice confront the overlap in the
populations of troubled and troublesome youth served. There is a core
group of children whose conduct and family circumstances could satisfy
the legal criteria required to trigger the intervention in multiple systems.
Part III deconstructs the rigid system-specific constructions of these
children, contending that these characterizations lead to exceedingly
narrow and frequently inappropriate intervention approaches that do not
meet the needs of troubled and troublesome youth, their families, and
their communities.
Part IV reviews the various signs of crisis that further betray the
inadequacy of modem American legal and social responses to troubled
and troublesome youth. In response to unmet service needs, parents,
advocates, and litigators have sued to compel provision of appropriate
mental health services to these children. Other signs of crisis include
influxes of troubled and troublesome children into emergency rooms and
as boarders on medical wards, high rates of parental relinquishment of
custody of children to the child welfare and juvenile justice systems,
large numbers of runaway and thrownaway children, and skyrocketing
rates of admission of children to mental hospitals.
Part V argues that our nation's high rates of out-of-home
placements are incompatible with core traditions in American law
21. See infra Part III for further discussion of the parameters of the population of interest.
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valuing parent-child relationships and family integrity, freedom from
unnecessary incarceration, and integration of those who are different into
the mainstream of community life. Furthermore, while the removal of
troubled and troublesome youth from their homes may provide
temporary containment of the immediate crises triggering intervention,
there is little evidence that such removals achieve the purposes used to
authorize them. In theory, the state's parens patriae and socializationoriented police power interests in promoting the welfare of our nation's
children justify its intervention in the family and its regulation of
children's lives. Part V contends that modem legal responses to troubled
and troublesome youth fail in their mandates to protect these children
and to promote their positive development into well adjusted and
constructively contributing members of society.
Part VI examines efforts throughout the twentieth century to reform
these systems, and in particular, to deinstitutionalize certain populations
of children from one set of institutions or another. While the child
welfare system and juvenile justice system have each been the focus of
federal reforms, many assert that policymakers should now work to
transform the mental health system responses to children and families.
Yet, these reforms have had limited success. Unintentional,
unanticipated, and undesired movements of children among systems is
the hallmark of these policy reforms, as formal deinstitutionalization
policies of one system lead to increased use of alternate systems'
institutions.
Part VII articulates a vision of a coordinated and responsive service
system that provides effective and appropriate services to troubled and
troublesome youth and their families. In their 1974 book, Change,
Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch distinguish two types of change: "one
that occurs within a given system which itself remains unchanged [that
22. Indeed, in the past few years, there has been a spate of policy-oriented reports produced
by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, committees, commissions and the like, calling
attention to mental health needs of children. The 1999 Report of the Surgeon General on Mental
Health dedicated over one hundred pages to the issues of children's mental health. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 117-220

(1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. In 2000, under the auspices of the Office of the
Surgeon General, a conference devoted exclusively to children's mental health developed a
"national action agenda." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA (2000)

[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S CONFERENCE]. In July 2003, President George W. Bush's New
Freedom Commission on Mental Health issued its final report and focused significant attention on
the needs of children and families. See PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH,
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2003) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION].

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

8

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble

2005]

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

is, "first-order change"], and one whose occurrence changes the system
itself [that is, "second-order change."]. 2 3 Therefore, as Watzlawick and
colleagues point out, "[s]econd-order change is thus change of
change... ,,24 or, expressed differently, change in the focus of and
process by which change occurs.
Clearly, our strategies for achieving change in our responses to
troubled and troublesome youth are flawed; more of the same is unlikely
to bring us closer to reaching our goals. Not only are these approaches
inconsistent with core American legal traditions, but they often
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the child's and family's difficulties.
Furthermore, there is evidence that those policymakers responding to the
current crises are recycling the ineffective solutions of the past. For
example, the Nevada state legislature "approved the construction of a
150-bed psychiatric hospital in Las Vegas" to alleviate the "clogging" of
emergency rooms by "mentally ill people., 25 Along similar lines, a
reporter who detailed the saga of a boarder kid in Massachusetts
imagined: "In a perfect world, this young patient would be sent
,26 Yet, pumping funds into
immediately to a psychiatric hospital ....
inpatient mental health services fails to recognize that we've already
been down that road, and the result was anything but perfect. Expanding
the number of inpatient beds offers little more than a temporary quick
fix, and proliferates a form of intervention with many shortcomings.2 7
These responses constitute first-order change. First-order change may be
a necessary first step by policymakers to relieve immediate crises,
particularly when there is substantial suffering associated with delays in
response. But, first-order change is no more likely to address the
underlying problems creating the crises than is the metaphorical finger in
the dike.
Thus, Part VII proposes a framework for legal policy reform that
seeks to achieve second-order change through altering: (1) the structure
23. See WATZLAWICK ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (emphasis added).
24. Id.at 11.
25. See Associated Press, Lawmakers Told Mentally Ill Clog Emergency Rooms, LAS VEGAS
SUN Sept. 19, 2003. Within days of the declaration of a state of emergency, "Nevada mental health
officials... announced a proposal to refurbish the state's Desert Regional Center to temporarily
house mentally ill patients until a new state hospital is built." Juliet V. Casey, State Announces
Temporary Housing Plan, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 13, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR

847630.
26. Trafford, supra note 9.
27. For a discussion of these shortcomings, see, for example, Weithorn, Skyrocketing
Admissions, supra note 16, at 796-98. For a "classic" analysis of the effects of institutionalization,
see ERVNG GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND
OTHER INMATES 4 (1961).
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of the intervention systems, and (2) the nature of the interventions
provided to troubled and troublesome youth and their families. This
model rejects traditions of removal, confinement, and segregation of
troubled and troublesome youth in favor of approaches that foster
positive adaptation of children within their natural systems, such as
families, schools, and communities,28 and are concordant with our
society's valuing of family, relationships, liberty, and inclusion.
Ironically, as set forth in Part VII, those intervention approaches most
faithful to our legal values are also those with the strongest empirical
support for efficacy. Part VII proposes the development of
"metasystem' '29 capabilities -that transcend current system boundaries
and coordinate a state's responses to these children and families and
allow access to a full range of universally available services at any point
of entry.3 ° In a truly restructured system, the needs of the particular child
and family would determine the components of the intervention rather
than which system has first contact with the child, or which of the labels
describing the child lead to payment. Thus, Part VII seeks to address the
failures of past reforms by emphasizing integrated policymaking and
intersystem coordination, and shifts in financial incentives that promote
the articulated policy goals.
II.

MODERN CHILD SERVICE AND INTERVENTION SYSTEMS THAT
RESPOND TO "TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME" YOUTH

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, five primary systems
provide care and service to, or intervene in the lives of, large numbers of
troubled and troublesome children in the United States: the health and
28. For examples of the social-ecological models of child development and family
functioning, see URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS
BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979); JAMES GARBARNO, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1992). These authors offer distinct and integrated ways of conceptualizing
the needs of troubled and troublesome youth and their families. These perspectives have led to the
development of innovative intervention approaches that effectively promote children's adaptive
functioning within the systems of relevance to them (that is, family, school, and community) and
that work to mobilize and strengthen children's natural support systems. For further discussion of
these programs, see infra Part VII.
29. One of the meanings of the prefix "meta" is "beyond, encompassing, transcending." The
prefix is used in that manner here, and the term "meta-system" [hereinafter metasystem] is used to
connote a governmental entity structured so to transcend the traditional boundaries of the child
service and intervention systems discussed within this Article.
30. In other words, whether a child's or family's problems become evident to the child's
school, to a pediatrician, to an emergency room physician, to a mental health professional, to child
protective services, to juvenile justice authorities, or to the police, the full range of appropriate
services should be easily accessed.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

10

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble
20051

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

1315

mental health care systems, and the child welfare, juvenile justice, and
educational systems. 31 The term "system" is used loosely. While a
service or intervention system ideally will reflect "a coordinated body of
methods or a scheme or plan of procedure," 32 certain of the systems
described herein might be more like "an assemblage or combination of
things or parts" that share a general common mission and "form[] a
complex or ...whole," but do not necessarily operate in coordination.3 3
These systems are comprised of various collections of professionals,
facilities, agencies, and organizations operating either in the public or
private sectors, most typically with some involvement in both sectors.
Three of these systems-the mental health, juvenile justice, and child
welfare systems-presently maintain, or in the past have maintained,
various types of "institutions" providing residential services for a subset
34 The concept of institution as used here, is
of the system's clients.
35
below.
further defined
A.

The Health Care System

Critical to an understanding of the mental health system in the
United States is an understanding of the health care system, because the
former is often treated as a component of the latter.3 6 More often than
not, however, the mental health component is like a "square peg" trying
to fit into a "round hole" within a health care system that tends not to be
particularly hospitable to its presence.
Modem assessments of the American health care system reveal
several ironies. While the United States boasts of surpassing other
countries in the advanced state of its medical technology, manpower,
and resources, it fares poorly in comparison to other developed nations
in its ability to deliver these services to its populace, and many

31. It is these five systems to which I refer when speaking of the five "child service and
intervention systems."
32. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1308 (1997).

33. Id.The language not in quotations was supplied by this author.
34. Because of the functions that the institutions of these three systems serve, they will be
referred to collectively as "child care and control institutions."
35. See infra Part VI.B.
36. This treatment of the mental health care system as a component of the health care system
has many dimensions. It is conceptual (i.e., mental health viewed as a component of health), relates
to the locus of care (i.e., mental health professionals often perform their functions in health care
settings) and to the characterizations of its clients (i.e., those with mental health problems are called
"patients"), and the mechanisms of financing (payment for mental health services is often through
the same private or public insurance programs as is payment for health services).
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Americans do not receive such care. 37 Furthermore, the American
population falls below many other industrial nations on a variety of
indices of health. One commentator, a member of a committee issuing a
2001 Institute of Medicine report, 38 asserted that "[t]he American health
care system offers the sophistication of a space station delivered with the
efficiency of a third-world post office., 39 The Institute report concluded
that: "Health care today harms too frequently and routinely fails to
deliver its potential benefits. ' 4° It cited "strong evidence" that
Americans do not reliably receive care' 4 1"that meets their needs and is
based on the best scientific knowledge.
While the Institute of Medicine grounded its findings on decades of
empirical research conducted in the United States by governmental
agencies and independent scientists, international studies have reached
similar conclusions. For example, life expectancy is lower and infant
mortality rates higher in the United States than in many other
industrialized nations, and yet we spend far more on health care. 42 A
year 2000 report published by the World Health Organization ("WHO")
examined the health care systems of 191 nations.4 3 Examining indices
relating to the health of the nation's population, disparities and inequities
in receipt of health care services within the population, and health care
system responsiveness, the report ranked the United States 3 7th among
the other nations on an aggregate measure of "overall health system
performance." 44 The study also revealed that the United States ranksfirst
in per capita spending on health care, suggesting a substantial
discrepancy between investment and result. 45 Although the WHO report

37.

See Katherine Barrett et al., A Case of Neglect: Why Health Care is Getting Worse, Even

Medicine is Getting Better,
Though
http://www.goveming.com/gpp/2004/intro.htm.

GOVERNING,

Feb.

2004,

available

at

38. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Rona Briere ed., 2001) [hereinafter CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM].

39. Christie Aschwanden, U.S. Health Care Takes a Battering, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
at
available
(2001),
378
378,
ORG.
(quoting
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script-sci-arttext&pid=S0042-96862001000400021
Dr. Lucian L. Leape).
40.
41.

CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 38, at 1.
Id.

42. Robert F. Rich & Christopher T. Erb, Introduction, Health Care Reform: Where Are We?
Where Are We Going?, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 39 (2004).
43.

WORLD HEALTH ORG.,

THE WORLD HEALTH

REPORT 2000-HEALTH

SYSTEMS:

IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (Angela Haden ed., 2000).
44. Id. at 144, 152-55. The U.S. trailed almost all industrialized nations, including most
European nations, as well as countries such as Israel (28th), Canada (30th), and Australia (32nd). Id
at 152-55.
45. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

12

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble
2005]

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

has been criticized by some, others suggest we view these findings as a
wake-up call. 46 This latter conclusion is reinforced by the Institute of
Medicine's warning that the American health care delivery system is in
need of "fundamental change. 'A 7 Further complicating the path to
reform: health care costs have risen dramatically and health expenditures
exceed the growth of our gross domestic product by greater margins
every year;48 substantial proportions of our populace have no health
insurance at least some of the time; 49 and the market-oriented structure
of the American health care system with its attendant political interests
makes reform exceedingly difficult.5 ° All of these problems affect access
to adequate and appropriate mental health services for children, since the
health care system is a primary gatekeeper of access to mental health
services in the United States today.
The modem health care system in the United States consists of two
primary components that, until recently, operated relatively
independently: the providers (that is, professionals, hospitals, clinics,
and other organizations) and payors (that is, third-party insurers,
employers, the government, and patients and their families). In recent
decades, there has been some consolidation of these two components,
primarily in the private sector, and most notably by Health Maintenance
Organizations ("HMOs"). 51 For much of the twentieth century, however,
the primary providers of medical services-physicians--enjoyed
substantial decisional autonomy in the delivery of health care services,
much political clout, and freedom from concerns about the costs of
medical services. 52 A network of private third-party insurers developed
throughout the century, with health insurance benefit packages
increasingly dispensed through employers. Private insurers, together
with employers and patients, bore the costs of the services. "The
46. See K. Walshe, InternationalComparisonsof the Quality of Health Care: What Do They
Tell Us?, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 4 (2003) (summarizing commentaries).
47. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supranote 38, at 1.

48. Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International Context, 23
HEALTH AFFAIRS 10 (2004); Ronald Pollack, Gaps and Inequities in America's Health Care
System, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 415, 416 (2003).
49. INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2004) (reporting an increase in the rate of uninsured persons under the age of 65 from 29.5% of this
population to 43.3% between the years of 1987 to 2002); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or

Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health Care System on the Health ofAmerica, 39 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 7, 18
50.
51.
1986).
52.

(1994).
Gostin, supra note 49, at 18; Pollack, supranote 48, at 420-21.
INST. OF MED., FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 33-34 (Bradford H. Gray ed.,
See KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 12-43 (1998).
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result... was a uniquely American form of health service financing.
Unlike virtually every other industrialized country, Americans relied
predominantly on private employment-based, insurance-type financing
schemes that largely divorced the financing of services from their
delivery." 53 Thus, the modem American health care system is not the
result of coordinated and comprehensive national policymaking. Rather,
it simply evolved throughout the twentieth century, shaped by a range of
social, economic, and political forces. The resulting system operates to
the disadvantage of many, such as those not employed, those not eligible
for employer-sponsored benefits, those whose employers do not offer
them health insurance benefits, and those whose insurance plans provide
coverage that does not adequately meet their health care needs.
Among the economic forces influencing modem health care
delivery is the rising cost of such care. This rise led many insurers to
adopt cost containment measures, referred to as forms of "managed
care." 54 Increasingly, for-profit corporations have acquired ownership of
various segments of the health care delivery market.55 This phenomenon,
together with the application of managed care principles guided by
profit-making incentives, has led to practices that many claim seriously
compromise patient care.5 6 While the future of managed care policies
implemented by insurers and HMOs is unclear in light of conflicting
53.

Id. at 17.

54.

WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 517 (5th ed. 1998).

Managed care is a term that applies broadly to a wide variety of arrangements that
restrict the generosity of traditional health insurance. Managed care (1) restricts choice
of physicians through networks and gatekeepers, (2) alters discrete treatment decisions
through utilization review and prior authorization requirements, and (3) creates costconstrained financial incentives through capitation payments and risk-sharing pools.
id.
55.

See PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE

MANAGED CARE ERA 55-56 (2002); Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-IndustrialComplex, 303
NEW ENG. J. MED. 963, 963 (1980); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 420-49 (1982); see also INST. OF MED., supra note 49. In some cases, for-profit
corporations have acquired or created facilities that provide health care services. In other cases,
certain entities, particularly HMOs, have melded the provider and insurer roles.
56. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care's "Thirty Years War":
The Origins and Dissolution of ManagedCare, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 316-28 (2004);
Linda Peeno, The Second Coming of Managed Care, 40-MAY TRIAL 18, 18 (2004); Clark C.
Havighurst, Consumers v. Managed Care: The New Class Actions, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 8, 11
(2001). For thoughtful analyses of the challenges, achievements, and future of managed care, see
Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55
(2002); Clark C. Havighurst, Managed Care-Work in Progressor Stalled Experiment?, 35 HOUS.
L. REv. 1385 (1999). Health care providers and patients now assert that the ethics that require
practitioners to place patients' welfare above other values have been compromised because of
economic factors and the intrusion of third parties into matters previously reserved for professional
judgment.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

14

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble

2005]

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

assessments, lawsuits, and prospective governmental regulation, these
policies and their application by medical corporations have implications
for the delivery of mental health services to children.
B.

The Mental Health "System"

Of the five systems discussed here, the term "system" is perhaps
least descriptive of the highly fragmented and uncoordinated array of
services targeting what have been referred to as mental disorders,
illnesses, or disabilities, mental health or psychological problems,
emotional disturbances, social maladjustments, and so on. Many
troubled and troublesome youth are, or have at one time been, viewed as
falling into one of these or related categories. Complicating legal and
societal responses to these children and their needs is the fact that most
of the services delivered to children in this diverse group are provided
under the fiscal umbrella of, or by professionals or facilities within, one
of the other four systems.57 Despite this reality, there is typically little or
no coordination or organization of these cross-system services. Thus,
whatever criticisms may be lodged at the American health care system
pale in comparison to those directed at the mental health system.
According to the first-ever Report on Mental Health developed by the
Office of the United States Surgeon General and published in 1999:
Over the past three centuries, the complex patchwork of mental health
services in the United States has become so fragmented that it is
Its shape has been
referred to as the defacto mental health system ....
determined by many heterogeneous58 factors rather than by a single
guiding set of organizing principles.
Political scientist David Rochefort has gone a step farther and
characterized this diverse and loosely-connected array of professionals,
services, facilities, and policies as the "mental health 'nonsystem.' ' '59 In
its Final Report, in 2003, the President's New Freedom Commission on
Mental Health asserted:

57. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 73-80, 179-85 (1999). Most of the
financing of mental health interventions occurs through sources such as private and public health
insurance and educational system budgets. Id.
58. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
59.

DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, FROM POORHOUSES TO HOMELESSNESS: POLICY ANALYSIS AND

MENTAL HEALTH CARE 5 (2d ed. 1997). For purposes of efficiency, I continue to use the term
"system" throughout this manuscript to refer to the myriad of organized and disorganized mental
health services, professionals, and facilities, despite recognition that the word "system" is a
misnomer when used in this context.
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"[T]he mental health delivery system is fragmented and in disarray...
lead[ing] to unnecessary and costly disability, homelessness, school
failure and incarceration." The ...unmet needs and barriers to care
[include]:
* Fragmentation and gaps in care for children,
" Fragmentation and gaps in care for adults with serious mental
illnesses,
" High unemployment and disability for people with serious
mental illnesses,
* Lack of care for older adults with mental illness, and
* Lack of national
priority for mental health and suicide
60
prevention.

The Surgeon General's Report characterized the "de facto mental
health system" as having four sectors: specialty mental health, general
medical/primary care, human services, and voluntary support
networks. 6 The specialty mental health sector includes services
provided by those professionals who, by training or affiliation, focus
their work in the field of mental health. By contrast, the medical/primary
care sector provides a range of general health care services. The mental
health-related expertise of its "family physicians, nurse practitioners,
internists, pediatricians" and related professionals 62 varies dramatically.
Yet, a substantial proportion of mental health problems that come to
professional attention first present themselves to these professionals.6 3
The human services sector includes a range of public and private
professionals and agencies such as: child and social welfare, juvenile
and criminal justice, and education. Finally, voluntary and consumeroriented programs and supports provide a range of services as well. This
sector has grown in the past several decades, and is comprised of
advocacy groups such as the National Mental Health Association 64 and
the National Alliance for the Mentally 111.65

60.

PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 22, at 3 (quoting

language from its Interim Report to the President).
61. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 73.
62. ld. at 73.
63. For example, the proportion of adults in the United States population who receive mental
health treatment from general medical professionals in a given year (5%) is only slightly below the
proportion who receive such services from mental health specialists (6%). Id. at 76.
64. The National Mental Health Association ("NMHA") "is the country's oldest and largest
nonprofit organization addressing all aspects of mental health and mental illness." See NAT'L
MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, More About NMHA, at http://www.nmha.org/about/index.cfm. "NMHA
was established in 1909 by former psychiatric patient Clifford W. Beers" who, "[d]uring his stays in
public and private institutions, .. .witnessed and was subjected to horrible abuse ....Beers set into
motion a reform movement that took shape as the National Mental Health Association." Id. The
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For children, to a greater extent than for adults, the human service
sector is involved in responding to mental health issues. Of those
children in the U.S. population who receive mental health services in a
given year, the largest proportion receive these services through the
schools. 66 Yet "there is a severe paucity of programs that focus on ....
the most severely impaired group of students in the schools and those
most in need of comprehensive services., 67 Research reveals that many
children processed through the child welfare and juvenile justice systems
meet diagnostic criteria for mental disorders, yet most of them do not
receive appropriate services. 68
Mental health care delivery in the United States suffers from all of
the problems of the health care system discussed above, given its
primary affiliation with that system. There exist dramatic inequities
across society in the degree to which those who require mental health
services can access and afford them. Many consumers are unable to
benefit from the advances in knowledge and expertise that have occurred
in the field. Complicating the mental health service delivery process
even more is the degree to which mental health services rely on other
service systems to provide them with a home and financing. Within each
system, mental health services and mental health needs are generally
given low priority. The models underlying the structure and philosophy
of service provision of the other systems may work for mental health
services in some instances, but not in others. 69 Indeed, as the mental
NMHA now has over 340 local and state affiliates throughout the United States, and states its
mission as working "to improve the mental health of all Americans, especially the 54 million
individuals with mental disorders, through advocacy, education, research and service." Id.
65. The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill ("NAMI") is "a nonprofit, grassroots, self-help,
support and advocacy organization of consumers, families, and friends of people with severe mental
illnesses" founded in 1979, and which "works to achieve equitable services and treatment for more
than 15 million Americans living with severe mental illnesses and their families." See NAT'L
ALLIANCE

FOR

THE

MENTALLY

ILL,

About

NAMI,

at

http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform-Yourself/About-NAMI/About-NAMl.htm.
It states its mission to be working for the "eradication of mental illnesses and to the improvement of
the quality of life of all whose lives are affected by these diseases." Id.
66.

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 77.

67. Michelle Rones & Kimberly Hoagwood, School-Based Mental Health Services: A
Research Review, 3 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REv. 223, 238 (2000).

68. See infra Part lIlB.1.
69. For example, there is now substantial professional consensus that schizophrenia is a
"disease" with a biological basis and a genetic component. But unlike persons who suffer from
arthritis or diabetes, persons with schizophrenia often lack the psychological skills to obtain and
follow through with their treatment. They may need lifetime psychosocial intervention simply to
ensure they take their medications. They may be unable to find or keep a job, and to satisfy their
minimum survival needs (for food, shelter, clothing). They may behave in ways that alienate others,
and thus may not have those familial and social relationships critical to successful functioning in the
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health system seeks to find its place within the health, education, social
service, and juvenile justice and criminal justice systems, it is like a
square peg trying to squeeze into a round hole, rejected at every turn by
the host system or those who finance that system. Third-party insurers
subject mental health treatment to far more scrutiny, restrictions, and
limitations than they do general health care; 70 schools seek to exclude
children with certain types of emotional problems from the entitlements
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [hereinafter IDEA];7"
the child welfare system fails miserably in addressing the predictable
mental health needs of foster children; 72 the juvenile justice system no
longer professes to offer treatment and rehabilitation to wards and is illequipped to deal with serious mental health conditions; 73 and the
criminal justice system likewise has disclaimed a rehabilitative purpose,
except in certain limited circumstances.74 Only those components of the
mental health system funded directly through state and federal budgets,
such as the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
face of a serious and chronic disorder. Mental health services structured around the medical model
and standard health insurance reimbursement schemes typically do not address these corollary, but
essential, needs. See, e.g., Howard H. Goldman, "How Do You Pay Your Rent? ": Social Policies
and the President'sMental Health Commission, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 65 (2003).
70. For a discussion of the inequities in the financing of mental and physical health
conditions, see, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-95, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT:
DESPITE NEW FEDERAL STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED (2000); David
Mechanic & Donna D. McAlpine, Mission Unfulfilled- Potholes on the Road to Mental Health
Parity, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7 (1999); Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative "Subterfuge "?: Failing
to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753 (1997).
71. See supranotes 227-33 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Part l1l.B.2.
73. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation of a Right to Mental
Health Treatmentfor Juvenile Offenders, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 61 (2004).
74. For example, several states have recently passed voter initiated mandates requiring
provision of treatment rather than correctional incarceration in response to certain first-time
nonviolent drug offenders. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct
Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2003). In
addition, "mental health courts" have developed in various locations around the nation, and seek to
bring a problem-solving and therapeutic bent to interventions with offenders. See, e.g., Robert
Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalizationof People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental
Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143 (2003). Specialty courts, such as
mental health courts and drug courts are referred to as "problems-solving courts," and seek to
achieve more constructive interventions than conventional case resolutions. Judith S. Kaye,
Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125 (2004).
Some caution, however, that these approaches have their limitations and their dangers, which must
be addressed in the implementation and proliferation of these models. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff &
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1501 (2003); Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the
OriginsandDevelopment of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513 (2003).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

18

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble
2005]

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

Administration ("SMHSA") within the Department of Health and
Human Services ("DHHS"), or a state department of mental health, seem
to have their own home, but those homes have become smaller and
smaller in recent years. 75 Thus, it is fair to say that the problems
encountered in the delivery of mental health services are wider and
deeper than those attendant to delivery of general medical care. The
splintered and haphazard nature of mental health service delivery in the
United States contributes significantly to the overuse and inappropriate
use of institutional interventions with troubled and troublesome youth.76
C. The Child Welfare System
The juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction authorizes state
intervention in families when deemed necessary to protect a child from
abuse, neglect, or other forms of maltreatment perpetrated by parents,
legal guardians, or others who stand in a legally recognized parent-like
relationship with the child. In defining the grounds for dependency
jurisdiction, state statutes must identify what types of parental conduct,
living situations, or harm experienced by a child constitute maltreatment.
These determinations are necessarily policy decisions infused with social
values as to what constitutes adequate parenting. 77 Because maltreatment
statutes authorize state intervention in the family, the statutes and the
courts that interpret and apply them must delicately balance parental
rights to discretion in childrearing 78 with the state's parens patriae
interests in protecting children from harm and its police power interests
in promoting the constructive socialization of children. 79 The modem
child welfare system reflects current social ambivalence about state

75.

See Ted Lutterman & Michael

Hogan, State Mental Health Agency Controlled

Expenditures and Revenues for Mental Health Services, FY 1981 to FY 1997, in MENTAL HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2000, 218 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., 2001);

Rosanna M . Coffey et al., National Estimates of Expendituresfor Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Treatment, 1997 (2000), available at http://www.openminds.com/indres/spending.pdf;
Henrick J. Harwood et al., NationalSpending on Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment by
Age of Clients, 1997, 30 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 433 (2003); David S. Mandell et al.,
Medical Expenditures Among Children with Psychiatric Disorders in a Medicaid Population, 54
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 465 (2003).

76. See infra Part IlI.B.5.
77. Lois A. Weithom, ProtectingChildrenfrom Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and
Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 53-60 (2001) [hereinafter Weithom,
ProtectingChildren].
78. See, e.g., Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79. For an analysis of these state interests, see infra Part V.B.
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intervention in the family: 80 The system is criticized for casting its net
too broadly and for overreaching in children's and families' lives, and at
the same time for failure to adequately protect children. 8 Critics also
cite child welfare workers' misunderstandings of, and disrespect for, the
cultural traditions of non-white segments of the population, and for bias
against racial and ethnic minorities and those in poverty.8 2 Furthermore,
there is no clear evidence that the child welfare system's interventions,
even under the best of circumstances, are effective in remediating those
circumstances leading to its involvement, in keeping children safe, or in
promoting children's short- and long-term social and emotional wellbeing. 83 Furthermore, evidence exists that out-of-home placements
80. See Weithorn, Protecting Children, supra note 77, at 53-60 (discussing the modem child
welfare system).
81. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
82. During hearings in the 1970s, Congress considered data indicating "that 25 to 35% of all
Indian children had been separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care,
or institutions," as a result of the intervention of state child welfare authorities. See Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (citing Problems That American
Indian FamiliesFace in Raising Their Children and How These Problems are Affected by Federal
Action or Inaction, Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong. (1974) (statement of William Byler)). Furthermore, the
evidence revealed that the "adoption rate of Indian children was eight times that of non-Indian
children. Approximately 90% of the Indian placements were in non-Indian homes." Id. at 33.
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000), in an
attempt to shield Indian parents from the intervention of child protection workers who are
unfamiliar with Indian culture and childrearing traditions. Id. at 34-35. The statute's goal was to
promote tribal sovereignty in decisionmaking over the welfare of Indian children. Id
83. Unfortunately, a century of child welfare intervention has been accompanied by very little
outcome research. Existing studies are plagued by methodological problems. Useful research must
be clear in specifying the intervention evaluated in a manner that allows others to replicate the
intervention outside of the experimental setting. Other methodological limitations include a failure
to use measures that are related to the initial purpose of state intervention. Thus, for example, while
parental reports of satisfaction with the intervention provide one type of information, it must be
supplemented by outcome measures that are more closely tied with the reason for state intervention,
such as whether the child was re-abused within a six-month period after return to her parents. Good
research also employs control groups comparable to the treatment group on important variables and
examines the changes over time in one group relative to the other. Much child welfare research fails
to provide such generalizable and criterion-relevant data that incorporate use of control groups. For
a discussion of the challenges in assessing the efficacy of child protection interventions, see
MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 181-200 (1988);
GERALDINE MACDONALD, EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: AN
EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO PLANNING AND EVALUATING INTERVENTIONS 19-24 (2001).

Many experts have bemoaned the lack of good child welfare research, and most remain
unconvinced that conventional forms of intervention by child protective services make a difference
in the lives of children and families, or that one approach used by child protection agencies is
superior to another. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A

NATIONAL EMERGENCY xii-xv (1990); Gary B. Melton et al., Empirical Research on Child
Maltreatment and the Law, 24 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 47 (1995); Ross A. Thompson & Brian
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expose children
to further risk of maltreatment by staff or other
84
residents.
The earliest incarnations of the child welfare system led to the
removal of large numbers of children from their homes, and the
placement of most of those children in institutional settings.8 5 Today, it
is far more likely that a child who is removed from her home will be
placed in a foster home than in an institution or other residential
facility,8 6 although older minors, and those who cross system boundaries
(that is, those exhibiting conduct consistent with that of juvenile
offenders or the symptoms of serious emotional difficulties) are more
likely to be placed in facilities rather than foster homes.
While significant attention has been paid to the coercive
intervention of the state in families under the authority of child welfare
statutes, there has been little emphasis on those families who avail
themselves of the services of their states' dependency systems
"voluntarily." I use the term "voluntarily" gingerly. While some parents
may sign "voluntary placement agreements" and temporarily surrender
custody of their children to the child welfare system, they often do so
with the threat that dependency proceedings against them will be
commenced if they do not so agree. 87 Recent evidence suggests that
others may relinquish custody solely to access otherwise unaffordable
mental health services for their children. 88 National statistics as to the

L. Wilcox, Child Maltreatment Research: Federal Support and Policy Issues, 50 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 789 (1995); Richard P. Barth & Marianne Berry, Implications of Research on the
Welfare of Children Under PermanencyPlanning,in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH REVIEW 323, 333

(Richard Barth et al. eds., 1994).
84. Paul Lerman, Child Protection and Out-of-Home Care: System Reforms and Regulating
Placements, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW

NATIONAL STRATEGY 353, 353 (Gary B. Melton & Frank D. Barry eds., 1994) [hereinafter Lerman,
Child Protection].
85. See infra notes 622-32 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 633-46 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Supportfor Children,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1619, 1629-31 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts, Kinship Care]; Amy Sinden,
"Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 345 & nn.24-25 (1999); Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We 'll Take Your
Child- The Parents'Fictional Voluntary SeparationDecision and a ProposalforChange, 65 TENN.

L. REv. 835 (1998); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest? 43 HARV. EDUC.
REv. 599, 601 (1973) (stating that "[i]f one were to use the legal standards of voluntariness and
informed consent applied in the criminal law to confessions and to the waiver of important legal
rights, many cases of relinquishment... might not be considered voluntary.").
88. See GAO, 2003, supra note 4; BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW,
RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET CHILDREN'S MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS (2000); see infra notes 307-08.
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proportion of cases initiated "voluntarily" are not available,
and there
89
state.
to
state
from
variability
substantial
be
appears to
D. The Juvenile Justice System
The modem juvenile justice system has broad discretionary latitude
to intervene in the lives of minors who violate criminal statutes (i.e.,
"delinquents") or who commit any of a series of infractions collectively
referred to as "status offenses." The range and variety of criminal
offenses is great, encompassing misdemeanors and less serious felonies
as well as serious or violent felonies. Many cases are handled informally
by police9" or diverted from the court system, 9' while others are formally
processed, leading to a dismissal of charges or an adjudication of
delinquency.
A juvenile adjudicated as delinquent is subject to a wide range of
dispositions, such as probation, suspended sentence, referral or
commitment to a mental health or substance abuse program, payment of
fines or restitution, commitment to a juvenile correctional facility, or
participation in any of the many innovative programs in existence in
various locations. 92 Increasingly, however, minors alleged to have

89. Studies conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s in California and New York City
found that approximately 50% and 58% of children in foster care in those respective jurisdictions
followed voluntary placement agreements. Mnookin, supra note 87, at 601. National data on the
proportion of cases that are grounded in "voluntary" versus coercive removals are not collected
routinely. See, e.g., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2000: ANNUAL REPORT (failing to include this as a variable tracked in
an over 300-page report of national data on child welfare placements and outcomes).
90. For example, one 1999 study indicates that police will typically use informal means (e.g.,
advising, commanding, threatening) in encounters with juveniles, arresting in only a small
percentage (13.1%) of cases. NAT'L REs. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME: JUVENILE
JUSTICE 163-64 (200 1) [hereinafter NRC, JUVENILE JUSTICE].
91. In the case of first-time and non-violent offenders, law enforcement and prosecutorial
personnel may refer the youth to any of a range of community-based programs offering alternative
services. Albert R. Roberts, The Emergence and Proliferationof Juvenile Diversion Programs, in
JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 183, 184 (Albert R. Roberts ed.,
2004); Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile
Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 142. These programs represent a
type of early intervention, with the goal of interrupting law-violating conduct without the
stigmatizing effects of the delinquency label or the deleterious concomitants of incarceration.
Diversion programs vary widely, and only some have been subjected to rigorous scientific
evaluations of efficacy. Some, however, have demonstrated positive effects, such as reductions in
future arrests. For a summary of outcome research, see NRC, JUVENILE JUSTICE, at 169-76. Some of
these programs will be discussed in greater detail within. See infra note 696 and accompanying text.
92. Albert R. Roberts, An Overview of Juvenile Justice and Juvenile Delinquency. Cases,
Definitions, Trends, and Intervention Strategies, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91,
at 5, 14-19.
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violated criminal statutes are processed as adults in criminal court rather
than in the juvenile justice system. 93 These changes reflect the "get
offenders that has become more
tough" attitude toward juvenile
94
prevalent in the last two decades.
The juvenile court also handles status offense cases. Status offenses
are a family of noncriminal infractions so named because the acts that
underlie them would not be considered offenses but for the perpetrator's
minority status.95 State statutes vary somewhat in their definitions of the
acts or patterns of conduct that fall within this category. Status offenders
may include those minors determined to be "beyond the control" of
parents or guardians 96 as well as those who violate a curfew established
by the city or county, 97 are habitually truant, 98 run away from home, 99 or
otherwise appear to be "incorrigible" by certain definitional criteria,
which may be quite vague.' ° The single largest category of violations
93. For a discussion of underlying policies and legal mechanisms permitting or mandating
transfers of juveniles to adult criminal court, see generally THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000); PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY

PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Trying Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court: An Analysis of
State Transfer Provisions(1998), availableat http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/l72836.pdf.
94. For a discussion of this "get tough" philosophy, see BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 189-244 (1999).
95. See generally Lee Teitelbaum, Status Offenses and Status Offenders, in A CENTURY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 158. Status offenders are sometimes referred to by state
statutes as "persons in need of supervision" ("PINS"), or "children in need of supervision"
("CHINS"). See, e.g., NEV. REV. ST. § 62B.320 (2004); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 7301-1.3(6)
(2004). For a more extensive discussion of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over status offenders, see
infra Part lI.B.3.
96. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(a) (2004) (also referring to this category of
minors as habitually disobedient); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(15)(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 984.03(9)(c) (2005) ("To have persistently disobeyed the reasonable and lawful demands of the
child's parents or legal custodians, and to be beyond their control despite efforts by the child's
parents or legal custodians and appropriate agencies to remedy the conditions contributing to the
behavior.").
97. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(a) (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02
(2005). For a discussion of the current legal status and efficacy of juvenile curfew laws, see Carol
M. Bast & K. Michael Reynolds, A New Look at Juvenile Curfews: Are They Effective?, CRIM. LAW
BULL., May 2003, at 5.
98. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(b) (2004) (defining habitual truancy as "four
or more truancies within one school year" or per the determination of a "school attendance review
board or probation officer"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(15)(b) (2004).
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(15)(c) (2004); FLA. ST. ANN. § 984.03(9)(a) (2005) ("[t]o
have persistently run away from the child's parents or legal custodians").
100. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(15)(d) (2004) (offering as one alternative
definition of an "incorrigible child" one who "[h]abitually behaves in such a manner as to injure or
endanger the morals or health of self or others." Status offenders may also be those minors who
engage in underage drinking, or use of drugs. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
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bringing status offenders before the court is illegal use of alcohol and
drugs by persons under the age of 21, even though those statutes
authorizing juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenders typically do
not address minors' use of such substances. 101
From its inception in 1899, the juvenile court defined its mission as
benevolent, grounded in the state's parens patriae authority to assist
those "wayward" children whose own parents, for whatever reason, had
been unable to keep them out of trouble or provide adequate care.' 0 2 It
espoused a "treatment" or rehabilitative philosophy, emphasizing the
needs of the individual child rather than the circumstances or acts that
triggered the court's intervention.103 Indeed, at its founding, the juvenile
court perceived its role as that of a sort of a "superparent. t' Consistent
with that "child-saving" mandate, intervention in the lives of minors
who had not committed crimes-status offenders-made sense to the
extent that it gave the court the opportunity to support parental authority
AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 207 (1999). For general discussion of the juvenile court's
status offender jurisdiction, its history and evolution, see FELD, supra note 94, at 166-88;
Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 158-75.
101. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100, at 166. For example, in 1996, juvenile courts in
the United States formally processed 162,000 status offense cases. Of those, 27.7% were grounded
in violations of liquor laws, 24.3% were truancy cases, 15.9% were runaway cases, 12.4% were
cases of ungovemability (i.e., beyond parental control/habitual disobedience). The remaining
percentage included the residual categories, such as "curfew violations, smoking tobacco and
violation of a valid court order." Id. This finding is consistent with other data indicating that a
substantial proportion of juveniles in juvenile correctional facilities meet the DSM-IV criteria for a
substance use disorder. See, e.g., Gail A. Wasserman et al., Assessing the Mental Health Status of
Youth in Juvenile Justice Settings, OJJDP JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL., Aug. 2004, at 3-4, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/202713.pdf. In addition, many of these individuals are
diagnosed with co-occurring mental health disorders, a phenomenon that is not limited to those
individuals who come in contact with the justice systems. Id.at 3-4; see, e.g., NAT'L MENTAL
Fact Sheet:
Substance Abuse-Dual Diagnosis, available at
HEALTH ASS'N,
http://www.nmha.org/infoctr/factsheets/03.cfm (noting that "[t]hirty-seven percent of alcohol
abusers and fifty-three percent of drug abusers also have at least one serious mental illness" and that
"[oif all people diagnosed as mentally ill, 29 percent abuse either alcohol or drugs.").
102.

See, e.g., JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL

COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 43-60 (1998); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV.L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
103. Mack, supra note 102, at 107; FELD, supra note 94, at 55-65; ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 43-45 (2d ed. 1977). Consistent with new
scientific understandings and the optimism of tum-of-the-century Progressive ideology, children
were viewed as psychologically different from adults-still developing, still malleable, and thus,
still reformable. Ronald D. Cohen, Child-Saving and Progressivism, 1885-1915, in AMERICAN
CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 273, 277-281 (Joseph M. Hawes &
N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985); NRC, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 157-58.
104. LaMar T. Empey, Introduction: The Social Construction of Childhood and Juvenile
Justice, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 1-34 (LaMar T. Empey ed.,
1979); Mack, supra note 102, at 107.
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or to substitute itself for parents perceived to ineffective in controlling
their children, particularly where it was believed that failure to do so
would lead to an escalation of the minor's norm-violating conduct.10 5 As
such, the basis for juvenile court intervention in the case of status
offenders straddles delinquency and dependency jurisdiction. While the
court's dependency jurisdiction is grounded in state disapproval of
parental conduct, and its delinquency jurisdiction is grounded in the
minor's violation of a criminal statute, status offense jurisdiction
combines censure of the minors' misbehavior with the implication of
parental inefficacy that accompanies the court's involvement. Not
surprisingly, the lines dividing the three categories of juvenile court
jurisdiction can, at times, become blurred. 10 6 Thus, at various points in
the history of the twentieth century juvenile court, minors falling into
any of these three general categories07 could be treated similarly and/or
housed together in system facilities. 1
The juvenile justice system has been the focus of substantial
criticism over the years. Many commentators challenged the unbridled
discretion of the court and the notion that the alleged parens patriae
mission renders traditional due process protections unnecessary.108
Ultimately, in a series of landmark cases beginning in 1967, the U.S.
Supreme Court extended a range of constitutional protections to
defendants in juvenile court, a trend referred to by some as the
"criminalization" or constitutionalization of the juvenile justice
system.109 Critics have also claimed that the juvenile justice system fails
to effect positive changes in the conduct or welfare of the minors with
whom it intervenes. Thus, for example, studies have failed to
demonstrate that incarceration in juvenile justice facilities has positive
effects on offender recidivism. 1 0 Rather, observers express concern that

105. Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 162.
106. Some states reconceptualized some status offenses, most typically "incorrigibility," which
is sometimes defined as being "beyond parental control," as subcategory of neglect, thus removing
these minors from classification as offenders, labeling them instead as dependent. JOHN R. SUTON,
STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981, at 216-17
(1988).
107. LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 112-14.
108. For a summary and discussion of these critiques, see FELD, supra note 94, at 79-108.
109. See infra notes 443-46 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., ROLF LOEBER & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, CHILD DELINQUENTS: DEVELOPMENT,
INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS xxvii (2001). See also RICHARD A. MENDEL, AMERICAN
YOUTH POLICY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS-AND

WHAT DOESN'T? 2 (2000), available at http://www.aypf.org/mendel/MendelRep.pdf, RICHARD E.
REDDING, JUVENILE FORENSIC EVALUATION RESOURCE CENTER, CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE
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time spent in juvenile correctional facilities only worsens juvenile
offenders' prospects for adaptive functioning after release because it
"leads to exposure to and victimization by older serious delinquent
offenders and further fuels criminogenic propensities in child
'
findings of the efficacy of
delinquents."1 11
Part VII below discusses
12
innovative alternative interventions.'
E.

The EducationalSystem

The service and intervention system that clearly reaches more
children than any other is the educational system. The components of
this network of public (federally-, state-, and locally-financed) and
private facilities have in common their general mission to educate (i.e.,
impart knowledge, develop skills, offer instruction to) our nation's youth
in order to prepare these individuals for meaningful and productive
participation as adults. 1 3 Because all states in the nation mandate that
children attend school beginning at ages five to seven through ages
sixteen to eighteen, 1 4 this system has the potential to touch the lives of
most American children.' 15 Thus, many advocate for expansion of
school-based health and mental health services so as to have the greatest
likelihood of reaching more of those who need such services.
Because of a series of federal enactments culminating with the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), public schools are
obligated to provide services to children with disabilities. 1 6 IDEA
defines "disabilities" broadly enough to include a range of emotional and
learning problems experienced by many troubled and troublesome
children, although critics argue that the definitions exclude a substantial
proportion of children who could benefit from mental health services

TREATMENTS

AND

INTERVENTIONS

FOR

JUVENILE

OFFENDERS,

available

at

http://www.ilppp.virginia.edu/Publicationsand-Reports/CharEffTreat.html.
111. LOEBER & FARRINGTON, supra note 1 10, at xxvii.
112.

See infra Part VII.

113. For an analysis of the state's and students' interests in obtaining a formal education, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114.

State

Compulsory

School

Attendance

Laws,

1NFOPLEASE

at

http://print.infoplease.com/ipa/A0 112617.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
115. The U.S. Department of Education reports that 76% of the children attending grades I
through 12 in the United States in 1999 attended public schools. STACEY BIELICK & CHRISTOPHER
CHAPMAN, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TRENDS IN THE USE OF

available
at
TO
1999,
at
iv
(2003)
SCHOOL
CHOICE:
1993
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2003031, This figure is down from 80% in 1993.
Id.The remainder of children attend private or parochial schools, or are home-schooled.
116. See infra notes 218-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and its relevant provisions.
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delivered under the auspices of the school system. These statutes and
their application to the needs of 7troubled and troublesome youth and
their families is examined below."
III.

DECONSTRUCTING SYSTEM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF
TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

Teenagers can be difficult for adults to understand in the best
circumstances .... When

poverty,

sexual

abuse,

violence,

homelessness, neglect, drug addiction, and family disorganization are
in the mix, the result is a surefire recipe for misery, distrust, and
failure ....
Absent effective treatment, children and adolescents with
mental disorders fail in school, they are bounced among foster homes,
and too often they are consigned to juvenile hall to spend their youth in
isolated confinement.118

A.

Who Are "Troubled and Troublesome" Youth?

In this Article, I refer generically to the young persons that are the
focus of my discussions as "troubled" or "troublesome." These terms
direct attention to two different and potentially salient dimensions of
these children's experiences or conduct: "troubled" emphasizes the inner
emotional distress experienced by these youth; "troublesome" highlights
the difficulties that their conduct creates for their families, schools, and
communities."1 9 Some of these children may appear be more troubled
than troublesome (for example, young persons who report being
depressed or anxious), while others may appear to be more troublesome
than troubled (for example, those who are truant, disobey their parents,
and stay out later than permitted). The use of lay terms to describe these
youth at this juncture is intentional. The distinct system-specific
nomenclatures typically employed to describe these children obscure the
substantial overlap among the children who fall within these systems'
117. See infra notes 218-40 and accompanying text.
118. Patrick Gardner, Crossing Guards Wanted. Navigating Among the Intersections of Public
Mental Health Programsfor Youth, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., July-Aug. 2001, at 178.
119. One could also refer to these youngsters as "troubling," in that their distress or conduct
often disturbs, worries, or perhaps even alarms their families and those in their communities. Other
authors have used these terms or variations on them to refer to the children who are the focus of this
Article, or some subgroup thereof. See, e.g., HOME-BASED SERVICES FOR TROUBLED CHILDREN (Ira
M. Schwartz & Philip AuClaire eds., 1995); CHERYL L. MAXSON & MALCOLM W. KLEIN,
RESPONDING TO TROUBLED YOUTH (1997); UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YOUTH

(Peter E. Leone ed., 1990); Paul Lerman, Counting Youth in Trouble in Institutions: Bringing the
UnitedStates Up to Date, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 465 (1991).
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mandates. Many of the youth served by one system satisfy the legal
criteria required to trigger the intervention of the others. This point is
critical, because key failures in public policies result from the lack of
coordination among these systems and the fragmented nature of the
resulting service delivery picture.
There have been continual increases in the use of institutional or
other out-of-home placements for troubled and troublesome youth in
America over this century, despite certain formal deinstitutionalization
policies. Because this Article seeks to understand the phenomena
contributing to this preference and to propose alternatives to it, of
greatest interest are those troubled and troublesome youth who are: (1) at
risk for institutionalization or out-of-home placement, and (2)
appropriate candidates for community-based alternatives.
The first criterion focuses on children whose emotional distress,
behavior problems, norm-violating behavior, or family difficulties place
them at risk for institutional or other out-of-home placement.t20 I am
excluding from my working definition youth whose difficulties do not
rise to a level that would trigger an out-of-home placement. There is no
question that the line between the included and excluded according to
this criterion is somewhat blurry, since many factors other than the
child's own emotional experiences and conduct affect whether that child
is at risk for an out-of-home placement. That blurriness, however, is not
of concern here, because I do not propose that my criteria of inclusion
and exclusion take on any formal legal significance. They simply
highlight the characteristics of the population for which the analyses and
conclusions set forth in this Article are most relevant.
As used here, the terms "troubled and troublesome youth" include
only those youth appropriate for community-based alternatives.
Specifically, the terms do not include juveniles who have engaged in
serious criminal offenses, such as homicide, aggravated assault, rape,
robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, and other serious felonies or attempts
thereof. The term "troublesome" is a wholly inappropriate descriptor for
conduct that causes, or risks causing, substantial harm to others, in that it
connotes behavior that is burdensome or bothersome, but not highly
120. The term institution is defined infra Part VI.B and includes admissions to hospitals or
residential treatment centers for the purpose of receiving intensive mental health treatment,
residency in a juvenile detention or correctional facility or other residential options used by juvenile
justice authorities, placement in child welfare or foster care institutions or other group settings. Outof-home placements include institutional placements as well as placements in foster homes. Implicit
in the use of the term "at risk for" out-of-home placement is the inclusion of children who have
already been placed outside of their home under the auspices of one of the service and intervention
systems discussed in this Article.
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dangerous. Identification of precisely which crimes should fall within
the category of "serious" will not be resolved here; I am merely
sketching the general parameters that define our group of interest. This
exclusion is important, however, because it relates to the underlying
legal basis for the child's removal from the home and community. My
focus here is on youth for whom state intervention is justified primarily
on parens patriae or "socialization-oriented" police power grounds, not
those whose incarceration is grounded in "public safety-oriented" police
power grounds. 21 In other words, the basis for removal from the home
and community for troubled and troublesome youth is either the
promotion of the youth's own welfare for his or her own sake or the
promotion of the youth's welfare for the sake of society-at-large, which
has an interest in fostering "the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens .... ,12 2 Recognizing that parens
patriaeand police power goals typically converge in the legal regulation
of children and families, I define my target group as those for whom the
cited purposes serve as the primary-even if not sole-justifications for
status
state intervention. Thus, this group includes nonoffenders,
123
offenders, and offenders committing "minor" criminal offenses.
B. Viewing Troubledand Troublesome Youth Through the Lenses of
the Mental Health/Health Care, Child Welfare, Juvenile Justice, and
EducationalSystems
The title of a 1986 Florida study-"Mad, Bad, Sad, Can't Add'alludes to the overlap in populations of youth served by the mental
121. For further discussion of this distinction in police power justifications for minors'
incarceration, see discussion in infra Part V.B. Generally, however, once a juvenile commits a
serious offense threatening public safety, decisions about the individual's sentence are influenced
primarily by the factors presently guiding punishment in our criminal justice system: the need to
protect the public through incapacitation of offenders; the potential deterrent effects of certain
sanctions; the community's desire for retribution; and the goal of educating the public as to the
parameters of law-abiding conduct through denunciation of the criminal violations. See KATE E.
BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2005).

122. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
123. I do not place the dividing line for inclusion versus exclusion between felonies and
misdemeanors. Some felonies (such as those related to substance abuse, larceny committed in
nonviolent circumstances) are likely to be more appropriate for parens patriae or socializationoriented police power intervention 'than punitive criminal intervention. A more nuanced case-bycase determination which considers the circumstances of the criminal conduct is more useful than
bright lines. Juvenile offenders committing many minor offenses still evoke the juvenile justice
system's traditional rehabilitation orientation. Furthermore, while the line between minors'
commission of non-serious and serious offenses may be blurry at times, research reveals that the
lines between status offenders and delinquents who commit minor criminal offenses is even blurrier.
See supra Part lII.A.
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124
health, juvenile justice, child welfare, and educational systems.
According to certain strands of sociological thought, 125 the use of
different labels to describe identical or similar aspects of human
functioning or interaction merely reflect alternative social constructions.
Thus, the "'same' behavior manifested in different circumstances can be
defined in various ways depending upon the system of classification
applied by the particular group ....These categories are not constant
but change according to the dominant modes of thinking .... In
other words, depending upon the "system of classification applied by the
particular group" doing the labeling, troubled and troublesome youth
might be viewed in any of several different ways.1 27 Lay persons as well
as professionals within the major service and intervention systems may
view the same troubled and troublesome behavior of a young person in
very different ways. 128
The use of one set of labels or another may serve a range of
purposes. At a very basic level, the labels help us organize and give
meaning to our observations. As human beings, we are always trying to
make sense of our world, and conceptual frameworks assist in this
process. According to sociologists, deviance designations also serve
important social goals, such as maintaining social control, 129 enabling

124. ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN & KRISTA KUTASH, FLA. MENTAL HEALTH INST., MAD, BAD,
SAD, CAN'T ADD? FLORIDA ADOLESCENT AND CHILD TREATMENT STUDY (FACTS): EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (1986).
125. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W.
SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 20-28 (1992); EARL
RUBINGTON & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, DEVIANCE: THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE (6th ed.
1996); MALCOM SPECTOR & JOHN 1. KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2001);
Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designationsof Deviance, 15
SOCIAL PROBS. 175 (1967).
126. ALLAN V. HORWITZ, CREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 7-8 (2002) (interpreting the work of
sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and Michel Foucault).
127. Id.at7.
128. For example, the conduct of a hypothetical 15 year-old boy who tries to shoot a live bird
with a B.B. gun in his backyard in a residential neighborhood may be viewed differently by several

sets of hypothetical parents and/or neighbors. Such behavior might be viewed as: (1)a manifestation
of immaturity and poor judgment-but sufficiently within the scope of normal adolescent mistakes
to be addressed solely through parental discipline and guidance; (2) a symptom of a mental disorder
requiring a formal mental health evaluation; (3) dangerous law-breaking conduct necessitating a call

to the police; or (4) a healthy emulation of adult role modeling in a family where the father's hobby
is duck-hunting (although the parents may point out to the child that a residential neighborhood is
an inappropriate locale for such conduct because of the presence of other people and beloved pets).
129. That is, they provide one "means by which society secures adherence to social norms;
specifically, how it minimizes, eliminates, or normalizes deviant behavior." CONRAD & SCHNEIDER,
supranote 125, at 7. While informal social control mechanisms operate in a variety of contexts such
as ordinary interpersonal interactions (for example, someone who is talking loudly on a cell phone
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particular groups or individuals to enhance their status and authority in
society, 30 or promoting certain social attitudes and values' 3 1 which may
change over time.' 32 Deviance designations may be influenced by a
range of interrelated legal and economic factors, with alternate
constructions used by policymakers or professionals to create eligibility
for or exclusion from certain services, or to authorize the use of
particular social or legal interventions. 133 Or, governmental entities may
prefer deviance designations that shift the cost of providing services to
others (for example, other individuals,34 groups, agencies, branches of
government, or levels of government). 1
Regardless of the labels used for troubled and troublesome youth,
however, their involvement with one child service and intervention
system or another typically signals that someone-whether it is the
in a restaurant may receive a series of disapproving looks from other patrons and may be asked by a
restaurant employee or another customer to speak more quietly), formal social control mechanisms
operate at a societal level "to secure adherence to a particular set of values and norms." Id. at 8.
"[T]he criminal justice system, with the police, courts, correctional facilities... [function as] the
major institution of social control. Other institutions such as education, welfare, the mass media,
and medicine are also frequently depicted as having social control functions." Id.
130. Id. at 21. For example, social adoption of the construction of troubled and troublesome
youth as "mentally ill" empowers medical professionals: hospitals are created and funded; mental
health professionals are authorized to make critical decisions about who receives what types of
interventions; psychiatrists are granted substantial influence over decisions about who will be
deprived of liberty through involuntary admission to hospitals. "Medicalization" of deviance in this
instance, according to Conrad and Schneider's perspective, allows the psychiatric profession to
benefit through prestige, political power, and opportunities for financial gain. Id. at 8-9, 28-37.
131. Deviance designations may, therefore, have "symbolic" implications for society. Gusfield,
supra note 125, at 179; JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE

AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 180-88 (2d ed. 1986). The dominance of certain humanitarian
values, such as benevolent care for those who are "ill" may encourage the "medicalization" of
deviance. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 125, at 1-16.

132. Changes in social attitudes often lead to shifts in deviance designations. Homosexuality,
once viewed as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association, is no longer categorized
as such because political opposition to that classification, combined with growing social tolerance
of differences in sexual orientation, overpowered the efforts of those who would have preferred that
deviance designation to remain unchanged. See, e.g., MARK TAUSIG ET AL., A SOCIOLOGY OF
MENTAL ILLNESS 144 (2d ed. 2004). Other types of conduct, once viewed primarily as moral
failings, such as "excessive" use of alcohol are now treated primarily as products of mental disease
(i.e., alcoholism) or as heinous criminal conduct if occurring while engaged in driving an
automobile. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKINGDRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER (1981).

133. For example, federal aid may serve as a "carrot" to induce state implementation of
policies requiring adoption of particular deviance designations. Statutes that tighten or loosen
substantive criteria or that inject or reduce procedural requirements necessary for the application of
the labels may promote a shift in constructions that enables those applying the law to find a way to
avoid the results intended by the policy changes. See, e.g., infra Part VII.
134. See, e.g., GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF
AMERICA'S MENTALLY ILL 118-24,287-94(1994).
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child, her family, or others-perceives a problem and/or is suffering.
Thus, the existence of a problem is real. 35 To the extent that the labels
assigned direct us to an appropriate 36 response to the problem, they are
of use. To the extent that they do not, new conceptualizations are
needed.
The following is an excerpt from a Washington Post story about a
particular troubled and troublesome child. No name is provided for him
in the article, so I will supply one:
["Donny"] is 9 years old and mentally ill. He suffers from attention
deficit disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression
[resulting from years of child abuse], a sorry cocktail of problems that
afflict some young people. He acts out, getting into fights at school,
and one day he threatens the life of another student. The school puts
him in an ambulance and sends him to the emergency room at Boston
Medical Center. There he is evaluated by a psychiatric team
37 that
recommends immediate hospitalization in a psychiatric facility. 1
Below, I examine how professionals in the various child service and
intervention systems (mental health, juvenile justice, child welfare, and
education) might view troubled and troublesome youth in general, and
"Donny" in particular.
1. The Mental Health/Health Care "Systems"
The "medical model" has become dominant in the Western
conceptualization of psychological problems. It has been widely
employed for the purpose of most formal legal, economic, and social
determinations surrounding those now viewed as having "mental
disorders." It imports standard medical terminology 138 and the medical
view of the disease process 139 into formulations about psychological
135. Despite the challenges of labeling, the emotional, physical, and financial toll on families
struggling to raise the most troubled and troublesome youth, and the distress experienced by the
youth themselves, can be acute. For examples of some of the scenarios experienced by these youth
and their families see Nowhere to Turn: Must Parents Relinquish Custody in Order to Secure
Mental Health Servicesfor Their Children?:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 108th Cong. 12-15 (2003).
136. An "appropriate" response is one that maximizes effectiveness consistent with the core
values discussed in Part V of this Article.
137. Trafford, supra note 9, at Z05.
138. Language used to describe physical diseases is imported, for example, etiology, diagnosis,
symptoms, pathology, morbidity, prognosis, treatment.
139. With the view that behavioral and interpersonal problems are diseases, the "medical
model" conceptualizes such problems as: having discrete and discemable etiologies; being
susceptible to precise identification and differentiation (from one another and from nondisease
states) through diagnosis; and, (once identified) responsive to particular treatments that have been
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problems. According to the medical view of deviance, most problematic
forms of human functioning are the result of physiologically,
anatomically, or genetically based illnesses that affect the brain, thereby
altering perceptions, emotions, cognitions, and/or behavior. These
manifestations, called symptoms, are merely the observable evidence of
the disease process.
The past decades have been rich with controversy, however, as to
the "true" nature and cause of these conditions. While an in-depth
review of the predominant perspectives is beyond the scope of this
Article, 40 it is worth noting that the medical model has been rejected by
a few renegades within psychiatry's own ranks, 14 1 and by those who
adopt the sociological formulations of social constructions. 142 Academic
psychology has never fully embraced the medical model, focusing more
on interactions between individuals' inherent characteristics and the
developed for diseases within those categories. George W. Albee, Emerging Concepts of Mental
Illness and Models of Treatment. The Psychological Point of View, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 870,
870 (1969); Paul H. Blaney, Implications of the Medical Model and Its Alternatives, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 911, 911 (1975). The basis of the model's diagnostic system is that the observation of
certain symptoms can permit one to generalize more globally about the individual's functioning. See
A. Lazare, Hidden Conceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 345, 346
(1973). Thus, on the basis of limited information, a clinician makes "predictions" about other
features of the "disease" process that have not been directly observed or reported. Joseph Zubin,
Classification of the Behavior Disorders,18 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 373, 373-76 (1967). Historically,
there have been two schools of the medical model within psychiatry: the organic school and the
psychodynamic school. The organic perspective views mental disorders as actual physical diseases
with biological origins. See, e.g., Harold 1. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock, Neurochemistry of
Behavior, in I COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 177 (Harold I. Kaplan et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1980); Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock, Neurophysiology of Behavior, in 1
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 189; John D. Rainer, Genetics and

Psychiatry, in I COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 135. The psychodynamic
school views mental disorders as having psychological causes, such as unresolved Oedipal conflicts.
See, e.g., William W. Meissner, Theories of Personality and Psychopathology. Classical
Psychoanalysis, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 631. While the
dynamic school does not presume a physical basis for behavioral and interpersonal problems, it does
adopt the medical terminology and framework, and thus implies that psychological problems can be
viewed in a manner analogous to, or metaphorically as, physical illnesses.
In recent decades, particularly in light of increasing evidence of the role biological factors
play in the development of conditions such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, the efficacy of
certain psychopharmacological agents in controlling some of these conditions, and the reluctance of
managed care organizations and third-party insurers to pay for long-term psychodynamic treatment,
the organic model has clearly become the predominant one in psychiatry. See, e.g., PETER TYRER &
DEREK STEINBERG, MODELS FOR MENTAL DISORDER: CONCEPTUAL MODELS IN PSYCHIATRY 101-

40 (3d ed. 1998).
140. For such an analysis, see DONALD J. K1ESLER, BEYOND THE DISEASE MODEL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (1999).
141. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SzASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A
THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).

142. See supra notes 129-34.
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143
psychosocial environment in the development of human functioning,
and often rejecting psychiatry's inclination to find pathology in certain
behavior patterns. 144
Although many disciplinary distinctions still remain, it is fair to say
that modem scholarship in both psychology and psychiatry recognizes
that the nature and causes of behavioral problems not only vary from one
category to the next, 145 but also from individual to individual. 46 Modem
theoretical models take into account the interaction of a myriad of
biological and social factors that may contribute to the development,
manifestation, and course of what are generally referred to as emotional
or behavioral problems, or mental disorders. 47 The specialty of

143. For a helpful analysis of the differences between the "medical model" and "psychosocial
model" and the disciplinary preferences of psychiatry versus psychology, see Randall C. Wyatt &
Norman Livson, The Not So Great Divide? Psychologists and Psychiatrists Take Stands on the
Medical andPsychosocial Models of Mental Illness, 25 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 120 (1994).
These two models not only represent divergent etiological perspectives and treatment
modalities but also suggest the social roles of practitioner and patients ....
The medical model conceptualizes a patient's maladaptive psychological, emotional, and
interpersonal experiences primarily in terms of organic, biochemical, or physiological
etiology, leading its adherents to advocate biochemical or physical methods of
treatment.... The psychosocial model, by contrast, conceptualizes emotional
disturbances as primarily the consequence of social, psychological, interpersonal,
cultural, and ethical conflicts.
Id. at 120.
144. One example of this divergence between psychiatry and psychology is reflected in their
historical positions on the pathology versus normality of homosexuality. Stephen F. Morin & Esther
D. Rothblum, Removing the Stigma: Fifteen Years of Progress, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 947 (1991).
The American Psychiatric Association had classified homosexuality as a mental disorder in its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, and only partially retreated from that position with revisions in
1973. Id. at 947. Not until 1987 was sexual orientation removed completely from the Manual. Id. In
that intervening period, however, the Psychological Association actively protested psychiatry's
characterization of same-sex relationships as pathological. Id.; see also AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N,
RESOLUTIONS

RELATED

TO

LESBIAN,

GAY,

AND

BISEXUAL

ISSUES,

available

at

http://www.apa.org/pi/reslgbc.html (last visited June 15, 2005).
145. For example, there is now substantial professional consensus that schizophrenia and
bipolar disorders do have biological, perhaps even genetic, bases. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (Text Rev., 4th ed. 2000)

[hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. By contrast, conditions such as posttraumatic stress disorders or
adjustment disorders are, first and foremost, responses to life events and circumstances. See id. For
modem perspectives on the interaction of biological and psychosocial factors in causing the
manifestations of various psychological disorders, see supra note 143.
146. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145.
147. See generally NATURE, NURTURE & PSYCHOLOGY (Robert Plomin & Gerald E. McCleam
eds., 1993). Researchers are only beginning to appreciate the complex interaction of genetics, other
physiological influences, and social environment and the reciprocal influences these factors may
have on one another. An interdisciplinary panel of scientists recently stated: "Human development
is shaped by a dynamic and continuous interaction between biology and experience." NAT'L RES.
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developmental psychopathology
understanding of how

has

contributed

much

to

our

complex, multilayered interactions of specific characteristics of
the child (including biological, psychological, and genetic
factors), his or her environment (including parent, sibling, and
family relations, peer and neighborhood factors, school and
community factors, and the larger social-cultural context), and
the specific manner in which these factors interact with and
shape each other over the course of development. 148
The medical model remains dominant in the field of mental health,
however, at least to the extent that access to services or their financing
occurs within or via the health care system and depends upon
recognition of a condition akin to an illness by the various gatekeepers
(i.e., mental health professionals, managed care organizations, and
public and private insurers). Thus, the official "lens" of the mental
health system is this diagnostic system. 149 The most commonly-used
diagnostic criteria are those set forth in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) which has gone
through multiple revisions since its first edition in 1952, and has most

COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 3 (Jack P. Shonkoff& Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).

There exist several interdisciplinary specialties focusing primarily on the interaction
between life experience and biology. For example, those psychologists and physicians who study
behavioral genetics
study variation in behavior as it is affected by genes .... Scientists realize that genes by
themselves do not control behavior. Genes enable organisms to respond to and use what
is around them in their environments. At the same time, environments influence the
actions of genes .... As a genetic term, environment means all influences other than
inherited factors... [, which can include:] family and friends, home and
[Also included are
workplace,.... specific experiences from everyday life ....
biological environmental factors such as:] nutrients, . . . viruses, bacteria, toxins, and
other products that affect the body during prenatal development and throughout life.
CATHERINE BAKER, AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SC., BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO How GENES AND ENVIRONMENTS INTERACT THROUGH DEVELOPMENT TO
SHAPE DIFFERENCES IN MOOD, PERSONALITY, AND INTELLIGENCE (2004), available at

Another formulation (the diathesis-stress
http://www.aaas.org/spp/bgenes/publications.shtml.
model) views the manifestation of behavioral disorders as a product of an interaction among various
biological and environmental risk factors (diatheses) and various situational stressors. See, e.g.,
Victoria M. McKeever & Maureen E. Huff, A Diathesis-Stress Model of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder."Ecological, Biological, and Residual Stress Pathways, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 237, 238
(2003).
148.

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 127.

149. No separate "lens" for the "health care system" is discussed here because the mental
health system is treated as a component of the health care system, mental health as a component of
health, and mental illnesses as types of diseases within the larger category of diseases.
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recently been revised in 2000 with the title: Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IVTR).150 The DSM-IV-TR defines a mental disorder as:
[A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present
distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one
or more important areas of functioning) .... In addition, this
syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally
sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a
loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered
a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction in the individual .... 151

The use of the term "mental disorder" in this Article refers to those
syndromes or patterns described in the DSM, since that is the generally
accepted meaning of the scientific and professional literature. The DSM
system has been the subject of criticism over the
years,1 52 including its
53
1
problems.
adolescent
and
child
classification of
Viewed through the lens of the DSM, many of the problems putting
troubled and troublesome youth at risk of out-of-home placement are
consistent with a formal diagnosis. And while we would expect a DSM
diagnosis assigned to children treated in a mental health facility, children
subject to intervention by the juvenile justice, criminal justice or child
welfare systems are often viewed as satisfying DSM criteria as well. For
example, some children who violate criminal statutes might be
diagnosed as having a conduct disorder, 154 and some children maltreated
150.

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual has been revised

periodically to integrate changing perspectives and advancing knowledge.
151. Id. at xxxi.
152. Criticisms focus on the heavy influence of the medical model in the DSM and the lack of
underlying theory or empirical evidence supporting the classification system. See, e.g., Mary L.
Malik & Larry E. Beutler, The Emergence of Dissatisfaction with the DSM, in RETHINKING THE
DSM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 5-6 (Larry E. Beutler & Mary L. Malik eds., 2002).

153. See, e.g., Peter S. Jensen & Kimberly Hoagwood, The Book of Names: DSM-IV in
Context, 9 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 231 (1997); Ann Doucette, Child and Adolescent
Diagnosis: The Need for a Model-Based Approach, in RETHINKING THE DSM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 152, at 201.

154. Conduct disorders are defined generally by "a repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior
in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated,"
requiring manifestation of at least three instances of behavior falling within any of the following
categories: aggression to people or animals (e.g., often bullies, threatens, or intimidates others, often
initiates physical fights, has used a weapon, has been physically cruel to people or animals, has
stolen while confronting a victim, has forced someone into sexual activity) deliberate destruction of
property; deceitfulness or theft (e.g., breaking into someone else's property, lies to or "cons" others,
steals nontrivial items without confronting the victim), or serious violations of rules (including, but
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by their parents might be diagnosed as having56 posttraumatic stress
disorder' 55 or other DSM-IV- TR mental disorders.'
So, how would Donny.57 be viewed through the lens of the mental
health system? The Washington Post writer has already told us that
Donny suffers from attention deficit disorder, 5 8 post-traumatic stress
disorder, 159 and depression,' 60 all three of which can be found in the
DSM-IV-TR. She has also concluded that Donny is "mentally ill," most
likely with the help of the psychiatrists who are seeking Donny's
hospitalization. Donny's academic problems, aggressive conduct, and
threats of violence are all likely to be viewed by mental health
professionals as symptoms of Donny's mental illness. The child abuse
Donny experienced is likely to be viewed as partly responsible for his
mental illness. In other words, all of the maladaptive patterns of
behaviors and emotions fit neatly within traditional psychiatric
formulations of psychopathology and mental disorder. Consistent with
such formulations, therefore, admission to a psychiatric hospital follows
logically as the intervention of choice to deal with a child such as
Donny, who presents to a hospital emergency room in crisis.

not limited to, running away from home or frequent truancy beginning before age 13). DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 145, at 93-99.
155. For a discussion of the criteria for diagnosing posttraumatic stress disorder, see id. at 463-

68.
156. Research reveals that children who have been subjected to abuse, neglect, or exposed to
domestic violence frequently develop symptoms that might lead to a diagnosis of any of several
disorders. See, e.g., Weithom, Protecting Children,supra note 77, at 4-7.
157. See supratext accompanying note 137.
158. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145, at 85-93.
159. Id. at 463-68.
160. Id. at 345-82.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

Table 1: Presenting Problems of Youth Admitted to Mental Health
Inpatient and Residential Treatment Center Programs in The United
States in 1997161
Psychiatric
Residential
Treatment Center
Inpatient
for Emotionally
Settings
Disturbed
(N=286,176)
Children
(N=65,949)
1
62
%
Presenting Problems
%
Family problems
Depressed or anxious mood 163
School coping
Aggression
Suicidality
Abuse or neglect victim
Alcohol or drug abuse
Skill deficits
Social withdrawal
Delinquent behavior' 64

47.3
64.5
44.4
48.7
55.4
20.3
25.7
10.1
17.0
24.5

72.4
55.7
57.2
66.2
27.8
47.2
31.2
23.7
19.7
55.6

And, indeed, Donny's constellation of symptoms is not that uncommon
in the population of troubled and troublesome youth who end up as
residents in mental health facilities. For example, Table 1 lists the
"presenting problems"' 165 of persons under age 18 admitted to inpatient
and residential mental health facilities during 1997.166 For our purposes
161. Kathleen J. Pottick et al., Children and Adolescents Admitted to Specialty Mental Health
Care Programsin the United States, 1986 and 1997, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, at
314, 322 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., 2004). The youth population
includes all children and adolescents under age 18. Id.
162. Percentages do not add up to 100% because multiple presenting problems could be coded
for each child.
163. This category includes depressed mood, eating disturbance, post-traumatic stress, phobia,
grief and loss, sleep problems, anxiety, and self-harm.
164. This category includes runaway, fire-setting, delinquency, abuse perpetrator, sexual
aggression, and involvement with the juvenile justice system.
165. The phrase "presenting problems" generally refers to the complaints described by patients
(or in the case of children, their parents and or other adults aS well) as motivating the contact with
the professional, agency, or institution.
166. The year 1997 is the most recent for which national admission data are available. It is
useful here to discuss the categories of facilities characterized as mental health organizations for the
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here, note that, like Donny, substantial proportions of the children
admitted to these two types of facilities experienced symptoms of
depression, had been abused or neglected, experienced difficulties in
school, and displayed signs of aggression. One might also characterize
the abuse Donny suffered as evidence of family problems. Furthermore,
if Donny's school had called the police rather than an ambulance when
Donny got into fights at school, Donny might have been adjudicated as
delinquent, as had many of the children whose presenting problems were
summarized in Table 1. Thus, given the data reported in that Table, the
Boston Medical Center psychiatrists responded to Donny's case in a
manner that was entirely consistent with generally accepted practice in
their profession.
But a more important question to ask is: What happens after Donny
is admitted to a psychiatric facility and treated? It is the answer to this
question that is the most disappointing and which leads us to search for
alternative solutions. The psychiatric hospital may be able to stabilize
Donny's symptoms by placing him on medications for his attention
deficit disorder,1 67 his depression, and the anxiety that is typically a
component of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [hereinafter PTSD], and
may be able to quell his aggressive conduct and threats thereof while he
purpose of reporting in Table 1. "Psychiatric inpatient settings" includes hospitals which primarily
provide "24-hour inpatient care and treatment in a hospital setting to persons with mental illnesses
in a hospital setting" and "may be under State, county, private for profit, or private nonprofit
auspices," and also includes general hospitals with a separate psychiatric service. Appendix A:
Sources and Qualificationsfor Datafrom the Survey of Mental Health Organizations,in MENTAL
HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, 270 app. (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds.,

2004). Whereas the hospital settings, in principle, focus more on short-term intervention, residential
treatment centers for emotionally disturbed children, or "RTCs," by contrast, are viewed as
providing longer-term residential care. DHHS provides the following definitions that elaborate on
these distinctions:
Inpatient hospitalization: Mental health treatment provided in a hospital setting 24 hours
a day. Inpatient hospitalization provides: (1) short-term treatment in cases where a child
is in crisis and possibly a danger to his/herself or others, and (2) diagnosis and treatment
when the patient cannot be evaluated or treated appropriately in an outpatient setting.
Residential treatment centers: Facilities that provide treatment 24 hours a day and can
usually serve more than 12 young people at a time. Children with serious emotional
disturbances receive constant supervision and care. Treatment may include individual,
group, and family therapy; behavior therapy; special education; recreation therapy; and
medical services. Residential treatment is usually more long-term than inpatient
hospitalization....
U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GLOSSARY OF TERMS, CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL
available
at
http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/CAHEALTH,
0005/default.asp.
167. For the formal diagnostic definition and criteria of attention deficit disorder, see DSM-IVTR, supra note 145, at 85-93.
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is in residence. Yet, there is little empirical evidence that the psychiatric
168
hospitalization will have a longer-term impact on his functioning.
Furthermore, once discharged, there will be little in the way of
noninstitutional mental health service available for him, other than
monthly medication checks with the psychiatrist at a local hospital clinic
or community mental health center. He is unlikely to be able to function
without disruption in school. As discussed below,' 69 his school may
determine that he is "socially maladjusted," and thus not eligible for
assistance for his emotional problems under the federal statute requiring
school systems to provide individualized educational and related
services to children with emotional disturbances: the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. 170 As for his living situation, he will return
either to the family setting in which he was abused, to a foster home, or
to a group home in the community. Immediately below, this Article
explores his case through the lens of the child welfare system, a system
with which he has undoubtedly had contact.
2. The Child Welfare System
The modem child welfare system is primarily concerned with
children whose family situations place them at risk of physical, sexual,
or emotional abuse or neglect, although most children do not come to the
attention of the child welfare system until after they have experienced
abuse or neglect. In theory, the system intervenes to protect these
children from future maltreatment, and tries to remediate the family
situation so that children can safely remain with their natural families. If
the court has removed the children from their homes as part of a safety
plan, child protection workers strive for reunification between the
children and their families, unless the juvenile court determines that such
7
reunification is not in the child's best interests.' '
168. The Surgeon General's Report provides a concise summary of the relevant research which
reveals that there is little evidence of efficacy of psychiatric hospitalization or admission to
residential treatment centers. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 169-71. While
recognizing the need for some children in crisis to be removed temporarily from the home or
community, the Report notes that there simply is no support for the proposition that these residential
interventions are as or more effective than community-based alternatives. Id. at 169-79.
169. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
170. See infta notes 218-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and its relevant provisions.
171. For a general discussion of the philosophy of the modem child welfare system regarding
reunification of families, see Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN:
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE 95 (2004). If the court determines that reunification is not

in the child's best interests, the rights of the parents may be terminated by the court, freeing the
child for adoption by other parties. See Mark F. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home:
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Formally, these children are labeled as "dependents," a reflection of
the fact that the juvenile court has supplanted the authority of the
children's parents with its own. Consistent with the findings that these
children have been or are likely to be maltreated by their caregivers, the
child welfare system views these children as victims. These children
would not be under the jurisdiction of the system but for their parents'
failure to adequately fulfill their duties to protect, nurture, and support
their minor children. Thus, the children's suffering is viewed as the
unfortunate result of their parents' failings.
Recent scholarship has revealed that a substantial proportion of
children who are under the jurisdiction of the child welfare system
emerge from these experiences with a range of cognitive, social, and
72
behavioral problems, meeting the criteria of various DSM diagnoses.1
Furthermore, the data presented in Table 1173 reveal that 20.3% of
children admitted to inpatient psychiatric units in 1997, and almost ha/f
(47.2%) of children admitted to residential treatment centers for
emotionally disturbed children, had been victims of child abuse or
neglect. These statistics support the notion that there is, indeed,
substantial overlap between the populations served by these two child
service and intervention systems.
These findings of a high incidence of psychological problems in the
population of children who have experienced abuse or neglect should not
be surprising. While one of the justifications for state intervention in the
Adoption and Guardianship, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER
CARE 115 (2004).

172. See, e.g., PANEL ON RES. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 208-23 (1993); Jane Timmons-Mitchell et al., PostTraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms in Child Sexual Abuse Victims and Their Mothers, 6 J. OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1 (1997); Lisa M. Linning & Christopher A. Kearney, Post-TraumaticStress
Disorder in Maltreated Youth: A Study of Diagnostic Comorbidity and Child Factors, 19 J. OF
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1087 (2004); Symptoms associated with PTSD have been diagnosed in
13% to 51% of children exposed to domestic violence. B.B. ROBBIE ROSSMAN ET AL., CHILDREN
AND INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF EXPOSURE 37 (2000). Children who have suffered
extreme neglect in infancy or early childhood, or who have had so many changes in caregivers so as
to "prevent formation of stable attachments" may be diagnosed with a "Reactive Attachment
Disorder." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145, at 127-30. "The essential feature of [this disorder] is
markedly disturbed and developmentally inappropriate social relatedness in most contexts that
begins before age 5 years and is associated with grossly pathological care." Id. at 127. The
diagnostic criteria actually cite "frequent changes in foster care" as one of several alternative
circumstances that might give rise to the disorder. Specifically, "pathogenic care" can be evidenced
by: "(1) persistent disregard of the child's basic emotional needs for comfort, stimulation, and
affection[;] (2) persistent disregard of the child's basic physical needs[; or] (3) repeated changes of
primary caregiver that prevent formation of stable attachments (e.g., frequent changes in foster
care)." Id. at 130.
173. See supranote 161, Table 1.
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family through the child protection system is to protect children from the
physical ramifications of maltreatment, another justification, albeit less
commonly articulated, is the protection of these children from
psychological harm. Assuming children survive physical abuse or
neglect-that their bones heal, that they recover from malnutrition, that
they do not get a sexually transmitted disease or physical wounds from
sexual abuse-the long-term effects that will remain with them for the
rest of their lives are primarily psychological. 174 Children who have been
maltreated and are placed out of their homes by child protection services
face risks not only from the abuse or neglect they have experienced, but
also from the "trauma of separation from [their] biological
family.
,175 Thus, while some out-of-home placements may protect
children from exposure to additional abuse or neglect, children removed
from the home "are a particularly vulnerable group because they have
experienced both a disturbed family situation and separation from their
natural parents.' 76
In light of these findings, one would anticipate a close collaboration
between the mental health and child welfare systems in response to the
potentially deleterious psychological concomitants of the underlying
family circumstances that have led to child welfare system involvement,
and to address any negative effects that removal from the home,
separation from parents, and/or changes in foster care placements might
trigger. Yet, such collaboration is not only atypical, it is relatively
rare. 177 Unfortunately, some children under the jurisdiction of the child
174. In recent years, psychologists studying this phenomenon have concluded that the "core
component" of all forms of child abuse or neglect is psychological. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Navarre,
Psychological Maltreatment: The Core Component of Child Abuse,

in PSYCHOLOGICAL

MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 45 (Maria R. Brassard et al. eds., 1987); Stuart N. Hart
et al., Psychological Maltreatment, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 72

(John Briere et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter APSAC HANDBOOK]; Stuart N. Hart et al., Evidence for
the Effects of Psychological Maltreatment, I J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 27, 31, 48-50 (1998)
[hereinafter Evidence]. "Presently available analyses of child maltreatment impact data for physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and physical neglect, suggest that the vast majority of the negative
consequences of maltreatment are psychological in nature .... " Evidence, supra, at 48. Robin A.
McGee & David A. Wolfe, Psychological Maltreatment: Towardan OperationalDefinition, 3 DEV.
& PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3, 4-5 (1991).
175. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 16-17 (1993).

176. d. at 17.
177. See, e.g., Barbara Bums et al., Mental Health Needs and Access to Mental Health Services
by Youth Involved with Child Welfare: A National Survey, 43 J. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT

PSYCHIATRY 960, 961, 969 (2004); Laurel K. Leslie et al., ComprehensiveAssessments for Children
EnteringFoster Care: A National Perspective, 112 PEDIATRICS 134 (2003); American Academy of
Pediatrics, DevelopmentalIssues for Young Children in Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 1145 (2000);
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: HEALTH NEEDS OF MANY CHILDREN ARE UNKNOWN AND

UNMET (HDHS-05-114), availableat http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95114.pdf.
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welfare system have not only bounced from one foster care placement to
another, but have been in and out of various psychiatric institutions as
well. The failure of the state to create stability for some of these children
through provision of intensive community-based services is the focus of
the case of Rosie D. v. Swift, class action litigation that is proceeding in
Massachusetts. Rosie's experiences are described as follows:
Rosie D. is a thirteen year old girl who suffered sexual and physical
abuse prior to her pre-adoptive placement in 1993. Rosie experienced
at least eight temporary placements by the Department of Social
Services before she was placed with Mr. and Mrs. D, just before her
fifth birthday. When Rosie began banging her head against the wall
and pulling out her hair, Mr. and Mrs. D. desperately contacted DSS
for assistance, to no avail. Within weeks of beginning kindergarten,
they were told to remove her from school because of her aggressive
behavior. She was forced to spend hours a day in restraints. Over the
next six years, Rosie was institutionalized at numerous facilities for
extended periods of time, primarily due to the lack of appropriate
home-based services to address her serious mental health condition.

[Although Rosie's adoptive parents wished to keep her at home, Rosie
spent substantial time in psychiatric and residential treatment
institutions because Mr. and Mrs. D.] "were unable to manage her
mental health needs without additional assistance." [As part of a classaction suit, her family is seeking] "intensive, around-the-clock, homethe further deterioration of her condition
based services" [to prevent 78
and future hospitalizations]. 1
Rosie is fortunate to have adoptive parents. For most troubled and
troublesome youth in the child welfare system, permanent placement
with a well-functioning family is an elusive goal. Troubled and
troublesome children typically have special needs that cannot be met by
foster parents without special training and access to appropriate
supportive services. Thus, typically, these children experience repeated
placement fails, compounding the
changes in placement, as each
179
children's emotional difficulties.
178. Complaint, Rosie D. v. Swift, No. 02-1604 (D. Mass. 2001); see infra notes 254, 260 and
accompanying text for further discussion.
179. In Braam v. Washington, a class of foster children whose placements had been changed
three or more times brought suit against the Department of Social Services, claiming that the state
had violated their substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm while in
state custody. The Washington Supreme Court held that the children had a substantive due process
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Revisiting Donny's case, he reportedly experienced child abuse,
which led to the development of PTSD and depression. Donny therefore
is likely to be (or to have been) in foster care, and may be a difficult
child for ordinary foster parents to handle. He will probably be moved
from one foster home to another, or from foster home to his parents and
back again, and before too long, he will end up back in a mental health
system facility. Most likely, he will bounce back and forth among
systems-including the juvenile justice system-in the absence of
services that can truly meet his needs, the needs of his family (be it
natural, foster, or adoptive), his school, and the larger community.
Without effective intervention, Donny is likely to evolve from a troubled
and troublesome child to a troubled and troublesome adult, and he may
ultimately engage in serious criminal conduct, leading to his
incarceration in an adult correctional facility.1 80 This brings us to an
examination of his story through the lens of the juvenile justice system.
3. The Juvenile Justice System
The personnel at Donny's school could have called the police rather
than an ambulance. After all, Donny had gotten into fights at school and
threatened the life of a peer. Those actions would likely justify the
juvenile court's intervention on a finding of delinquency, grounded in

right to be free from such risk of harm when in state custody, and that provision of appropriate
mental health services is encompassed within the state's obligation as custodian and caretaker.
Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 857, 859-60 (2003) (en banc). The case was remanded for
further proceedings, but settled in 2004. A discussion of the settlement agreement and a link to the
agreement are available at Washington State Department of Social & Health Services, Settlement
at
2004),
(Aug.
11,
Lawsuit
In
Braam
Reached
Agreement
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement
http://wwwl.dshs.wa.gov/mediareleases/2004/pr04207.shtml
Reached]. The terms of the settlement include the development and implementation of steps to
better protect and guard the welfare of children in foster care, such as provision of safer and more
stable foster care placements, individualized mental health assessments and treatment, and adequate
training and support to foster parents and relative caregivers. See id.
180. Research reveals that a range of problems in childhood, including a history of
experiencing abuse, predisposes individuals to adult dysfunctional conduct, including criminal
behavior. See, e.g., CATHY S. WIDOM & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, NAT'L INSTIT. OF JUST., RES. IN
Feb. 2001, available at
BRIEF, AN UPDATE ON THE "CYCLE OF VIOLENCE,"
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/184894.pdf; Rani A. Desi et al., Childhood Risk Factors for
Criminal Justice Involvement in a Sample of Homeless People with Serious Mental Illness, 188 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 324 (2000); see also Michael Wald & Tia Martinez, Connected by
25: Improving the Life Chances of the Country's Most Vulnerable Youth (2003), available at
http://www.hewlett.org/Archives/Publications/connectedBy25.htm (demonstrating the relationship
between various "risk factors" during adolescence-such as failure to complete high school,
juvenile justice or criminal justice system involvement, child welfare system involvement, and
teenage pregnancy-and adult "disconnection" from society as manifested through, for example
unemployment and participation in criminal activity).
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either simple assault or battery charges. And indeed, children
manifesting such behaviors are referred either to the mental health
system or the juvenile justice system, with factors such as race,
socioeconomic status, and gender more influential in that triage process
than the children's conduct and apparent needs.181
Not surprisingly, researchers report that a relatively high proportion
of juvenile offenders and residents of juvenile justice facilities meet the
criteria for serious mental disorders.18 2 Thomas Grisso, in summarizing
the empirical research base, however, observed "troublesome
variability" among the mental disorder prevalence rates reported across
studies of juvenile justice populations.1 83 He attributes this variability to
several factors, including a lack of uniformity in the ways in which the
researchers defined and evaluated mental disorders, and in differences
among the juvenile justice samples studied. 184 While future research will
likely present a more meaningful picture of the psychological
85
functioning of various subgroups of the juvenile justice population,'
there are some consistencies in the existing data base. A review of early
studies found that the rates of diagnosable mental disorders among youth
involved with the juvenile justice system were "considerably higher"
than for same-aged youth in the general population, even when
excluding "conduct disorder" diagnoses. 186 In a more recent federally181.

See supra Part 1II.B.3.

182.

See THOMAS GRiSSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL

DISORDERS 6-14 (2004); Gail A. Wasserman et al., Assessing the Mental Health of Youth in
Juvenile Justice Settings, JUV. JUST. BULL., Aug. 2004; Karen M. Abram et al., Comorbid
Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 60 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1097
(2003) [hereinafter Abram et al., Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders]; Linda A. Teplin et al.,
Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133
(2002) [hereinafter Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders]; Randy K. Otto et al., NAT'L COALITION
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIM. JUST. SYS. PREVALENCE OF MENTAL DISORDERS AMONG

YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, in RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF
YOUTH INTHE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1992).
183. GRISSO, supra note 182, at 7.
184. Some of the sources of variability include lack of consistency in: (1) which mental
disorders are included (such as whether "conduct disorders" are included, given that they are
defined, in part, by the same behavior as leads to juvenile justice system involvement); (2) how
mental disorders are evaluated (such as what types of instruments and general methods are used to
assess the youths); and (3) what are the characteristics of the sample (such as what types of facilities
are surveyed, whether the youths are in pretrial detention or have been adjudicated delinquent, and
so on). Id. at 7-13.
185. Through research funded by the MacArthur Foundation, Grisso and other members of a
research network have developed and are testing various instruments that will greatly improve
meaningful data collection on the presence, nature, effects, and responses to interventions of mental
disorders experienced by various juvenile justice populations. Id. at 27-123.
186. Orro ET AL., supra note 182, at 11-16, 21. The studies reviewed varied with respect to the
setting and sample parameters. Most studies evaluated the youth during detention (while held pre-
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funded study, 1,829 youths in juvenile detention were assessed to
determine the prevalence of diagnosable mental disorders during the
prior six months. 187 The study found that, even after excluding conduct
disorders,18 60.9% of males and 70.0% of females met diagnostic
criteria for one or more psychiatric disorders. 189 Other disorders
diagnosed in fairly substantial proportions are anxiety disorders (21.3%
of males; 30.8% of females); affective/mood disorders such as
depression (18.7% of males; 27.6% of females); and attention deficit
disorder (16.6% of males; 21.4% of females). 90 Finally, in another very
recent study which examined a juvenile justice sample within several
weeks of admission to a juvenile justice facility, and focused on
functioning and behavior within the prior one month, Gail Wasserman
and colleagues reported that 67.2% of the sample met the criteria for at
least one mental disorder. 19' While 31.7% of the sample met the criteria

adjudication), while others evaluated youth who had already been placed in residential settings. Id.
at 30-41. Because the same behaviors that lead to juvenile justice system involvement serve as the
basis for a conduct disorder diagnosis, it is useful to separate out youth for whom a conduct disorder
is the only diagnosable condition. The studies reviewed by Otto and colleagues found prevalence
rates of conduct disorders ranging from 50% to 90%. Id. at 21. Many youth had multiple diagnoses,
an indication that they may be coping with more complicated and challenging emotional and
functional difficulties. The review reported higher prevalence rates (than was found in the general
population) of several other categories of disorders, including substance use disorders,
affective/mood disorders, anxiety disorders (which includes post-traumatic stress disorder), learning
disabilities and attention-deficit disorders, and psychotic disorders. Id. at 17-21. Psychotic disorders
are relatively uncommon in children generally. In this review, study results found a prevalence rate
ranging from 1% to 6% in the juvenile justice samples, which is higher than that observed in the
general population of youth. Id. at 20.
187. See Teplin et al., PsychiatricDisorderssupranote 182.
188. Many youth who get into trouble with the law meet the diagnostic criteria for conduct
disorders, which are defined generally by "a repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which
the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated." DSM-IVTR, supra note 145, at 93.
189. Teplin et al., PsychiatricDisorders,supra note 182, at 1136. If conduct disorders are not
excluded, the study diagnosed at least one condition in 66.3% of males, and 73.8% of females.
Thus, although conduct disorders were common (37.8% of males; 46.8% of females), most children
diagnosed with conduct disorders met the criteria for other conditions as well. Substance use
disorders, however, were the most commonly diagnosed condition for males and females, found in
approximately half of the sample. Teplin et al., PsychiatricDisorders,supra note 182, at 1136. This
finding is consistent with those of other studies. For example, the review of Otto and colleagues
revealed that most studies find that 25-50% of youth involved with the juvenile justice system have
substance use disorders, and some studies have reported even higher percentages. OTTO ET AL.,
supranote 182, at 18.
190. Teplin et al., PsychiatricDisorderssupranote 182 at 1136.
191. Wasserman et al., supranote 182, at 3.
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most of those children met the criteria for other
for a conduct disorder,
92
well.'
as
conditions
The studies just reviewed sampled youth involved with the juvenile
justice system to ascertain what proportions of them met criteria for
diagnosis of various mental disorders. Significant overlap in the juvenile
justice and mental health populations has also been discovered by
assessing what proportion of a sample receiving mental health services
has either had contact with the juvenile justice system, or has engaged in
conduct that could possibly lead to such involvement. For example, one
team of researchers in Seattle, Washington found that children receiving
public mental health services were almost three times more likely to
have had contact with the juvenile justice system than a comparable
sample in the general population. 93 The researchers compared those
youth receiving public mental health services who had had contact with
the juvenile justice system with those who had not had such contact, and
found that the 41.6% who had been involved with the juvenile justice
system were more likely to be African American (58.3% in the dual
system group; 15.9% in the mental health-only group), and in state
custody (56.5% of dual-system group and 15.9% of mental health-only
group). 194 Substantially more of the dual system children had been
expelled from or dropped out of school (62.1% versus 8.4%), had belowgrade level academic performance (51.2% versus 31.6%) and were
195
identified as seriously behaviorally disturbed (58.1% versus 23.3%).
Diagnostically, the most dramatic difference between the two groups
was the higher presence of a conduct disorder diagnosis in the dual
system group (20.7% versus 1.1%). 196 Other factors that distinguished
the two groups were the higher levels of abuse or neglect and foster care
placement experienced by the dual system group. 97 These findings are
consistent with those reported by other investigators revealing that race
often plays an important role in decisions whether or not children
meeting criteria for multiple service and intervention systems are
192. Specifically, 18.9% of the sample was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, 9.1% was
diagnosed with mood disorders, and 49.3% was diagnosed with substance use disorders. Id.
193. Ann Vander Stoep, et al., L Risk of Juvenile Justice System Referral Among Children in a
PublicMental Health System, 24 J. Juv. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 428, 436 (1997).
194. Carina C. Evens & Ann Vander Stoep, II. Risk Factors for Juvenile Justice System
Referral Among Children in a Public Mental Health System, 24 J. JUV. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN.

443,446 (1997).
195. Id. at 446-47. The percentages of mental health system only children was calculated by
this author by dividing the number of children who met the particular criterion by the total number
of children in that group.
196. Id. at 449.
197. Id. at 448.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

referred to the juvenile justice system-with African-American youth
disproportionately so referred.1 98 In addition, the high rates of cooccurrence of diagnosable mental health problems, justice system
involvement, and a history of child abuse or neglect have also been
observed by many researchers. 99 These data support the assertion that
many children in the juvenile justice system also meet mental health
diagnostic criteria. Such findings reinforce the need to look beyond the
lens of the system in which a child happens to be found in determining
the child's and family's needs and the most appropriate response to these
needs. Failure to do so will likely render interventions relatively
ineffective.
The overlaps among systems and the populations they serve extend
further, however. Research also reveals substantial overlap the juvenile
justice and special education population, a finding that will be discussed
immediately below.2 °0 In addition, however, the child welfare and
juvenile justice systems share many of the same children. Sometimes
referred to as "dual jurisdiction ' 20' or "crossover" 20 2 cases, the
relationships among the populations served by these two systems is well
known to researchers and many system workers, yet there is little
coordination, collaborative service provision, or cross-system sharing of
information and resources between systems. 20 3 Sadly, the special needs
198. Id. at 449-50. See also Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Race Bias in the Diagnosis and
Disposition of Violent Adolescents, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1211, 1215 (1980) (finding that race,
rather than frequency of aggressive conduct, distinguished the referrals of youth to the mental health
versus juvenile justice system, with African-American youth more often placed in correctional
facilities, and Caucasian youth more often placed in psychiatric facilities); Kenneth B. Nunn, The
Child as Other: Race andDifferential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
679 (2002); NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASs'N, Mental Health and Youth of Color in the Juvenile
JusticeSystem, available at http://www.nmha.org/children/justjuv/colorjj.cfm.
199. See, e.g., Jodi A. Quas et al., Child Maltreatment and Delinquency: FramingIssues of
Causation and Consequence, 5 CHILD. SERVS. SOC. POL'Y, RES. & PRAC. 245 (2002); Diana J.
English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and Violent Criminal
Behavior: A Replication and Extension (2002); Denise C. Herz, Understandingthe Use of Mental
Health Placements by the Juvenile Justice System, 9 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 172
(2001); Gail A. Wasserman et al., Mental Health Assessments in Juvenile Justice: Report on the
Consensus Conference, 42 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 752 (2003).
200. See infra Part III.B.4-5.
201. See, e.g., Gene Siegel & Rachael Lord, When Systems Collide: Improving Court Practices
and Programs in Dual Jurisdiction Cases, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUV. JUSTICE SPECIAL PROJECT
BULL. (2004); Shanna Connor, Comment, The Best Interests of the Minor: Assessing California's
Ban on DualJurisdictionin the Juvenile Courts, U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 295 (2003).
202. Claudette Brown, Over: From Child Welfare to Juvenile Justice, 36 MD. BAR J. 18
(2003); Katharine W. Scrivner, Crossover Kids: The Dilemma of the Abused Delinquent, 40 FAM.
CT. REV. 135 (2002).
203. For a discussion of research findings and proposals for improved service delivery, see, for
example, M.L. Armstrong, Adolescent Pathways: Exploring the Intersections Between Child
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of these children typically are not met by the child welfare or juvenile
justice system, neither of which seems capable of responding to
problems extending beyond the traditional boundaries of its systemspecific statutorily-defined target population.20 4 Research also reveals
substantial overlap between the juvenile justice and special education
population, as discussed immediately below.
4. The Educational System
The Washington Post reporter describing Donny's situation
indicates that he was aggressive at school, and that he has an attention
deficit disorder. Formally now referred to as "Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder" or "ADHD," this diagnostic category has
undergone substantial reconceptualization over the years.20 5 Presently,
the American Psychiatric Association identifies three variants.20 6 ADHD
can seriously hinder academic success, and frequently appears in the

Welfare

and

Juvenile

Justice, PINS,

and

http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/pathways.pdf;

Mental

Health

(1998),

available at

Leslee Morris, Youth in Foster Care Who

Commit Delinquent Acts: Study Findings and Recommendations, 3 THE LINK CONNECTING JUV.
JUST.

AND

CHILD

WELFARE

1

(2004),

available

at

http://www.cwla.org/programs/uvenilejustice/thelink2004summerfall.pdf; Richard Wiebush et al.,
Preventing Delinquency Through Improved Child Protection Services, JUV. JUST. BULL. available
at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjbul20017_1/contents.html; Janet Wiig, Cathy Spatz Widom &
John A. Tuell, Understanding Child Maltreatment & Juvenile Delinquency: From Research to
(2003),
available at
Program, Practice, and Systematic Solutions
Effective
http://www.cwla.org/programs/uvenilejustice/ucmjd.htm; Janet Wiig & John A. Tuell, Guidebook
for Juvenile Justice and Child Welfare System Coordination and Integration: A Framework for
at
available
(2004),
Outcomes
Improved
http://www.cwla.org/programs/juvenilejustice/jjguidebook.pd
204. See supra Parts III.B.2-3.
205. See, e.g., Arthur D. Anastopoulos & Stephanie D. Shaffer, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 470 (C. Eugene Walker & Michael C.
Roberts eds., 3d ed. 2001); Drew H. Barzman et al., Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
Diagnosisand Treatment: Separating Myth from Substance, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 23 (2004).
206. The DSM-IV-TR identifies a "hyperactive-impulsive" type, an "inattentive" type, and a
"combined" type mixing features that are typically ascribed to both of the first two categories.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145, at 87. The "hyperactive-impulsive" type may present as having
behavioral problems. In addition to a high activity level, substantial impulsivity (that is, difficulty
inhibiting and delaying responses to stimuli), and difficulty sustaining attention, the condition may
also be accompanied by "low frustration tolerance, temper outbursts, bossiness, stubbornness ....
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 145, at 87-89. By contrast, the predominantly "inattentive" type of ADHD
entails less hyperactivity and impulsivity, and is characterized by the child's difficulty sustaining
attention to tasks. Rejection by peers, poor self-esteem, and other negative consequences may
follow from the interpersonal and academic problems. In a non-supportive environment, the child is
likely to be blamed for the condition, and viewed as unmotivated or willfully disobedient, which
will likely exacerbate existing problems. Anastopoulos & Shaffer, supra note 205 at480-82.
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although
presence of learning disabilities 20 7 which have an independent,
208
often cumulative negative impact on educational success.
In recent years, scholars have underscored a strong relationship
among ADHD, learning disabilities, and troublesome conduct, including
conduct that triggers juvenile justice system intervention. 2 9 In fact,
studies of youth incarcerated in the correctional system suggest that
between 30% and 50% of these youth experience some type of special
education disability, as contrasted with a prevalence rate in the general
population of approximately 10%. 2 1 One important question, therefore,
whether we are talking about ADHD or any of a broad range of learning
disabilities or mental disorders, relates to what obligations the
educational system has to provide services to these children.
Until the 1970s, children with a range of disabilities were often
excluded from attendance in their local schools, and from the regular
207. The term "learning disabilities" refers to a heterogeneous group of neuropsychological
conditions that can affect children's learning processes in various ways (e.g., affecting various
processes relating to reading, writing, spelling, listening, speaking, reasoning and mathematical
skills) depending upon the specifics of each child's condition. Byron P. Rourke & Jerel E. Del
Dotto, Learning Disabilities: A Neuropsychological Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 205, at 576; see also NAT'L JOINT COMM. ON LEARNING DISABILITIES,
AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE HEARING ASS'N, Operationalizing the NJCLD Definition of Learning
(1997),
available
at
Assessment
in
Schools
Disabilities
for
Ongoing
http://www.ldonline.org/njcld/operationalizing.pdf
208. See Anastopoulos & Shaffer, supra note 205; Russell A. Barkley, AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, in CHILD PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 63 (Eric J. Mash and Russell A.
Barkley eds., 1996); James H. Johnson et al., Aggressive, Antisocial, and Delinquent Behavior in
Childhood and Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY supra note 205, at
393,404.
209. See, e.g., Larry D. Bartlett, Special Education Students and the Police: Many Questions
Unanswered, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2004); Barzman et al., supra note 205; Mary Magee Quinn et
al., Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections: A National Survey, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD.
339 (2005); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH
DISABILITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
RESEARCH (2003), available at http://nicic.org/Library/018987; Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz,
Estimating the Prevalence of Learning Disabled and Mentally Retarded Juvenile Offenders. A
Meta-Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YOUTH 82 (Peter E. Leone ed.
1990); David Osher et al., Addressing Invisible Barriers: Improving Outcomes for Youth with
Justice
System,
available
at
in
the
Juvenile
Disabilities
Robert B. Rutherford,
http://www.ldonline.org/ld-indepth/legal-legislative/invisiblebarriers.pdf;
Jr. et al., Youth with Disabilities in the Correctional System: Prevalence Rates and Identification
Issues, available at http://cecp.air.org/juvenilejustice/docs/Youth%20with%2ODisabilities.pdf.
210. For a summary of empirical findings, see NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY supra note 209,
at 56-57, The National Council called for better research, however, noting that studies differ with
respect to definitions of disability, types of assessment procedures used, and particular subsets of
the total population of juveniles who come into contact with the juvenile justice system. Id. at 5758. Among those categories of disabilities included in many of the studies are: specific learning
disabilities, attention deficit disorders, mental retardation, and "emotional disturbance." See infra
notes 220-26 and accompanying text for discussion of the "emotional disturbance" category.
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classroom. 21' According to Congressional findings prior to the 1975
enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(P.L. 94-142),212 "one million of the [eight million] handicapped
children in the United States [were] excluded entirely from the public
school system and [did] not go through the educational process with
their peers. ''213 Congress also found that "the lack of adequate services
within the public school system" often required families to obtain
services for their children that are "at great distance from their residence
and at their own expense." 2 14 Public Law 94-142 mandated that states
provide a "free appropriate public education" to those children meeting
the statute's definitions of "handicapped," as a condition of receiving
certain federal funds.2 15 The legislation also sought to
assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children, including children in public or private institutions or
other care facilities, are educated with children who are not
handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of handicapped children from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.2 16
This latter requirement codified the notion that education for
children with special needs should occur in the "least restrictive
environment." 217 The statutes were amended over the years, and their
provisions were renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
in 1990.211

211. For a discussion of the norm of exclusion of children with special needs from regular
classrooms and schools, and the cases initially challenging such exclusion, see, for example, Gary
L. Monserud, The Questfor a Meaningful Mandatefor the Education of Children with Disabilities,
18 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 683-711 (2004).

212. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
213. Id. at sec. 3(b)(1), (4).
214. Id at sec. 3(b)(6).
215. Id. at sec. §§ 3(c), 4(a)(18); idsec. (a)(4), § 602(18).
216. Id. at sec. 5(a), § 612(5).
217. For a discussion of the concept of the least restrictive environment, see Patrick Howard,
The Least Restrictive Environment: How to Tell?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 167 (2004). This Act and some
weaker predecessors constituted the Congressional response to key federal court decisions holding
that unnecessary exclusion of disabled children from public schools violates equal protection and
due process guarantees. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1972).
218. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq. (2005)). Further amendments accompanied reauthorizations of subsequent years as well. See,
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The IDEA includes within its definition of "child with 22a0
disability, ' 219 a child who has an "emotional disturbance."
Educational institutions, however, have demonstrated some reluctance to
identify and serve children with emotional difficulties, a phenomenon
that has been the subject of commentary, criticism, and litigation. 221 The
first hurdle that parents encounter is proving that their child is indeed
emotionally disturbed under the terms of the Act. Governing regulations
further define the term "emotional disturbance" as follows:
(i) The term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the following
characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that
adversely affects a child's educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
factors.
health
sensory,
or
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
and
teachers.
relationships
with
peers
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal
circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated
with personal or school problems.

e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997); Monserud,
supra note 211, at 690.
219. In 1990, Congress replaced the term "handicapped" with "disabled," because of negative
connotations that had attached to the former term. See, e.g., Karl Menninger, 11,Removing Old
Labels: An Essay in Terminology, 84 ILL. B.J. 17 (1996).
220. The definition of "child with a disability" under the Act "means a child":
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or
language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance [hereinafter referred to as "emotional disturbance"] orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities;
and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2004). Prior to the 1997 amendments to IDEA, Pub. L. No. 105-17, the
relevant term was "serious emotional disturbance." Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, § 602(3)(A)(i)
(1997).
221.

See, e.g., BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FAILING TO QUALIFY: THE FIRST

STEP TO FAILURE INSCHOOL? 3-5 (2003) [hereinafter "FAILING TO QUALIFY"]; Lucy W. Shum,
Note, Educationally Related Mental Health Services for Children with Serious Emotional
Disturbance:Addressing Barriersto Access Through the IDEA, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 233
(2002). The National Council on Disability, supra note 209 at 5, states: "Most sources suggest that
many schools are not providing legally required services to youth with disabilities."
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(ii) The term includes schizophrenia. The term does not apply to
children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined
that they have an emotional disturbance.2 22
This definition has been the subject of much criticism, particularly
in its exclusion of children who are "socially maladjusted" from the
category of emotionally disturbed children.223 Neither term was a
diagnostic "term of art" in the mental health or education fields prior to
their use in the legislation and regulations, and studies have revealed that
those applying the definition do not apply the term in a systematic or
consistent manner from setting to setting or case to case.224 There is also
inherent illogic in excluding children who are "socially maladjusted"
from the definition of "emotional disturbance" when the criteria for
inclusion in the latter category incorporate difficulties such as "an
inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers," or "inappropriate types of behavior or feelings
under normal circumstances., 225 Given the confusion engendered by
these seemingly inconsistent terms of inclusion and exclusion, it is not
surprising that courts have split in their interpretations226of these terms in
reviewing children's eligibility under these provisions.
Schools have invoked the "socially maladjusted" clause in order to
exclude some children with emotional or behavioral problems from the
reach of the IDEA. In particular, children diagnosed as having a
"conduct disorder" are often determined to be "socially maladjusted,"
and therefore not "emotionally disturbed" under the Act. 22 7 Some argue

222. Child with a Disability, 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4) (2004).
223. See, e.g., Harvey F. Clarizio, Social Maladjustment and Emotional Disturbance:
Problems and Positions 1, 29 PSYCHOL. IN THE SCHOOLS 131 (1992); Harvey F. Clarizio, Social
Maladjustment and Emotional Disturbance: Problems and Positions 11, 29 PSYCHOL. SCH. 331
(1992); Steven R. Forness & Jane Knitzer, A New ProposedDefinition and Terminology to Replace
"Serious Emotional Disturbance"21 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 12 (1992); C. Michael Nelson & Robert
B. Rutherford, Jr., Troubled Youth in the Public Schools: Emotionally Disturbed or Socially

Maladjusted?, in UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YOUTH 38 (Peter E. Leone ed.,
1990); Russell Skiba et al., Opening the Floodgates? The Social MaladjustmentExclusion and State
SED Prevalence Rates, 32 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 267 (1994).

224. See, e.g., Virginia Costenbader & Roberta Buntaine, Diagnostic Discrimination Between
Social Maladjustmentand EmotionalDisturbance:An EmpiricalStudy, 7 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV.

DISORDERS 2 (1999); Russell Skiba & Ken Grizzle, The Social MaladjustmentExclusion, 20 SCH.
PSYCHOL. 580 (1991).

225. Child with a Disability, 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4)(B)-(C) (2004).
226. Compare Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998) with Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., 258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001).
227. See. e.g., Springer, 134 F.3d at 664; see also A.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d
472 (10th Cir. 1991); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65, 71 (D. Conn. 1990). For a discussion of
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that this exclusion was not intended by Congress, 228 and does not make
not
good policy sense because of the long-term costs to communities of229
system.
educational
the
through
children
these
with
early
intervening
While some of these students may still qualify for services on the
basis of other problems such as a specific learning disability like
dyslexia, the school system is obligated to provide only the services
necessary to address the disability on which eligibility is grounded. 230
Even if a child's condition qualifies her for services as emotionally
disturbed under the IDEA, there is still the question of what services the
school system is mandated to provide. While the legislation does require
schools to provide qualified children with "special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs, 2 3 1 there has been
substantial debate and litigation on the question of what is meant by the
phrase "related services. 232 Mental health services, particularly those
provided outside of the four walls of the public school, provided during
non-school hours, or involving persons2 33other than the child (such as
parents) have been the subject of dispute.
Yet, all of these disputes about who does and does not qualify
under IDEA and for which services misses the point. Children
determined by the school system to be emotionally disturbed are at
serious risk of poor academic performance and post-school adjustment.
Research reveals that this subgroup of children is more likely than are
other disabled children generally to drop out of high school (54.8%
versus 36.4%), to be retained at grade level a year (16.1% versus 6.5%),
or to be arrested within one year (25.0% to 12.2%) or three to five years
(57.6% versus 29.5%) after leaving high school.234 These data only
address those children who met the definitional criteria of emotionally

this exclusion, see Steven R. Forness et al., Conduct Disorders in School. Special Education
Eligibility and Comorbidity, I J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 101 (1993).
228. See Fomess & Knitzer, supra note 223.
229. See C. Michael Nelson et al., Do Public Schools Have an Obligation to Serve Troubled
Children and Youth?, 57 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 406 (1991).

230. Thus, while these children may receive special education services for the dyslexia (such
as assistance with mastering reading and written tasks), they will not receive services to address
other problems they or their family are experiencing.
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2004).
232. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999); see also Ellen
A. Callegary, The IDEA 's Promise Unfulfilled: A Second Look at Special Education & Related
Services for Children with Mental Health Needs After Garret F., 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 164
(2002).
233. See Callegary, supra note 232.
234. Mary M. Wagner, Outcomes for Youths with Serious Emotional Disturbancein Secondary
School and Early Adulthood, 5 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHILD. & YOUTHS 90, 98, 102 (1995).
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disturbed and were not excluded on the basis of "social maladjustment."
more
One might predict that excluded children are likely to fare even
235
poorly than children who qualify for special education services.

Observers argue that the failure of schools to identify and serve
children with a range of learning and emotional problems is a lost
opportunity that ultimately results in many youths' appearance in the
juvenile justice system.23 6 Unfortunately, there is evidence that "as
schools have become more restrictive and punitive (e.g., zero tolerance
for misbehavior), they have increasingly pushed greater numbers of
youth with disabilities into the juvenile justice system. 237 The story of
"Chad" below, illustrates such a missed opportunity to provide services
to a child before his condition escalates to the point where incarceration
in a juvenile justice facility results.
"Chad"
[Chad's mother sought mental health intervention for her son, diagnosed
with bipolar illness, when he was in junior high school.] The school system
responded to his bipolar illness by insisting there was nothing wrong with him,
refusing to provide special education services, and expelling him when he failed
to follow school rules. His mother nearly lost her job because she was
frequently absent from work to care for him, and her other children begged her
to kick him out of the house. At age 12 when he first entered the juvenile justice
system, the courts responded by incarcerating him ....[At the time Chad was
placed in juvenile detention, he was reportedly] suffering from depression and
suicidal ideation. He was held in isolation for 152 of his first 240 days. Because
of the severity of his illness and the lack of proper treatment, this child was
committed to a youth center five times and each time this pattern of isolation
continued. [T]his child's behavior deteriorated and his symptoms of depression,
aggression, and eventually self-mutilation, increased. This led to more periods
238
of isolation as punishment for his ...behavior ....
235. This prediction is based both on the expectation that children who are excluded on the
basis of "social maladjustment" are likely to have more severe behavioral and social problems,
which place them at greater risk for functional difficulties. These children may also be expelled or
suspended for their conduct, which is likely to exacerbate these difficulties. Furthermore, to the
extent that the school's services would be helpful, they are denied the opportunity to benefit from
them.
236. See, e.g., FAILING TO QUALIFY, supra note 221 at 14-15; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
supranote 209, at 5; Peter E. Leone et al., School Failure, Race, and Disability:Promoting Positive
Outcomes, Decreasing Vulnerabilityfor Involvement with the Juvenile DelinquencySystem (2003).
237.

See, e.g., FAILING TO QUALIFY, supra note 221, at 2-3; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,

supra note 209, at 5, 57-58.
238. The name "Chad" is fictitious and was supplied by this author. "Chad's" story is drawn
from Juvenile Detention Centers: Are They Warehousing Children with Mental Illness: Hearing
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If the school had identified Chad's condition as an "emotional
disturbance," had not expelled him, and had provided or helped his
family access comprehensive services, might he have avoided the
escalation that led to his confinement in a secure juvenile justice
facility? There is a growing body of empirical research suggesting that
some school-based mental health programs may be effective in assisting
troubled and troublesome youth and their families with various
problems. 239 And, while these programs have been developed with
particular reference to the school as the site of service delivery, there is
no reason why the school could not serve to connect families to a wider
range of services, including those described in Part VII below. The
school setting is the formal service location in our nation having the
most contact with American children. As such, it is a logical and natural
and families
place to identify and intervene early with children
240
difficulties.
behavioral
and
emotional
experiencing
5. Which Lens is the "Right" One?
Donny's case, and that of many other troubled and troublesome
youth, can be viewed through the lenses of the mental health, child
welfare, juvenile justice, and educational systems. Too frequently,
troubled and troublesome children end up in one system or another for

Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Carol
Carothers, Executive Director, NAMI Maine).
239. Mental health services provided in the school may be best referred to as "promising"
interventions. While there is not yet a well-developed empirical data base indicating which types of
school-based services are effective with which types ofproblems, initial studies suggest that at least
some populations are likely to benefit from certain types of school-based services. See, e.g., Paula
Armbruster & Judith Lichtman, Are School Based Mental Health Services Effective? Evidence from
36 Inner City Schools, 35 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 493 (1999); Jenni Jennings et al.,
Implementing and Maintaining School-Based Mental Health Services in a Large, Urban School
District, 70 J. SCH. HEALTH 201 (2000); Laura A. Nabors & Matthew W. Reynolds, Program
Evaluation Activities: Outcomes Related to Treatment for Adolescents Receiving School-Based
Mental Health Services, 3 CHILD. SERVS: SOCIAL POL'Y, REs. & PRAC. 175 (2000); Eric M.
Vernberg et al., Innovative Treatment for Children with Serious Emotional Disturbance:
PreliminaryOutcomesfor a School-Based Intensive Mental Health Program,33 J. CLIN. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 359 (2004); Mark Weist et al., Psychosocial Functioning of Youth
Receiving Mental Health Services in the Schools Versus Community Mental Health Centers, 35
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 69 (1999); see also Rones & Hoagwood, supra note 67, for a
discussion of limitations of school-based programs.
240. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, COMM. ON SCH. HEALTH, Policy Statement: SchoolBased Mental Health Services 113 PEDIATRICS 1839 (2004); PROVIDING MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES TO YOUTH WHERE THEY ARE: SCHOOL- AND COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES
(Harinder S. Ghuman et al. eds., 2002); Gail K. Porter et al., School-Based Mental Health Services:
A Necessity, Not a Luxury, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SYSTEMS OF CARE: THE
NEW COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 250 (Andres J. Pumariega & Nancy C. Winters eds., 2003).
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reasons unrelated to their needs. Various systems may reject these
children because of financial considerations; the child may need to be
"packaged" so as to fit within whatever system will finance the
intervention. But, the services available in that system may not be the
most appropriate for the child. Or, perhaps the most appropriate system
is overburdened; children may need to be served by whichever system
has available slots. Perhaps no one has performed a comprehensive
enough assessment to find out what the child and her family really need.
Or, perhaps the various systems are unable to escape from the influence
of narrow system-specific formulations and solutions. In a provocative
Transition
Funders Group referred to what it
briefing paper, the Youth 24
1
calls the "tunnel problem.,
A youth's entry point into the series of systems that serve youth
usually determines how government responds, not the youth's
underlying problems. Each of the many systems that serve youth has a
fixed menu of services or solutions to offer. Because most agency staff
members think primarily of the set of solutions within their system,
they usually send youth down one of these "service tunnels." The
tunnel may be the most appropriate choice among the agency's set of
options, but may still be an ineffective course of action. Once a youth
starts down a particular tunnel, it is often hard to reverse course and
take a different path. 242
Which lens is or which lenses are correct is an empirical question,
the response to which will differ from case to case. The lens that is
correct for any given child is the lens that permits that child to function
as successfully as possible in all of those spheres that contribute to
positive adjustment and personal satisfaction in our society, while at the
same time protecting others in the community. One can debate what
qualities and skills facilitate positive adjustment and positive
satisfaction, and precisely what constitutes such adjustment and
satisfaction. Yet, we know that, in general, certain things are more likely
than not to be a part of such positive adjustment, such as success in
school, the ability to form and maintain healthy social and intimate
relationships, the ability to perform age-appropriate tasks of self-care
and independence, the capacity to understand and abide by the most
basic of society's rules (such as those that prohibit physical aggression

241. Timothy Ross & Joel Miller, Beyond the Tunnel Problem: Addressing Cross-Cutting
Issues that Impact Vulnerable Youth, Youth Transition Funders Group Briefing Paper #1 at 1,
availableat http://ytfg.org/documents/Beyond theTunnelProblem 1.pdf.
242. Id.
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against others), and the absence of certain dysfunctional and emotionally
difficult psychological states (such as debilitating levels of depression or
anxiety). While it may not be possible for all people to achieve success
and satisfaction in all of these spheres, the lens or lenses that are correct
are those that promote troubled and troublesome youth's positive
adaptation in these realms to the greatest extent possible.
Most of the time, a single lens is inadequate for the task of
understanding troubled and troublesome youth and their needs. In order
to serve some youth and their families, it may be necessary to view them
through all of the systems' lenses. Or, perhaps innovative perspectives
such as those advanced by Urie Bronfenbrenner and James Garbarino
should replace the lenses of the individual systems. 243 Often what
children and families need-an intensive and multifaceted combination
of interventions that work with them and their families in their natural
settings (i.e., home, school, and community)-is not available in any of
the service or intervention systems.244
IV.

TRENDS IN CURRENT RESPONSES TO TROUBLED AND
TROUBLESOME YOUTH: THE MANY SIGNS OF CRISIS

Children are really suffering.... There are children at home getting no
services; children in foster care not getting mental health services;
children in the hospital who don't need to be in the hospital; and
are there because judges feel they
children in jails and prisons who 245
need some kind of residential care.
In this Part, I describe five indications that thousands of troubled
and troublesome youth and their families are in crisis because child
service and intervention systems have failed to meet their underlying
needs. These crises have, in turn, become the community's crises, as
families needing service turn to hospital emergency rooms, the juvenile
justice system, and the child welfare system, and the problems of
troubled and troublesome youth exacerbate in downward spirals that
affect their siblings, their parents, their peers, their neighbors, their
schoolmates, and the community-at-large. Ironically, these phenomena
243.
244.
245.

See infra notes 795, 804 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VII.
Carey Goldberg, Mentally Ill Youth Trapped by Large Gaps in Treatment, Five to 10

Percent of All U.S. Children Have Serious Psychiatric Disorders, Federal Officials Say, N.Y.

TIMES, July 9, 2001, at AI (quoting Nancy Rosenbloom, Legal Aid Society, New York City); see
also Nancy Rosenbloom, Alexander A., Bernadette B., and Claudia C. v. Antonia C. Novello &
James Stone, 185 PLI/CRIM 521, 523 (2000).
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occur in spite of a range of federal efforts to reduce institutional
interventions and to shift the locus of care to the community for
populations that include large numbers of troubled and troublesome
youth.246

A.

Waitingfor AppropriateServices: "Stuck Kids" and Unmet Needs

Reports from around the country indicate that families encounter
excessively long waiting lists when seeking community-based mental
health services for their children.24 7 Ironically, in an era when empirical
research has demonstrated that a range of innovative community-based
approaches to children's emotional and behavioral problems yields high
levels of success, even in the most challenging cases,248 government has
failed to invest in expansion of community-based mental health
services. 249 Data reveal that increases in utilization of inpatient mental
health services by children between 1986 and 1997 dramatically
outpaced growth in the outpatient
sector, despite initiatives aimed at
250
result.
opposite
the
obtaining
Not only is there an "absence of service options at the front end of
the system,, 251 that is, prior to the point at which children's
circumstances lead to removal from the home, but there is also "an
inadequate range of services at the back end, ' 252 leading to delays in
discharging children from various residential placements. Apparently,
"stuck kids" wait on inpatient psychiatric units or in residential treatment
centers for emotionally disturbed children, ready for discharge, but
unable to leave because of the unavailability of community-based
services. 2533 One expert estimated that during one fiscal year, children in
246. These efforts are analyzed in Part VI.
247. See, e.g., Ellen Story & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Needed: 'MCAS'for Children's Mental
Health Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 2001, at D4, available at 2001 WL 3929506 (reporting that
approximately 2,500 children in Massachusetts waited in the community for a case manager to help
them access mental health services at the time of their article's publication); SURGEON GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 17 (remarks of David (Dan) R. Offord); Semansky & Koyanagi,
supra note 12, at 24; ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 12, at 1; DeQuendre Neeley-Bertrand, Mental Health
and

Child

Welfare:

Waiting for

Care,

CHILD.

VOICE,

May

2001,

available

at

http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0I05mentalhealth.htm.
248. For a discussion of these community-based alternative approaches, see Part VII.
249. See, e.g, Pottick et al., supra note 161, at 314.
250. Id. at 316-17.
251. See, e.g., Gail B. Nayowith, A Window of Opportunityfor Children Who Stay Too Long,
Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, Inc., 185 PLI/CRIM 355, 366 (2000).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., id. at 366 (referring to the phenomenon as "kidlock"); ISSUE BRIEF, supra note
12, at 5; Goldberg, supra note 245, at Al.
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Massachusetts "spent 20,811 days-the equivalent of 57 years-stuck in
[psychiatric] wards" waiting for community-based mental health
services to become available.25 4 A 2003 report by the Association of
Academic Health Centers reported that "[a]round the country, many
children are literally trapped in psychiatric hospitals or general care
wards, because they can't be discharged for lack of community services
to take over their care. With stuck kids occupying psychiatric beds, other
children in need are put on waiting lists ....
The problem of stuck kids is just one of the signs that the
affordable, accessible, and appropriate services necessary for troubled
and troublesome children and their families are not available in most
communities. The authors of a recent U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services report on children's utilization of mental health services
concluded:
Although the extent of unmet need for youth in our country is
unknown, evidence is emerging that youth continue to face significant
barriers to receiving appropriate services and remain "stuck" in
inappropriate levels of care ...and that unmet need is likely
256 to be
greater among minority and uninsured youth than other youth.
Public interest lawyers have responded to the range of service gaps
by suing states for their failures to provide adequate mental health
services to various subgroups of children. 7 The plaintiffs and claims
vary from one suit to the next. In general, however, the claims are
grounded in alleged denials of statutory rights created by Medicaid, the
IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and most recently,
following the favorable result in the Olmstead case,258 the Americans

254.

Story & Sharfstein, supra note 247, at D4. According to another estimate, between

October 2000 and March 2001, children in Massachusetts reportedly spent 15,796 days "stuck" in
hospitals awaiting discharge. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 12, at 5; Complaint, Rosie D. v. Swift, supra

note 178, at
255.

57-58.

Lisa M. Lindeman, Academic Health Centers and the Challenge of Mental Health Care

18 (2003), availableat http://www.ahcnet.org/publications/pubs cat hcdr.php.
256. Pottick et al., supra note 161, at 323.
257. See generally Lenore B. Behar, Using Litigation to Improve Child Mental Health
Services: Promises and Pitfalls, 30 ADMIN. & POL'Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 199 (2003); JENNIFER

MATHIS, Community Integration of Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on Olmstead
Litigation, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 158 (2001).

258. 527 US. 581 (1999). The plight of "stuck kids" in psychiatric hospitals is not unlike the
circumstances of the plaintiffs in Olmstead v. L.C., who have been deemed appropriate for release,
but who remain institutionalized because of inadequate availability of community services. See id.
at 593. For a discussion of the Olmstead decision and its implications for children who are
unnecessarily institutionalized, see infra notes 541-56 and accompanying text.
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with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 259 For example, in Rosie D. v. Swift, a
class of "Medicaid-eligible" children with identified "behavioral,
emotional, or psychiatric disabilities" who "have been hospitalized or
are at risk of hospitalization" claimed that the state of Massachusetts had
failed to provide them with the intensive, home-based mental health
services "medically necessary" for them to avoid hospitalization and
function successfully in the community.2 6 ° While the Rosie D. case has
not yet been adjudicated on the merits or settled, a class of California
Medicaid beneficiaries succeeded in obtaining a favorable judgment in
Emily Q. v. Bonta.26 1 The Emily Q. plaintiffs were defined as children
who have been hospitalized in a psychiatric facility, who were
hospitalized at the time the litigation was filed, or who were at risk for
such hospitalization. The court ordered the state of California to provide
a range of individualized community-based mental health services in
order to allow the children to function successfully in the community.
Some cases have focused on children with mental health needs who
have been or are at risk of being removed from their homes by the child
welfare or juvenile justice system. For example, the Katie A. v. Bonta
plaintiffs are children in California who "are in foster care or are at
imminent risk of foster care placement," have a diagnosable mental
disorder and who need individualized home-based mental health
The cli
claims in this case were grounded in the defendants'
services. 262Th
alleged obligations to provide such services under Medicaid and the
ADA, as well as in several state and federal constitutional claims.26 3 The
favorable result in Emily Q. may have motivated the state of California's

259. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. For a discussion of these legal theories, see generally Mathis,
supra note 257; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, MERGING SYSTEMS OF CARE PRINCIPLES
WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: OLMSTEAD PLANNING FOR CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE (2001); BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, TEAMING UP: USING IDEA
AND MEDICAID TO SECURE COMPREHENSIVE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND
YOUTH (2003); BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, LITIGATION STRATEGIES:
RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET CHILDREN'S MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS (2000).

260.

Complaint, Rosie D. v. Swift, supra note 178 at

1-5.

261. Emily Q. v. Bonta, No. CV 98-4181 AHM (C.D. Cal. 2001) (order granting judgment and
permanent injunction), availableat 2001 WL 1902812.
262. See Katie A. v. Bonta, Case No. CV-02-05662 AMH at 10 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2003)
(order granting class certification); see also First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Katie A. v. Bonta, Case No. CV-02-05662 AMH at 2, 5-10 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Notice Lodging Fully-Executed Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs and County Defendants,
Katie A. v. Bonta, Case No. CV-02-05662 at 2-3 (April 18, 2003).
263. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Katie A. v. Bonta,
supra note 262, at 17-26.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

61

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

relatively quick settlement in Katie A.264 The state, county, and city
defendants agreed to provide the requested home-based services as is
necessary "to prevent removal from their families" or, where such
removal cannot be prevented, "to facilitate reunification, and to meet
their needs for safety, permanence, and stability. 265
The Willie M. case involved children diagnosed with serious
emotional, mental, or neurological disorders whose conduct had been
characterized as "violent or assaultive," who presently were, had been,
or were at risk of being involuntarily institutionalized or placed in a
residential program, and who were not receiving appropriate
community-based services. 266 Thus, these children were at greatest risk
for juvenile justice system confinement because of the dangerous nature
of their tendencies towards others. The plaintiffs alleged that the state of
North Carolina failed to provide them with services as required under
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (the predecessor of
IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and recited state
and federal constitutional claims as well. The case was ultimately
resolved by a consent decree. Services provided under the agreement
included a variety of home-based and outpatient services, residential
placements in group homes or therapeutic foster homes as needed, and a
range of educational services.2 67 Determining that the state had complied
was
with all of the requirements of the consent decree, the case
268
monitoring.
of
years
twenty
almost
after
1998,
early
dismissed in

264. See Notice Lodging Fully-Executed Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs and County
Defendants, Katie A. v. Bonta, supra note 262, at 3-4.
265. Id.
266. Mark Soler & Loren Warboys, Services for Violent and Severely DisturbedChildren: The
Willie M. Litigation, in STEPPING STONES: SUCCESSFUL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN 61, 66-67

(Sheryl Dicker et al. eds., 1990). For two excellent analyses of this groundbreaking litigation, which
was initiated in 1979, see generally Soler & Warboys, supra; Kenneth A. Dodge, et al., Willie M.: A
Legacy of Legal, Social and Policy Change on Behalf of Children, available at
http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/child/briefs/Willie%20M%2OLegacy.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2005).
267. Press Release, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Willie M. Case
at
1998),
available
23,
(Jan.
Judge
by
Federal
Settled
http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/mhddsas/childandfamily/williem/casedismissal.htm.
268. Id. According to the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services:
The Willie M. program's total annual expenditure exceeds $75 million, including state
and federal sources. State studies show that 85% of the Willie M. children are enrolled in
school, 57% have not been physically violent in the previous three months, and 90%
have not been arrested or convicted of a crime in the previous three months. More than
80% of the children live in the community, including their natural homes, therapeutic
foster homes, or group homes.
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Actions have been filed, decided on the merits, or settled in other
states as well. 269 These cases highlight the depth of need for appropriate
non-institutional mental health services for children.27 ° Strategically, the
grounding of claims in statutory rights to services is logical, and has
been relatively successful. Yet, hundreds of thousands of families are not
within the jurisdictions or classes identified in the lawsuits. Many are not
eligible for public insurance programs such as Medicaid or SCHIP.
According to one independent state commission:
Overall, more children are turned away from the public mental health
system than are served. As a result, thousands of children and families
[in California] suffer needlessly because mental health care is
unavailable. In the end, the lack of timely and adequate care costs
taxpayers millions of dollars in additional criminal justice, education,
time diminishing the economic
and health costs-while at the 2 7same
1
potential of these young people.
In light of reductions in governmental expenditures on mental
health services, the possibility that federal insurance programs such as
Medicaid may experience future reductions, and the shrinking levels of
private third-party reimbursement for all levels of health care, proactive
policy reform is absolutely necessary to insure that there exist
appropriate community-based services for those children and their
families in need.

269. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, J.K. v. Eden, No. Civ 91-261 TUC JMR at 18 (D. Ariz.
2001) (agreement that Arizona will provide "accessible behavioral health services designed to aid
children to achieve success in school, live with their families, avoid delinquency, and become stable
and productive adults"); Arizona Vows to Improve Children's M[ental] H[ealth] Care, 36
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1 (2001); see generally Second Amended Complaint, French v. Concannon,
Civ. Action No. 97-CV-24-B-C (D. Maine 1997); French v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Human
Servs., Joint Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Mar. 19, 1998)
(agreement that Maine will provide home-based mental health services to children allegedly entitled
to receive such services under Medicaid).
270. For a thoughtful analysis of the impact of children's unmet mental health needs on
children, their families, social institutions, and society-at-large, see generally Patrick Gardner,
Unmet Mental Health Needs Cause Failure Across Youth-Serving Institutions, XXII YOUTH L.
NEWS 1 (2001).

271. Little Hoover Comm'n, Young Hearts & Minds: Making a Commitment to Children's
Mental Health 21 (2001), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc.html. The Little Hoover
Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy is an independent state
oversight agency whose mission includes investigating state government operations, analyzing
policy issues, and recommending legislative changes. See Little Hoover Comm'n Fact Sheet,
availableat http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/private.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

63

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 33:1305

"Boarding" in Emergency Rooms and on Medical Wards

The inaccessibility and unavailability of appropriate communitybased mental health services for youth and their families has led to a
"spill-over" of individuals and families into other service and
intervention systems, and in particular, hospital emergency rooms.
Given existing legal mandates and financial incentives, discussed below,
hospital emergency rooms have served as a magnet for children and
families in crisis unable to access services through other channels.
In July 2004, officials in Clark County, Nevada, the county in
which Las Vegas is located, declared a state of emergency:
The state of Nevada's refusal over the past 15 or 20 years to properly
fund mental health reached a breaking point over the weekend. With
one-third of the emergency-room beds in 11 area hospitals filled with
mentally ill patients on Friday, and with health care officials calling
the situation the worst mental health crisis in the region's history,
Clark County Manager Thorn Reilly declared a state of emergency. In
reaction, Gov. Kenny Guinn released up to $100,000 in emergency
272
funds to pay for the staff and space needed to relieve the crisis.
One emergency room director analogized the effect of these
psychiatric patients in Clark County hospitals to closing "down three
emergency wards in Las Vegas. 2 73 Officials expressed concern that the
crisis was not only hampering these hospitals' present responses to
traditional medical emergencies, but would seriously undermine their
ability to respond to a large-scale medical disaster or mass casualty
incident.274
The problem of high levels of emergency-room use by those with
mental health problems is not unique to Nevada.2 75 Awareness of this
trend prompted a coalition of emergency-room physicians, mental health
advocates, and mental health professionals to co-sponsor a national

272. Mental Health CrisisNeeds a Permanent Fix, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 13, 2004, available
at 2004 WL 62262518.
273. Launce Rake, Mental Health Crisis Called County's Worst, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 12,
2004 at 1, available at 2004 WL 62262466.

274. Id.
275. The press reports document similar problems in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gregg
Krupa, Mentally Ill Overwhelm Hospital ERs, THE DETROIT NEWS, May 27, 2004, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2004/health/0405/27/a01-165882.htm; Matthew Mosk, ERs Feel Strain of
Mentally Ill, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al (discussing mental health admissions to Maryland
emergency rooms).
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survey investigating the pervasiveness of the problem. 276 The
"Psychiatric Emergencies Survey," conducted by the American College
of Emergency Physicians ("ACEP") with the support of the National
Mental Health Association, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
and the American Psychiatric Association, revealed that over 60% of
responding emergency physicians had seen an increase in the numbers of
persons with psychiatric emergencies seeking services in their
emergency rooms during the prior six to twelve months.277 Over 80% of
respondents reported that the "boarding" of psychiatric patients has had
a "negative effect on the care of other patients., 278 The term "boarding"
in this context refers to the phenomenon of persons with mental
disorders remaining in hospital emergency rooms while waiting for
mental health services to become available.2 79
Although the ACEP survey did not solicit information as to the age
distribution of the "boarders" in the respondents' emergency rooms,
reports continue to pour in from around the country indicating that the
presence of children with mental health crises in emergency rooms
persists. 28 ° For example, in New York City, an official at Children's
Hospital of New York-Presbyterian, one of New York's largest health
centers, reports that the number of children arriving at its emergency
room with psychiatric symptomatology jumped from around 200 in 1994
to 800 in the year 2002.281 A Yale-New Haven Children's Hospital study
found a 59% increase in children in psychiatric crisis visiting its
276. See, e.g., News Release, National Mental Health Association, Emergency Departments
See Dramatic Increase in People with Mental Illness Seeking Care, (April 27, 2004), available at
http://www.nmha.org/newsroom/system/news/vw.cfm?do--vw&rid=601.
277. American College of Emergency Physicians, PsychiatricEmergency Survey, Item 5 (Mar.
26, 2004).
278. Id.at Item 11.
279. American College of Emergency Physicians, Press Release, Emergency Departments See
Dramatic Increase in People with Mental Illness-Emergency Physicians Cite State Health Care
Budget Cuts as Root of Problem (Apr. 27, 2004), availableat http://www.acep.org/1,33706,0.html.
280. See, e.g., Alice Dembner, Acutely Mentally Ill ChildrenFaceDelay of Care, Study Finds,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2003 at B1, availableat 2003 WL 3407685; William Hathaway, Mental
Health Crisisfor Kids: Increase in Cases PressuresFacilities, HARTFORD COuRANT, Aug. 8, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 87432447; Richard A. Knox & Alice Dembner, Trapped in Mental Ward,
State Lacks Programsfor Troubled Youths, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL

3329157; Lombardi, supra note 9; Richard Morgan & Alison Gendar, The New Craze: Schools
Using ERs as Dumping Ground, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 17, 2004, available at 2004 WL

76394291; Diana K. Sugg, A Hospital Crisis: Children in Need of PsychiatricCare, Bait. Sun, Feb.
13, 2000; Trafford, supra note 9; Ann Graham Walker, Children's Psych Complaints on Rise, 36
MED. POST, Aug. 23, 2000.
281. See, e.g., Samantha Marshall, Children's Psychiatric Cases Double in ERs: Children's
2002), available at
Outcry Puts ERs
to Test, CRAIN'S N.Y.
BuS. (June
http://www.namiscc.org/News/2002/Summer/ChildrensER.htm.
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emergency room between 1995 and 1999.282 In all of these cases,
officials comment that this trend seriously impedes effective emergency
room functioning, and that emergency rooms are poorly equipped to
meet the needs of emotionally disturbed children.
The problem does not end in the emergency room, however. Once
evaluated, many young boarders are transferred to general pediatric
medical wards where they wait until mental health services become
available.2 83 The following description of the phenomenon is provided
by one team of physicians:
One significant change in mental health services for children and
adolescents that is not frequently mentioned ...is that pediatric
hospitals have been transformed into a safety net for youths in need of
inpatient psychiatric care. Because of the shortage of pediatric and
adolescent mental health services, pediatric patients who require
psychiatric hospitalization may be admitted instead to a medical
service because there are no available inpatient psychiatric beds. These
psychiatric,2patients
on the medical service are termed psychiatric
4
,boarders. §
Boarding children do not receive much in the way of treatment. For
example, in one study, Sharfstein and colleagues reported that not one
boarder kid in their sample of ten children covered by Medicaid received
"any of the five key services that Medicaid requires to be available in
psychiatric hospitals, including group therapy and family therapy" while
boarding.285 A Washington Post reporter describes the emergency room
experience of the nine-year-old boy whom we called "Donny, ' '286 who
was diagnosed with ADD, PTSD, and depression, "acts out," gets into
fights at school, and is allegedly a victim of child abuse:

282. Walker, supra note 280. Subsequent data from Connecticut suggest that the problem has
not abated in that locale, despite state action to divert the children to other services. Hathaway,
supra note 280 ("A flood of disturbed youngsters continues to inundate the emergency rooms at
children's hospitals in Hartford and New Haven [Connecticut] ....Despite the state's initiatives to
keep children out of emergency rooms, where they sometimes languish for days, the kids keep
coming... Psychiatric admissions of children [to emergency rooms] have nearly doubled, from 14
cases per thousand in 1995 to 24 in 2002, according to statistics gathered by the Connecticut
Hospital Association.").
283. Goldberg, supra note 245; Trafford, supra note 9; Lombardi, supra note 9.
284. Jonathan M. Mansbach et al., Which PsychiatricPatients Board on the Medical Service?,
Ill PEDIATRICS 693 (2003).

285. Joshua Sharfstein et al., Clinical and Fiscal Implications of Using a Pediatric Inpatient
Service as a Psychiatric Facility, May 15, 2000, Paper Presented at Ambulatory Pediatric
Association Meeting.
286. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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The school puts him in an ambulance and sends him to the emergency
room at Boston Medical Center. There he is evaluated by a psychiatric
team that recommends immediate hospitalization in a psychiatric
facility....

But there's no place for him to go. Boston Medical Center has no
psych unit for children and adolescents. All the beds for disturbed
youngsters at other institutions in the state are filled....

And so the boy becomes a boarder kid. Too sick to go home, he
boards at the hospital in a kind of medical limbo until a bed can be
found. He is one of a growing number of children stuck in hospitals
waiting for care. Usually the wait is a day or two, but sometimes it can
stretch weeks and even months....
...

Boarder kids get no real psychiatric treatment. They stay in the ER
or on a general pediatric floor. They have to be watched 24 hours a day
by a security guard or "sitter" to make sure they don't wrap an IV tube
around7 their neck or assault another patient. They just sit there and
28
wait.
The physician in charge of pediatric emergencies at Boston Medical
Center is quoted as stating that "[t]here is no real therapy going on. They
languish there for days. 2 88 According to the Washington Post, 50% of
children for whom staff recommend inpatient mental health treatment
"end up as boarders., 289 The number of boarder kids entering in
emergency rooms and forced to wait there 290 or on other medical units
for mental health services has increased substantially in recent years:
In Massachusetts, an estimated 200 youngsters were boarding in
hospitals during May. At the Yale-New Haven Children's Hospital in
287. Trafford, supra note 9.
288. Id. (quoting Sigmund J. Kharasch).
289. Id.
290. Although there are no data addressing how many "boarder kids" must wait in emergency
rooms, rather than on medical wards, reports indicate that at least some children spend days in the
hectic and potentially frightening environment of the emergency room. See id.; see also sources
cited supra note 280 (describing the case of a boy who waited six days with his mother in the
emergency room before transfer to a psychiatric placement).
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Connecticut, 80 percent of kids needing hospitalization for psychiatric
disorders had to be boarded during April. At Johns Hopkins Hospitals
in Baltimore, the psych units for children and adolescents are full twothirds of the time, and in the last five years,
visits to the ER by
29 1
youngsters in psychiatric crisis have tripled.
While there are no comprehensive empirical data informing us of
the scope of the problem of "boarder kids," or how long these children
remain in emergency rooms or on non-psychiatric medical wards, two
sets of pediatricians in Massachusetts reported on initial investigations
conducted at their respective hospitals. Mansbach and colleagues, in the
one published empirical study of the pediatric boarding phenomenon,
reported that during a one-year period spanning from 1999-2000, 315
juvenile patients for whom psychiatric admission was recommended
arrived at the emergency room of Boston Children's Hospital.2 92 Of
these, 67% were placed in an inpatient or residential mental health
facility, while another 103 children, or 33% of the sample, were boarded
on medical units.293 The total number of boarding days for these children
was 304, with a median of two days, but a range of one to fifty-one days.
These findings were consistent with those obtained by Sharfstein and
colleagues at Boston Medical Center.294 Sharfstein found that during a
five-month period in 1999, 67 of 196 children (34%) with "acute
psychiatric needs in the Emergency Department were admitted to the
inpatient pediatric service" to await the availability of a bed on a
295
psychiatric service.
Mansbach and his team were disturbed by several of their findings.
They found that the child's race was a factor in whether he boarded, with
African-American children more likely to experience delay in
placement. 296 In addition, the most severely disturbed children-those
with suicidal and homicidal ideation or conduct-were the most likely to
board. This latter finding suggests that those psychiatric facilities
choosing which patients to admit may not apply the standard method of
triaging which requires that the most severely and acutely ill patients
297
receive priority in obtaining service.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Trafford, supra note 9.
Mansbach et al., supra note 284, at 694-95.
Id.
Sharfstein et al., supranote 285.

295. Id.
296. Mansbaeh et al., supra note 284 at 697. Other statistical analyses performed by the
authors demonstrated that the observed racial differences could not be attributed to non-racial
factors such as socioeconomic status or whether or not the child was in foster care. Id.
297.

Id.
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Boarding, as described here, presents an excellent example of the
type of "cost-shifting" that occurs as agencies and governmental entities
seek to avoid the expense of providing mental health services. The
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"),
passed by Congress in 1986, requires hospitals receiving certain
categories of federal funds to evaluate whether or not "an emergency
medical condition" exists when patients seek services in their emergency
rooms. 298 If such a condition does exist, the hospital is obligated either to
"stabilize" the individual's condition or transfer the individual under
certain limited circumstances.2 99 Passed for the purpose of limiting the
practice of "dumping" of poor and uninsured patients who require
emergency treatment, EMTALA was not, however, accompanied by
federal funding to assist facilities in carrying out its mandate.300 Given
the unavailability of community-based mental health services described
immediately above, many children and families will appear in the
emergency room only after circumstances have become critical. For
those who are uninsured, the emergency room is likely to be the only
avenue available to them for receiving care. And even for those with
some form of insurance, exhaustion of coverage maximums, low rates of
reimbursement, and limitations on types of covered services place them
in the same position as the uninsured.
The rates of reimbursement to hospitals from public and private
insurance plans for the emergency room services to emotionally
disturbed children are quite low, particularly when juxtaposed with high
levels of staffing required by these crisis situations. 3 0 ! By failing to fund
adequate public community-based services, the state shifts the costs of
providing services for uninsured and inadequately insured children to the
hospitals, many of which are private, non-profit facilities. Because the
costs to the hospitals are so high, many facilities have been forced to
close their trauma centers and emergency departments in order to

298. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2004).
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)-(c) (2004).
300. See Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency
Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 145-

46, 162-67 (2004).
301. For example, the actual costs of providing care to ten children who presented to the
Boston Medical Center emergency room, studied by Sharfstein and colleagues, totaled $21,102.98
(which included, for example, 24-hour security guards for children whose conditions necessitated
such measures). Yet, because of limitations on the types of services for which it can be reimbursed,
Medicaid and Massachusetts Behavioral Health Partnership (the for-profit company managing the
behavioral health component of the state's Medicaid program) paid only $6,540.01. See Sharfstein,
et al., supra note 285, at 3, 19-23. Thus, the hospital was significantly under-reimbursed.
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survive financially. 30 2 Obviously, this result ultimately reduces the
available medical services to the entire community, and thus should be
of concern to the general public as well as policymakers.

C. Relinquishing Custody and "Warehousing"
Heather
Heather's mother found her daughter "hard to manage." When Heather
was six years old, her mother began a ten-year course of unsuccessful attempts
to access appropriate mental health services. "By fifth grade, Heather had
experienced countless visits to crisis [inpatient psychiatric] units. Ineffective
and missing services paved the way to police intervention. [Heather] assaulted
her peers." Her mother reports watching "with terror and a broken heart"
Heather's life "spinning out of control." By age 12, [Heather] "was sexually
acting out, using alcohol and other drugs, and carving her body." When she
assaulted her mother, police facilitated Heather's hospitalization in a psychiatric
facility. Heather's mother was told that "the only option for keeping her safe
was residential treatment." Because her family did not have adequate insurance
or funds to afford these services, Heather's mother indicated that she was told:
"In order to get her the service that she needed, I would have to refuse to take
her home from the hospital," that is, relinquish custody, so that she would be
eligible for services. Her mother reported that September 27, 1999 was "the
most devastating day of my life. I had to tell my fragile daughter that I would
not take her home." Heather's mother reported that "[p]sychologists did not
want to label my daughter with bipolar at age ten. Instead, they waited all those
years and she got lots of other labels--delinquent, addict, promiscuous, violent,
and runaway." Heather was placed in a series of residential programs, none of
which was successful. After an assault on a staff member, she was classified as
qualifying for special education services on the basis of an emotional
disturbance. Heather was repeatedly returned home, but no services were
provided to the family by any of the systems that had been involved in
Heather's case. The subsequent years were characterized by substance abuse,
running away, law violations (e.g., breaking a window, stealing mother's car,
in a youth detention center and a locked
possession of drugs), a placement
30 3
center.
treatment
behavioral

302. See Lee, supra note 300, at 166-67 (citing evidence that in Los Angeles, ten of eighteen
trauma centers closed in recent years).
303. Heather's story is drawn from: Testimony of Theresa Brown, Nowhere to Turn: Must
Parents Relinquish Custody in Order to Secure Mental Health Services for Their Children?:
Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 169, 10-12
(2003).
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Scenarios similar to Heather's have occurred tens of thousands of
times in recent years. As noted in the introduction to this Article, parents
across the country have relinquished custody of their children to the
child welfare or juvenile justice systems in the hope that doing so would
access the mental health services for their children that they had either
been unable to afford, unable to wait for, or unable to find.30 4 The first
official recognition of this problem came in a 2003 GAO report.30 5 Yet,
prior to the GAO investigation, the press 30 6 and public interest and

advocacy organizations 3 0 7 attempted to publicize the phenomenon they
referred to as "custody relinquishment." There was even an occasional
~ te'
article in the scholarly literature. 308 It took
the GAO investigation,
however, to attract the attention of lawmakers. Two Congressional
committees held hearings and conducted investigations of their own in
response to the GAO report, focusing first on the general issue of
custody relinquishment, and then on the large numbers of children for
whom this relinquishment results in warehousing in juvenile detention
facilities.30 9 In a July 2004 report, the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform reported that during the six-month
304. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
305. GAO, 2003, supra note 4 at 4. The GAO asserted that its estimate that 12,700 children
were placed in these systems in order to access mental health services was likely to be an
underestimate of the scope of the problem because officials in several states ("including officials of
5 states with the largest populations of children") did not respond to the GAO survey. Id.
306. See Anne-Marie Cusac, Arrest My Kid: He Needs Mental Health Care, THE
PROGRESSIVE, July 2001; Giving up Troubled Kids Treatment Involves Separation, (Dec. 5, 2005),
available at ABCNews.com.
307. In 1999, NAMI conducted a national survey of parents of children with mental disorders
to investigate the extent of the phenomenon of custody relinquishment. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, FAMILIES ON THE BRINK: THE IMPACT OF IGNORING CHILDREN WITH

SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (1999), available at http://www.nami.org/youth/brink.html. Twentythree percent of 903 respondents indicated having been advised to relinquish custody of their
children in order to access otherwise unaffordable mental health care, and 20% indicated that they
followed that advice. Id. Many of these parents report that their children were subsequently
physically or sexually abused in the hospital, residential treatment center, or detention facility. Id.
The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law published a series of reports on the topic. See, e.g.,
BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STAYING TOGETHER: PREVENTING CUSTODY
RELINQUISHMENT FOR CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (1999); BAZELON
CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW: AVOIDING CRUEL CHOICES (2002); BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (2001).

308. See, e.g., Robert Cohen et al., Relinquishing Custody as a Requisitefor Receiving Services
for Children with Serious Emotional Disorders: A Review, 17 L. & HUMAN BEH. 121 (1993).
309. See generally Nowhere to Turn: Must Parents Relinquish Custody in Order to Secure
Mental Health Services for Their Children?: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 169 (July 15 & 17, 2003); INCARCERATION OF YOUTH supra
note 6; Juvenile Detention Centers,supra note 7.
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period from January 1 to June 30, 2003 "nearly 15,000 incarcerated
youth waited for3 10community mental health services" in juvenile
detention facilities.
The GAO concluded that the following factors combine to lead to
the custody relinquishment phenomenon: shortages in mental health
services in the community; limited public or private health insurance
coverage for mental health conditions; difficulty meeting eligibility
requirements of various child-serving agencies; and inability to access
services through agencies such as the school system. 3 11 In some
instances, according to the GAO, these agencies misinterpret their
responsibilities, thus inappropriately denying service.3 12 Parents, unable
to afford or find care, are advised by staff of governmental agencies, by
law enforcement, and by other professionals to relinquish custodywhich they can do by voluntarily entering into a custody relinquishment
agreement with the child welfare system or by having their child arrested
for a status offense or criminal violation so that their children will be
more likely to receive mental health care.
While some children whose parents relinquish custody do, indeed,
obtain services (such as a spot in a residential treatment facility), many
others do not. Furthermore, the trauma of removal from home and
school and separation from parents, siblings, extended family and
friends is at best counterproductive, and more likely, quite destructive to
the child's psychological well-being. 3 13 Parents lose the opportunity to
care for and guide the daily lives of their children while the state

310. See INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 306, at ii. The methodologies employed by
the GAO, 2003, supra note 4, and House Committee, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 6,
relied solely on appraisals by child welfare and juvenile justice administrators as to both the
numbers of children inappropriately referred to their facilities, as well as the nature of those
children's service needs. The accuracy of the estimates is unknown. In addition, when the Report to
the House Committee asserts that the youth in question are waiting for community mental health
services, it appears to include inpatient or residential mental health treatment facilities as among
those services for which the youth wait. Id. at 3-4 ('Community mental health services' refers to
mental health services that are available outside of the juvenile justice system, including inpatient
hospitalization, outpatient services, residential treatment, and specialized foster care.") Thus, while
the phrase "community mental health services" typically refers to noninstitutional services, the
Report apparently uses this term to refer more generically to mental health services, whether those
services are provided in an institutional or outpatient setting, as long as the placement is not in a
juvenile justice facility.
311. See GAO, 2003, supra note 4, at 5, 20-30.
312. Id.at3O-31.
313. See Cohen et al., supra note 308, at 129-30 (citing a "sense of loss and grief' experienced
by these children with respect to "the loss of relationships with family members, the loss of the
child's own role within their nuclear family unit, and the perception of guilt-it was his or her own
behavior that.., led to placement" and "feelings of worthlessness").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

72

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble
20051

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

1377

assumes decisionmaking authority over the child. Sadly, many of the
settings into which these children are placed are highly inappropriate for
them. Children with emotional disorders who are placed in detention are
often kept in isolation, and may become victims of physical or sexual
abuse.3 14 Many are suicidal or have attacked others.31 5 The facilities
report that they are ill-equipped to serve or handle emotionally disturbed
youth, and that the influx of large numbers of such children waiting for
mental health services disrupts their ability3 6to serve the rest of their
residents according to their formal mandates. "
The juvenile justice and child welfare systems are the "end of the
road" in terms of state provision of services. Like emergency rooms,
they cannot refuse to provide service. If they are overwhelmed, they
continue to function, but simply do a poorer and poorer job as their
resources are stretched beyond recognition. Not surprisingly, the 2004
Congressional investigation found that the cost of incarcerating children
who await community-based mental health services is exceedingly
high-approximately $100 million annually.317 Ironically, the state
ultimately pays the bills, whether the services are provided under one
administrative agency or another. Although researchers are in the early
phases of examining the short- and long-term cost differentials of
responding to troubled and troublesome youth with appropriate
community-based versus inappropriate institutional services, initial
examinations
suggest that community-based options are more cost8
effective.

31

314. See Juvenile Detention Centers, supra note 7, at 2-3.
315. See INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 306, at 8-9. A Tennessee juvenile justice
administrator commented: "I find the last place some of these kids need to be is in detention. The
kids with conduct disorder end up being locked in their cell for their actions. Those with depression
are locked up alone to contemplate suicide." Id. at 13-14.
316. Seeid.at9-10.
317. Id.atll.
318. For example, research suggests that an intensive and multifaceted community-based
intervention model called Multisystemic Treatment leads to more favorable outcomes in youth, and
is less expensive than institutional alternatives. See infra notes 821-31 and accompanying text.
Research also indicates that another innovative model, Therapeutic Foster Care, delivers services
that are more effective and less expensive than more restrictive interventions. See infra notes 84249. There has been far more research on the comparative costs of institutional and community-based
care for adults with mental disorders, and persons of all ages with intellectual disabilities, than for
troubled and troublesome children. While the needs of mentally disordered adults and persons with
intellectual disabilities do not constitute precise analogs to those of troubled and troublesome youth,
the findings of studies focusing on these other groups are instructive. For example, one study
examined the cost-efficacy of services to "chronically mentally ill" adult patients over ten years. See
J.P. Dauwalder & L. Ciompi, Cost-Effectiveness Over 10 Years: A Study of Community-Based
Social Psychiatric Care in the 1980s, 30 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 171
(1995). The investigators concluded that a combination of community-based interventions was more

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

73

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33:1305

Despite some indications of progress in one jurisdiction or another,

there remain serious problems requiring more aggressive action. In
October 2003, Senator Susan Collins introduced Senate Bill 1704 ("The
Keeping Families Together Act"), which garnered the widespread
support of dozens of mental health, children's, and consumer advocacy
organizations. 31 9 The proposed legislation seeks to eliminate the practice
of custody relinquishment for the purpose of accessing mental health

services for children by providing grant funds for states to create
accessible and affordable networks of appropriate children's mental
health services.3 20 Unfortunately, the bill did not progress toward
passage since its 2003 introduction, leading sponsors to introduce it
again in 2005.321
D.

Homeless, Runaway, and "Thrownaway" Kids

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
("OJJDP") reported that in 1999, approximately 1,682,900 youth
experienced at least one "runaway" or "thrownaway" episode.32 2 Other
effective and less expensive than institutional care, a finding that confirmed general trends in the
research literature. Id. at 181-82. In addition, policy researchers have compared the annual costs of
serving individuals with intellectual disabilities, including children, in various settings. See, e.g.,
Darrell R. Lewis & David R. Johnson, Costs of Family Care for Individuals with Developmental
Disabilities,in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL

DISABILITIES 63 (Roger J. Stancliffe & K. Charlie Lakin eds., 2005). Lewis and Johnson's figures
indicate that, for children with severe intellectual disabilities, care in large institutions is more than
three times as expensive as family care, over twice as expensive as small group home care, and
slightly more expensive than care in larger community-based group settings. Id. at 79. As noted
below, cost-savings multiply when one looks beyond the costs of service delivery and considers the
savings that flow from using effective versus ineffective interventions, such as reduced need for
expensive services in the future and, in the case of juveniles in the justice system, reduced
recidivism and avoidance of entry into the criminal justice system as adults. See infra notes 850-852
and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., S. 1704, 108th Cong. (2003).
320. See id
321. The bill has been renamed the "Keeping Families Together Act of 2005." See S. 380,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2865, 109th Cong. (2005). As of this writing, it has not made it out of
committee in either house.
322. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (2002). The terms are defined as follows:
A runaway episode is one that meets any one of the following criteria: A child leaves
home without permission and stays away overnight[; a] child 14 years old or younger (or
older and mentally incompetent) who is away from home chooses not to come home
when expected to and stays away overnight[; a] child 15 years old or older who is away
from home chooses not to come home and stays away two nights.
A thrownaway episode is one that meets either of the following criteria: A child is asked
or told to leave home by a parent or other household adult, no adequate alternative care
isarranged for the child by a household adult, and the child is out of the household
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studies have placed the numbers substantially higher.3 23 Federal data
collection relating to these phenomena commenced in 1999, and
whether these numbers reflect
therefore it is not possible to determine
324
changes in patterns over recent years.
Those children who end up on the streets face real risks. OJDDP
estimated that 71% of these youth "could have been endangered during
their runaway/thrownaway episode by virtue of factors such as substance
dependency, use of hard drugs, sexual or physical abuse, presence in a
place where criminal activity was occurring, or extremely young age (13
years old or younger). 3 2 This population overlaps substantially with
other groups discussed in this Article. These children could be
adjudicated as status offenders because they have run away. But many
could fall within the child welfare system's jurisdiction as well. For
example, the 1999 survey found that approximately 21% of the runaway
or thrownaway youths had experienced physical or sexual abuse in their
homes during the prior year, leading them to fear a return home.326 Other
the
of
proportions
that
higher
reported
have
studies
32
7
runaway/thrownaway population have experienced such abuse.

overnight; a child who is away from home is prevented from returning home by a parent
or other household adult, no adequate alternative care is arranged for the child by a
household adult, and the child is out of the household overnight.
Id.
at2.
323. See, e.g., David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE
COURT 86, 93 (1996) (discussing research findings placing the estimate of children who had some
runaway experience in a twelve-month period in 1992-93 at 2.8 million, or 15% of the population of
children ages 12-17 years of age.
324. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: HOMELESS AND RUNAWAY YOUTH RECEIVING
SERVICES N FEDERALLY FUNDED SHELTERS, at 2 (1989) (noting that despite reports of increasing

size of homeless youth population, no data exist to inform conclusions regarding trends) [hereinafter
GAO, 1989].
325. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 18, at 2; see also Amy J. L. Baker et al., Recidivism at a
Shelter for Adolescents: First-time Versus Repeat Runaways, 27 SOC. WORK RES. 84, 85 (2003)
(noting lack of access to medical care, inadequate food and clothing, high rates of exposure to
violence and sexual victimization, tendency to engage in "survival sex" and substance abuse).
Homeless and runaway youths are also at greater risk for HIV infection. See Mary Jane RotheramBorus et al., Homeless Youths andHIVInfection,46 AM. PSYCHOL. 1188 (1991).
326. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 18, at 8.
327. See Baker et al., supra note 325, at 84-85; see also GAO, 1989, supra note 324, at 24
(noting that approximately 36% of homeless youth report parental neglect, and approximately 29%
of runaway youth report sexual or physical abuse). Kimberly A. Tyler et al., Family Risk Factors
and Prevalence of Dissociative Symptoms among Homeless and Runaway Youth, 28 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 355, 358-59 (2004) (reporting that in a sample of runaway youth, 43% had experienced
parental neglect, 26% had experienced sexual abuse within the family, and 82% had experienced
physical abuse within the family); Les B. Whitbeck et al., Families of Homeless and Runaway
Adolescents.- A Comparisonof Parent/Caretakerand Adolescent Perspectives on Parenting,Family
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Research reveals that runaway and homeless adolescents are
significantly more likely to have diagnosable psychological problems
than are same-aged peers. For example, one recent study found that 89%
of runaway and homeless adolescents in a national study met the criteria
for at least one of the following mental disorders: conduct disorder,
major depressive episode, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse,
or drug abuse. 328 Approximately two-thirds of the sample met the criteria
for two disorders.32 9 Other studies have corroborated findings that high
proportions of runaway or homeless children have serious mental health
symptoms or disorders. 330 Furthermore, studies suggest that the homes
from which the children run away are characterized by a high level of
emotional conflict. 33 I Given the apparent overlap between runaway and
thrownaway adolescents and other troubled and troublesome youth, it is
highly likely that the availability of a continuum of appropriate homeand family-based interventions would ameliorate some the
circumstances and conditions that lead these adolescents to depart from
their homes.
E. Still "Skyrocketing" Rates of Mental Hospitalization
In light of all of the other places that troubled and troublesome
youth have been turning up, it is perhaps surprising that the rates of
children entering hospitals and residential treatment centers for mental
health treatment have continued to surge. The admission numbers
reported below suggest that the term "skyrocketing" is an even more
Violence, and Adolescent Conduct, 21 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 517, 523 (1997) (noting a high
level of reports by runaways of physical and sexual abuse).
328. See Les B. Whitbeck, et al., Mental Disorder and Comorbidity Among Runaway and
Homeless Adolescents, 35 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 132, 135 (2004).
329. See id.
330. See, e.g., Les B. Whitbeck et al., Depressive Symptoms and Co-occurring Depressive
Symptoms, Substance Abuse, and Conduct Problems Among Runaway and Homeless Adolescents.
71 CHILD DEV. 721 (2000); Lara E. Embry et al., Risk Factors for Homelessness in Adolescents
Released from Psychiatric Residential Treatment, 39 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 1293 (2000) (summarizing research); Robert E. Booth & Yiming Zhang, Severe
Aggression and Related Conduct Problems Among Runaway and Homeless Adolescents, 47
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 75 (1996); Tyler et al., supra note 327, at 361-62 posit a relationship between
the experiences of abuse prior to running away and the development of emotional problems. One
study found that repeat runaways are more likely to have emotional problems than those who run

away for the first time. Baker et al., supra note 325, at 89-90. One study found that one-third of a
sample of youth who had been hospitalized for mental health treatment experienced one or more
episodes of homelessness within the five-year period following that hospitalization. Embry et al.,
supra. Because these individuals were studied five years after their adolescent hospitalizations, they
were adults at the time of the study.
331. GAO, 1989, supra note 324, at 24.
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appropriate descriptor now than it was when I first used it in 1988.332
The admission data indicate each time a child entered a mental health
facility for a minimum of a 24-hour stay within an identified annual
period. These data do not differentiate between admissions of children
who are new to the facility that year and re-admissions of children who
stayed in that or another facility previously during that annual period.
While it would be useful to know what proportion of the admissions
reported here are readmissions, the high rates are disturbing regardless.
Each admission of a child to a residential psychiatric facility represents a
crisis in the life of that child, that child's family, and possibly also many
others in the community. Whether the high rates of admission reflect a
dramatic increase in the numbers of children admaitted to these facilities
or reveal a "revolving door" phenomenon in which children are
repeatedly admitted and discharged,333 the findings detailed here are
cause for alarm.
Table 2 reports rates of three variables of usage of inpatient
psychiatric care of minors between the 1920s and 1990s. 334 The first

variable is rates of admission. Between the 1920s and 1970s, annual
admission rates of minors for inpatient psychiatric care increased almost
332. I first referred to rates of admission of minors to mental hospitals as "skyrocketing" in my
1988 piece. See Weithom, Skyrocketing Admissions, supranote 16.
333. Indeed, research reveals that in the current climate of reduced availability of intensive
mental health services and reimbursement limitations in public and private insurance programs,
length of stays on psychiatric units have become shorter. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., LENGTH OF STAY IN STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, No. 02-06 (2002);
Bentson H. McFarland et al., Psychiatric Hospitalization Length of Stay for Medicaid Clients
Before and After Managed Care, 29 ADMIN. & POL'Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 191 (2002); Kathleen J.
Pottick et al., Changing Patterns of Psychiatric Inpatient Carefor Children and Adolescents in
General Hospitals, 1988-1995, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1267 (2000); Kathleen J. Pottick et al.,
Factors Associated with Inpatient Length of Stay for Child and Adolescents With Serious Mental
Illness, 23 SOC. WORK RES. 213 (1999). Furthermore, some studies have suggested that current
insurance-related limitations on length of stay in psychiatric facilities have led to briefer
hospitalizations which are, in turn, more likely to be followed by readmissions. See, e.g., Cynthia A.
Fontanella, PsychiatricReadmission of Adolescents in the Public Mental Health System, Center for
Health Care Strategies, Inc. Resource Paper (2004); Roberto Figueroa et al., Use of Claims Datato
Examine the Impact of Length of Inpatient PsychiatricStay on Readmission Rate, 55 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 560 (2004); Oscar Hereen et al., The Association Between Decreasing Length of Stay and
Readmission Rate on a Psychogeriatric Unit, 53 Psychiatric Servs. 76 (2002) (observing this
phenomenon with geriatric patients); Thomas Wickizer & Daniel Lessler, Do Treatment
Restrictions Imposed by Utilization Management Increase the Likelihood of Readmission by
Psychiatric Patients? 36 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 844 (1998); Thomas M. Wickizer et al., Effects of
Health Care Cost-Containment Programs on Patterns of Care and Readmissions Among Children
and Adolescents, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1353 (1999).
334. Admission data are converted into "rates" per 100,000 children in the population. This
conversion allows for more meaningful comparisons across years, because it controls for changes in
the size of the national population of children over the time periods studied.
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ten-fold, from 13 admissions per 100,000 youth in the national
population to 123.8 youth per 100,000 in 1971. 33 ' Admission rates
continued to climb during the latter three decades of the century, rising
to 128.1 youth per 100,000 in 1980, to 186.3 in 1986, and to a startling
412.1 in 1997.336 Thus, between 1971 and 1997, the rate increased over
330%.

335. See infra Table 2 and accompanying notes.
336. Id.
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Table 2
337
Numbers and Rates of Admission, Residence, and Patient Care Episodes of Minors to
Inpatient Mental Health Treatment and Residential Treatment Centers for Emotionally
Disturbed Children, 1920s to 1990s (continued on p. 1384)

1922.23...

1971 "9

1986340

1997341

Inpatient Psych
Number Admissions
Rates/100,000

5,908
13.0

87,588
123.8

117,915
186.3

286,252
412.1

RTC
Number Admissions
Rates/100,000

N/A
N/A

10,591
15.2

24,511
39.0

65,949
94.9

Total Admissions: Psych + RTC
Number
Rate/100,000

5,908
13.0

98,179
139.0

142,426
225.3

352,201
506.9

337. These data report residence levels of persons under the age of 18, with the exception that
the 1920s data, and community mental health center data from 1971, which report admissions for
persons under age 20.
338.

LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 138.

339. The 1971 "Inpatient Psych" data include admissions of persons under age 18 to public and
private psychiatric hospitals and mental health units of general hospitals, as well as inpatient
admissions of persons under age 20 to community mental health centers. NAT'L INSTIT. OF MENTAL
HEALTH, UTILIZATION OF MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES 1971, 21, 26, 31 Tables 4, 9, 14 (1973)
[hereinafter NIMH 1971]. The rate of 123.8 per 100,000 reported here differs from the figure of 111
that Lerman reports, LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 138, and which I
reported previously, see Weithorn, Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16, at 783, because the 111
figure does not include admissions to community mental health centers (CMHCs). Given the
inclusion of this category of admission data in subsequent-year data sets, I have included the
community mental health centers numbers in the 1971 figures.
The RTC admission data include all admissions to Residential Treatment Centers for
Emotionally Disturbed Children in 1971. NIMH 1971, supra, at 19 (Table 2). DHHS reported the
total number of admissions to RTCs for emotionally disturbed children in 1971 as 11,148, Id. at 19.
While one might assume that all of these admissions were of persons under the age of 18, data
reported in subsequent years suggest that a small proportion of admissions (i.e., approximately 5%)
are persons aged 18 or older. See, e.g., Laura J. Milazzo-Sayre, et al., Persons Treated in Specialty
Mental Health Care Programs,UnitedStates, 1997, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2000, at
172, 194 Table 10. Therefore, I reduced the 1971 total of 11,148 by 5%, arriving at the figure of
10,591.
Residence and Patient Care Episode data for 1971 were also adjusted down 5% for the
reasons just noted. Thus, the initial RTC Residence total of 17,489 and PCE total of 28,637, see
NIMH 1971, supra, at 20 (Table 3), were adjusted to 16,616 and 27,205 respectively. Residence
data for inpatient psychiatric facilities for 1971 are not available, although PCE data for inpatient
psychiatric facilities for that year are available, thus permitting the computation of residence data.
The total number of PCEs for 1971 is 111,021. Id. at 39 (Table 20). The 111,021 figure was
obtained by subtracting the total number of outpatient PCEs of persons under age 18, as reported in
Table 20, i.e., 632,216, from the total number of PCEs-inpatient and outpatient-i.e., 743,237. Id.
Because the PCE variable consists of the sum of residence figures on a given day of the year plus all
admissions in the subsequent one-year period, residence data can be calculated by subtracting
admission data from PCEs. Thus, the 1971 Inpatient Psych admission figure (87,588) was
subtracted from the 1971 PCE figure (111,021) to arrive at the 1971 Residence figure (23,433).
340. Appendix E. Sources and Qualificationsof Data, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES,
1992, at 279, 285-286 app. (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Mary Anne Sonnenschein eds.,1993).
341. Laura J. Milazzo-Sayre, et al., supra note 339, at 182.
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from p. 1383)

1922-23

1971

1986

1997

Patients in Residence
Inpatient Psych
Number in Residence
Rate/100,000

4,246
10.0

23,433
33.6

16,697
26.4

12,402
17.8

RTC
Number in Residence
Rate/100,000 in Residence

N/A
N/A

16,616342
23.8

22,693
36.1

32,986
47.4

Total in Residence: Psych + RTC
Number in Residence
Rate/100,000 in Residence

4,246
10.0

40,049
57.4

39,390
62.5

45,388
65.2

Patient Care Episodes
Inpatient Psych
Number PCEs
Rate/100,000 PCEs

10,154
23.0

111,021
159.0

134,612
214.0

298,654
429.1

RTC
Number PCEs
Rate/100,000 PCEs

N/A
N/A

27,205143
39.0

47,204
75.0

98.935
142.1

Total PCEs: Psych + RTC
Number PCEs
Rate/100,000 PCEs

10,154
23.0

138,226
198.0

181,816
289.0

397,589
571.2

The continued increase in the rate of admission between 1986 and
1997 is initially surprising in light of the emergence and ultimate
domination of managed care policies that have restricted use of
expensive interventions such as inpatient mental health treatment. 344 Yet,
these policies place limits on the length of hospital stays, which results
in more frequent readmissions of patients.34 5
Particularly notable between 1971 and 1980 was a shift in the
relative frequency with which children and adolescents admitted for
inpatient psychiatric treatment used public versus private facilities. In
1971, private hospital admissions accounted for 37.4% of juvenile
mental hospitalizations.34 6 By 1980, the proportion of total psychiatric
342. These data were adjusted by this author, see supra note 339.
343. These data were also adjusted by this author, see supra note 339.
344. See, e.g., Robert C. Saunders & Craig Anne Heflinger, Effects of Managed Care on
Southern Youths' BehavioralServices Use, 26 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 23 (2004) (reporting
that managed care within Medicaid programs has restricted access to the full range of services,
including overnight stays in psychiatric facilities); Thomas M. Wickizer et al., Controlling Inpatient
Psychiatric Utilization Through Managed Care, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 339 (1996) (reporting
findings that managed care has restricted the number of days that adult psychiatric patients remain
in the hospital).
345. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
346. In 1971, of the 87,588 psychiatric admissions of individuals under age 18 in the United
States, 32,754, or 37.4%, were to private hospitals (6,420 to free-standing private psychiatric
hospitals and 26,334 to private general hospitals). NIMH 1971, supra note 339 at 31.
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admissions that occurred in private facilities had risen to 61.2% .1 4 The
rate of admission of minors to public facilities decreased 35.9% during
this nine-year period 348 while the rate of admission of minors to private
facilities jumped 69.3%. 34 9 Rates of admission to public facilities rose
slightly in the 1980s and 1990s. 350 Yet, private facility admissions
continued to soar, and accounted for approximately three-quarters of
juvenile psychiatric admissions by 1997. These data strongly support
Paul Lerman's prediction, made over twenty years ago, that the private
sector of the mental health industry is the fastest growing system of
juvenile institutional care in the United States. 35' The shift toward
private domination of the inpatient mental health sector reduces the
accessibility of inpatient mental health services for families without
wealth or good insurance coverage. Historically, state hospitals, like the
juvenile justice and child welfare systems, had not turned away those
viewed as needing their services, irrespective of financial resources or
insurance benefits. The reduction of public mental health beds 352 appears
to constrict those options available to those who have exhausted, or
never had, such resources or benefits, making it more likely that such
individuals will turn to other service and intervention systems when in
crisis.
Rates of admission to residential treatment centers for emotionally
disturbed children rose substantially in the past three decades as well,
347. In 1980, of the 81,532 psychiatric admissions of individuals under age 18 in the United
States, 49,910, or 61.2% were to private hospitals (16,735 of free-standing private psychiatric
hospitals and 33,175 to private general hospitals). NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, USE OF
INPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES BY CHILDREN AND YOUTH UNDER AGE 18, UNITED STATES,
1980, at 12 (1986) [hereinafter NIMH 1980].
348. Rates of psychiatric admission of minors to state and county mental hospitals, general
hospitals, and community mental health centers decreased from 77.5 in 1971, NIMH 1971, supra
note 339, at 26, to 49.7 in 1980. NIMH 1980, supra note 347, at 12 Table 1. The rate of 49.7
admissions per 100,000 persons under the age of 18 is the sum of the rates for state and county
mental hospitals (26.1), for public general hospitals (16.4) and for "multiservice" mental health
facilities (7.2). Id. Beginning with the 1980 data set, NIMH no longer referred to the community
mental health center category as such, but used the term "multiservice" facility. Community mental
health centers are public facilities.
349. In 1971, the rate of admission per 100,000 persons under age 18 to private facilities was
46.3, NIMH 1971, supra note 339, at 26, while in 1980 that rate was 78.4. NIMH 1980, supra note
347, at 12. The 1980 figure is the sum of the rate of 26.3 per 100,000 for private psychiatric
hospitals and 52.1 for private general hospitals. Id.
350. Rates ofjuvenile admission to public facilities rose from 49.7 per 100,000 in 1980, to 59.8
in 1986.
351. See, e.g., Lerman, Trends andIssues in the Deinstitutionalizationof Youths in Trouble, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 281, 282-83, 292-92 (1980).
352. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text for data regarding reductions in public mental
health facility beds.
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increasing from 10,591 admissions of persons under the age of 18 in
1971 to 65,949 such admissions in 1997, an increase of over 600%.
Examining the combined inpatient and residential treatment center
figures, total admission rates rose between 1971 and 1997 from 139 to
506.9, a 365% increase. It is highly likely, however, that these data
underestimate the increase in admissions.3 53
Two other statistics developed by DHHS help complete the picture
of institutional use. Residence data, referred to by DHHS as persons
"under care population" include "all persons who were admitted to the
program before the first day of the specified survey month and who
received service from the program during the survey month., 354 Inother
words, this statistic takes a one-day snapshot of those persons residing in
the institution for the purpose of receiving services. The other statistic,
called "patient care episodes" ("PCEs"), is the sum of the one-day
residence count and the number of admissions for the one-year period
immediately following. 355 Thus, this variable is the most comprehensive,
in that it combines admission and residence data.
Table 2 reveals numbers and rates of minors admitted to and
residing in mental health facilities from the 1920s through the 1990s, as
well as the total PCEs. It is striking to note that, in contrast to admission
353. Charles Kiesler and Celeste Simpkins demonstrated that a substantial proportion of
admissions for psychiatric treatment are to "scatter beds," that is, beds in regular medical or surgical
units of general hospitals for the purpose of receiving psychiatric treatment. See CHARLES A.
KIESLER & CELESTE G. SIMPKINS, THE UNNOTICED MAJORITY IN PSYCHIATRIC INPATIENT CARE 1-

7 (1993) [hereinafter UNNOTICED MAJORITY]. Kiesler and Simpkins found that for the year 1980,
over 60% of the episodes of psychiatric inpatient treatment that occurred in general hospitals took
place on regular medical or surgical wards, and not on specialized psychiatric units. ID. at 1-7 &
Table 1.1. These data reflected episodes for individuals across the age span. DHHS does not include
scatter beds in their counts.
One might wonder what the relationship is to the phenomenon analyzed by Kiesler and
Simpkins, and that of children who "board" on pediatric units, waiting for mental health services.
See supra Part IV.B. for discussion of the "boarding" phenomenon. Because boarders are admitted
to general pediatric wards, this population may overlap with those described by Kiesler and
Simpkins as occupying "scatter beds." But, there may also be important distinctions. Patients in the
population described by Kiesler and Simpkins were admitted to scatter beds in general hospitals in
order to receive psychiatric treatment. Given the minimal information available about the

phenomenon of pediatric boarding, it appears that boarding serves to provide a temporary place of
containment for children in crisis while they await placement in a mental health facility rather than
as a locus for provision of the recommended treatment.
354.

MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, supra note 13, app. at 373, 373. Residence data

are also converted to rates per 100,000 children in the population to control for changes in the
national population of children from one annual period to the next.
355. This comprehensive statistic provides a more meaningful picture of the actual "use" of
that facility throughout the year than do either admission or residence data alone. These data are
also converted into rates for 100,000 whenever possible to control for changes in population from
year to year.
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data, which increased in a linear fashion throughout the twentieth
century, residence data peaked in the 1970s, and were cut in half
between 1971 and 1997. Because the number of children in residence in
mental health facilities at any one time is capped by the number of beds,
the reduction in residence numbers is consistent with reports that
psychiatric facilities have closed, or down-sized, resulting in an overall
reduction in the beds available for psychiatric patients.356
PCE data, as the composite of admission and residence counts,
reflect the substantial increase that occurred for both of its components
between the 1920s and 1970s, with an almost 700% increase in PCE
rates over that fifty-year period. Despite the "tempering" role that the
decreases in residence counts have on the 1980s and 1990s numbers, the
increase in the rates per 100,000 of PCEs between 1971 and 1997 is over
170%, with a doubling of rates between 1986 and 1997. Thus, despite
substantial reductions in both the number of inpatient and residential
mental health facilities serving children and the number of beds
available, PCEs have continued to climb. These data, of course, do not
include children served in scatter beds of general hospitals for the
purpose of receiving mental health treatment, nor do they include
children who "board" on medical units or in emergency rooms.
A comparison of the inpatient and RTC residence data reveals that,
while residence rates per 100,000 children in hospital-like facilities were
cut in half between 1971 and 1997, residence rates of children to RTC
doubled during that same period. Thus, when taken together, these two
types of facilities reveal a combined residence rate that has grown
steadily over the century. The increase in filled beds accounted for by
the RTCs has more than offset the reductions in the psychiatric inpatient
units. These data are certainly consistent with the growth and increasing
importance of RTCs in serving children identified as emotionally
disturbed. Perhaps the most dramatic figures of all, however, are the
patient care episode figures in the final portion of Table 2. These data
combine the one-day residence count with the number of additional
admissions that occur throughout the year, as a more stable measure of
the number of instances that the facility provided service to a child in a

356. See Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., Highlights of Organized Mental Health Services in
2000 and Major Nationaland State Trends, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, supranote

13, at 243, 244-47 & Table 2. The statistics reveal that between 1970 and 2000, the total number of
psychiatric beds in mental health facilities or units dropped by more than half. More startling,
however, is the reduction in public psychiatric beds-that is, beds in state and county mental
hospitals. Availability of such public beds dropped by over 85% between 1970 and 2000, from
413,066 to 59,403.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

83

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

one-year period. While the rate of PCEs in psychiatric facilities
increased 34.6% between 1971 and 1986, the rate doubled between 1986
and 1997. The PCEs for RTCs almost doubled (up 92.3%) between 1971
and 1986, with an additional increase of 89.4% from 1986 to 1997.
Finally, PCEs in both types of facilities combined increased 46%
between 1971 and 1986, and 97.6% between 1986 and 1997.
Those analyzing national data sets for DHHS were also surprised at
the continuing increase in the use of inpatient mental health services:
Contrary to expectations, inpatient care increased at a greater rate than
outpatient care. However, the increase in the inpatient rate dwarfed that
of outpatient care between 1986 and 1997. Despite reforms, youth do
not appear to be diverted away from inpatient
357 care as was planned; in
fact, they are hospitalized more than before.
F.

Conclusion

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, policymakers
sought to reduce the use of institutional interventions with children, as
well as with persons identified as mentally disordered or mentally
disabled. Yet, more children have experienced episodes in institutions in
recent years than at any other time in this century.3 58 Thus,
paradoxically, our nation sustains high levels of institutionalization of
children despite the inconsistency of those trends and our society's core
legal values as discussed in Part V below, and articulated policy goals,
as discussed in Part VI below.
V.

DISCONTINUITIES BETWEEN CORE TRADITIONS IN AMERICAN LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICIES AFFECTING TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME
YOUTH
Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event .... [I]n our
society, children normally grow up in families, not in governmental
institutions. 3 9

High rates of institutional and other out-of-home placements for
troubled and troublesome youth are incompatible with core traditions in
American law. Troubled and troublesome youth are routinely removed
from their homes and communities, confined in various institutional
357. Pottick et al., supra note 161, at 316-17.
358. See Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 105.
359. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 318 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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settings, and segregated from the mainstreams of their communities.
These responses are inconsistent with our nation's asserted policies of
protection of family integrity, avoidance of unnecessary incarceration,
and social inclusion of those with special needs. Furthermore, this
pattern of response poorly serves the police power and parens patriae
goals underlying governmental intervention in the lives of troubled and
troublesome youth and their families.
While it is true that, in some instances, troubled and troublesome
youth must be placed in settings other than their family's home-either
for their own protection, or for the protection of others-today,
thousands of children annually are placed or retained in such settings
unnecessarily. Parts III, IV and VI of this Article demonstrate that
substantial numbers of troubled and troublesome youth live in out-ofhome placements, receive inappropriate or unduly restrictive
intervention, and are bounced back and forth among child service and
intervention systems because of poorly conceived, poorly implemented,
or poorly funded federal, state, and local policies. While these patterns
have persisted for decades, data suggest exacerbation of these problems
in recent years, with numbers of affected children continuing to surge.36 °
Part VII briefly describes a rich body of empirical data revealing that for
many troubled and troublesome youth, home-based and communitybased interventions can avoid the need for out-of-home placements. This
Part demonstrates that high rates of out-of-home placements, particularly
institutional placements, are inconsistent with core American legal
traditions.
A.

The StartingPoint The Primacy of the Family

Few would argue with the premise that the family is a central-if
not the most central-social institution in American life. It has often
been said that "families are the building blocks out of which the larger
units of social organization are fashioned.",361 The law is concerned with
the family, its structure, its functioning, and its welfare, because we view
the well-being of society-at-large as linked to that of the family.
From ancient times, it has been widely recognized that there exists an
essential connection between families and the larger societies that
contain them. It is not only that families are the schools of first
instance, in which children learn to embrace their deepest and most
360. See discussion supra Part IV.
361.

John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF

FAMILY 43, 46 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoffeds., 1979).
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primitive assumptions about life and other people. It is also, as
Confucius, Plato, and probably a hundred of their forerunners
recognized, that the family is a sort of molecule, the very stuff of
so that the welfare of the one
which the larger society is composed, 362
and the other are indissolubly coherent.
The family is also the institution within which we reproduce
ourselves-biologically, socially, and politically.
[O]ne of [the family's] main roles is to be the basis of the orderly
production and reproduction of society and its culture from one
generation to the next ....[A] central role of the family is to arrange
in a reasonable and effective way the raising of and caring for children,
ensuring their moral development and education into the wider culture.
Citizens must have a sense of justice and the political virtues that
support political and social institutions. The family must ensure the
nurturing and development of363such citizens in appropriate numbers to
maintain an enduring society.
Some conceptions of the American family have changed throughout
the centuries, however. Historian John Demos, citing an essay by a
seventeenth century clergyman, referred to the colonial family as "a little
commonwealth., 364 It was the "fundamental economic, educational,
political, and religious unit of society," serving many functions that have
since been transferred to governmental and private agencies such as
schools and hospitals, and to commercial units such as businesses and
financial institutions.36 5 As more and more traditional family functions
have been performed by persons and entities outside of the family, there
have remained certain core functions that most agree are still best
provided within the family. Chief among these is the procreation and
upbringing of children, with the family serving as the primary source of
care, nurturance, support, socialization, and inculcation of values.
Arguably, the perceived importance of parents in the socialization
process increasedduring the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
During the nineteenth century, children came to be seen more
explicitly than ever as vulnerable, malleable charges with a special
and
talents,
needs,
particular
with
and
innocence
school
the
common
such
as
institutions
characters ....Though other
362.
L.Q. 15,
363.
364.

David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification,74 WASH. U.
17-18 (1996).
John Rawls, The Idea of PublicReason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765,788 (1997).
Demos, supra note 361, at 46.

365. STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE xiv (1988).
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and the church shared its duties, molding the nation's young...
became more clearly the primary responsibility of the family.
[Y]outhful minds and bodies would develop properly only in a special,
sheltered home under the watchful guidance of concerned...
parents .... In the child-centered homes that began to sprout within
class, the parent-child relation ... became an allthe nation's middle
36 6
important nexus.

The twentieth century saw a continuation of the emphasis on the special
role of families in the upbringing of their children. Yet, the twentieth
century-and the second half of the century in particular-brought with
it many changes in family structure, forms, and roles. Notions of what
constitutes a family and what roles family members should play continue
to fluctuate as our society and its family law respond to dramatic
increases in nontraditional family forms, 367 high rates of family
dissolution, 368 and the continuing struggle for gender equality. In this
context, family law struggles with how to configure and balance the
multifaceted interrelationships of the family members with one another,
with those outside of the family, and with the complex web of private
and public entities ranging from employers, schools, law enforcement,
and so on. Yet, despite the dramatic transformations in families and
family law, the primacy of the parental role in raising children has
remained a centerpiece in the law of family relations.369
Indeed, while values of care and support characterize social and
legal expectations surrounding a variety of family relationships, such as

366. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 8-9 (1985).

THE

HEARTH:

LAW

AND

THE

FAMILY

IN

367.
The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to
household. While many children may have two married parents and grandparents who
visit regularly, many other children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996,
children living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age
18 in the United States.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (citing U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Current Populations Reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998)). For a
comprehensive survey of demographic changes in the American family over the past half-century,
see IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 870-76, 942-49 (4th ed.
2004).
368. See ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 367, at 232-68.
369. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64-67 (summarizing relevant Supreme Court doctrine and
reaffirming parents' fundamental rights "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children").
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those between spouses 370 and spouse-equivalents, 371 and those between
adult children and their aging dependent parents,37 2 arguably there is no
set of family obligations more universally embraced in America, or more
deeply embedded in our family law, than the duties of parents to care for
their minor children.373 The notion that parents are invested with the
responsibility to care for, support, and raise their children remains one of
the most stable features of family life in American culture:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
374
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. The primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
is 5 now established beyond debate as an enduring American
children 37
tradition.

This language from the Court's opinions in Prince v. Massachusetts
and Wisconsin v. Yoder makes clear that, according to constitutional
doctrine, parents are entrusted with the responsibility for their children's
upbringing and preparation for adult life. In addition, certain rights,
rising to the level of fundamental rights, accompany these parental
obligations. 376 These constitutionally-protectible rights insulate parents
from state intervention in childrearing in many contexts, investing
parents with significant decisional autonomy regarding their children's
370. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (2005) (establishing married partners' duties of mutual
support, respect, and fidelity).
371. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1201 (2004) (defining provisions of "civil unions" a
status available to same-sex couples, providing all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of
marriage to those who enter into it); See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 et seq. (2005) (defining
provisions of a "domestic partnership," a status available to same-sex couples and some oppositesex couples over the age of 62, providing for most of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of
marriage to those who enter it).
372. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, IntergenerationalResponsibility and Family Obligation: On
Sharing, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 765 (1992) (addressing social, ethical, and legal issues relating to adult
children's care for aging and ill parents); CAL. FAM. CODE § 4400 (2004) (imposing on adult
children of dependent parents a duty of support: "Except as otherwise provided by law, an adult
child shall, to the extent of his or her ability, support a parent who is in need and unable to maintain
himself or herself by work.").
373. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 367, at 447-680, 944-1305.
374. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
375. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
376. See discussion in Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-67 ("[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.").
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upbringing, and safeguarding their opportunities to have the custody and
companionship of their children.377 The Supreme Court, however, has
not explicitly carved out a symmetrical fundamental right of children in
a continuing relationship with their parents378 or other family
members, 379 although it has alluded occasionally to children's interests
in maintaining the parent-child bond.38 °
What are the policy rationales for the elevation in American
constitutional jurisprudence of parental decisionmaking authority and
parental rights to the custody and companionship of their children?
Understanding the theories underlying this powerful grant of autonomy
helps us to appreciate why high rates of out-of-home placements of
troubled and troublesome youth are inconsistent with our core legal
traditions. Jurists and scholars have proffered a range of explanations for
the constitutional protection of parental discretion in childrearing.
Natural law perspectives view parental rights as "pre-political; the
law presupposes rather than creates them; and they arise from a
relationship that is entirely apart from the power of the State" although
"one of the state's most basic functions is to protect these rights. 3 81
377. See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1971); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
378. Dismissing a child's claim that she has a due process right to maintain a relationship with
her biological father, notwithstanding a statute presuming her mother's husband to be her father,
Justice Scalia stated: "We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so here
because, even assuming such a right exists, [her] claim must fail." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
379. But see Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Troxel, in which the Court held that
parents' fundamental rights to custody and control over their minor children place certain limits on
the state's authority to permit grandparent visitation:
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's liberty
interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, ... it seems to me
extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty
interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.
530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Emily Buss challenges the proposition that formal
recognition of children's rights to maintain relationships with others over parental objection would
indeed result in greater protection for children's interests and welfare, given most children's
inevitable dependence on adults to exercise these rights on their behalf See Emily Buss, Children's
AssociationalRights?: Why Less is More, 11 WM. & MARY BILL.RTS. J. 1101, 1103-16 (2003).
380. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 ("[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and
his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.").
381. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Needfor Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 887-88
(1984) [hereinafter Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood]. This perspective, of course, grounds the
existence of parent-child ights on the biological connection between parents and children, and does
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Other theories focus instead on the responsibility of parents to raise,
support, and nurture children, emphasizing the logic of vesting those
legally charged with the duty of raising children with some measure of
authority in choosing how to accomplish the task. Three linked
presumptions support the notion that parental discretion is a good
starting point for allocation of authority in raising children: (1) the law
presumes that minors' immaturity, inexperience, and undeveloped
capacity for judgment limit their ability to direct their own lives; (2)
parents "possess what a child lacks" in these areas of functioning; and
(3) parents generally "act in the best interests of their children. 3 82 In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that parents are
capable of acting, and are motivated to act, in their children's "best
interests," and that they are better equipped to do so than are the children
themselves. Furthermore, powerful emotions underlie parental
inclinations to promote their children's welfare. The parent-child
relationship is unique in the sheer depth and intensity of the emotional
ties that pervade it: "natural bonds of affection" 38 3 characterize most
relationships between parents and 3 children,
including the inherent
84
exhibit.
often
parents
that
selflessness
Yet, there is substantially greater protection of parental autonomy
than one would expect from a result-oriented "best interests" inquiry
alone. If a result-oriented best interests formulation served to fully
explain the constitutional protection of parental autonomy, then
supervention of parental autonomy could arguably follow whenever
others (e.g., the state, third parties, or the children themselves) could
demonstrate that they are better situated than are the parents to act in the
children's best interests. At least in principle, however, the state does not
intervene in childrearing every time it discerns that there is a "better"
way to raise the children than that chosen by the parents. Doing so
would create several problems. First, determining precisely what
constitutes children's "best interests" can be a highly speculative

not accommodate circumstances in which continued vesting of autonomy in a child's biological
parent arguably disregards the child's needs and interests.
382. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (setting forth those presumptions on which parental
autonomy in childrearing is grounded).
383. Id.
384. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, OfBabies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning
Parenthood in IrrationalAction, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493, 2494-97 (1995) [hereinafter Woodhouse,

Burning Buildings] (noting that intense emotions experienced by parents with respect to their
children often lead parents to engage in actions that might be viewed as irrational if observed in
other relationships (such as the willingness of parents to risk their own lives to protect their children
from dangers)).
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endeavor.8 5 This fact argues against state intervention in the family in
the face of anything other than serious dangers to the child's welfare in
matters reflecting substantial societal consensus.386 Second, under our
democratic theory of government, diversity in family values and
concomitant childrearing approaches is preferred over the
"standardization" that would result if the state did not allow parents to
exercise discretion in most areas of their children's upbringing.387 This
premise was stated with clarity by the Supreme Court in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, as the Court struck down an Oregon statute which
mandated that eight- to sixteen-year-old children attend public school,
thereby precluding parents' opportunity to choose among educational
institutions:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with388the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Thus, in the absence of evidence that alternative methods of childrearing
are truly harmful to children, variation among family approaches is to be
encouraged rather than hindered.
Third, given the strength of the emotional bonds that form between
parents and children, not only can we expect that most parents strive to
promote their children's welfare, but also that disruptions of parent-child
relationships exact a cost to the child's well-being that must be carefully

385. Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289-90 (1975). See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747,
1756 & n.19 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Hatchingthe Egg], for a discussion of the limitations
of the best interests standard.
386. See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 992 (1975). Professor Wald points out that "[n]o
national consensus exists concerning what constitutes a 'healthy' adult" or "how to raise a child to
make him 'healthy'-however 'healthy' may be defined." Id. He asserts that state intervention in
families for the purpose of child protection should not seek "to regulate all aspects of childrearing,"
but should instead focus on "basic harms from which we wish to protect all children." Id.at 993.
See also Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 648 (2002) (arguing that state
intervention in the family should be limited to circumstances "where the state's relative childrearing expertise is greatest-where the developmental stakes are most public, or where the
consensus if most unqualified" and that even then "we should be slow to allow state intervention if
the child's welfare is our goal" because of the costs of intervention to the child are so great).
387. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532-33 (1925).
388. Id. at 535.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

91

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

measured against the benefits of state intervention.389 Decades of theory
and research in developmental psychology confirm the importance to
children's well-being of healthy parent-child bonds and of continuity in
such caregiving relationships. 390 Thus, there is inherent value in allowing
389. Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1214
(1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family, 1980].
390. Scholarship examining the role of attachment relationships in the formation of healthy
child and adult functioning has flourished over the last several decades. Researchers have explored
the evolutionary role and neurobiological bases of attachment behavior, and studied how the nature
and quality of attachment relationships affect psychological functioning throughout the lifespan.
There is now a rich empirical base from which to conclude that the quality of children's
relationships with adult caregivers strongly influences their well-being. The best compilation of
modem attachment research is available in HANDBOOK OF ATrACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS (Jude Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 1999).
Many in the legal world rely on the writings of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit as support for
the proposition that continuity and permanence are important to children's welfare. See generally
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979);

JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986). While these writings
provide accessible discussions of the contribution that maintenance of emotional bonds with parent
figures makes to children's development, these works have also provoked substantial criticism. Jean
Koh Peters summarizes these critiques as relating to: (1) "inappropriate or inadequate data and
authority for the psychological principles underpinning their work"; (2) "concern that the.., work
reflected an overly narrow and culture-bound view of families, which failed to recognize the
existence and success of diverse family forms larger than the two-parent nuclear family"; and (3)
fears that the authors' principles would be disproportionately harsh on poor families and children."
Jean Koh Peters, The Roles andContent of Best Interests in Client-DirectedLawyering for Children
in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1545 (1996). For example, Katharine
Bartlett criticizes Goldstein et al.'s unsubstantiated assumption that children's maintenance of
relationships with a range of people with whom they have emotional bonds "jeopardizing their
adjustment to new family situations," and should be strongly disfavored. See Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood, supra note 381, at 908. By contrast, Bartlett argues that children suffer when
relationships to important caregivers are disrupted, even if those caregivers are not legallyrecognized parents and children are required to manage a complex web of relationships to adults
who may not be in familial relationships with each other. Id. at 902-912. And, indeed, empirical
research has only scratched the surface in understanding the nature and process of children's
attachment to multiple caregivers, revealing a far more complex picture than that portrayed by
Goldstein et al. See, e.g., Carollee Howes, Attachment Relationships in the Context of Multiple
Caregivers, in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS,

supra, at 671. Initial findings support Bartlett's position, and challenge the wisdom of excluding
multiple caregivers from a child's life. For example, in summarizing the research findings to date,
Howes concludes that "[p]articularly for children with difficult life circumstances... it seems
possible that alternative attachment figures can provide children with a 'safety net' for their future
development." Id. at 685. And for children who are removed from the home and placed with
substitute caregivers such as foster parents, a range of factors may contribute to the children's
overall development including: the nature and quality of the caregiving provided in the home of
origin and the child's attachment to his/her legal parents, the history of traumatic or deleterious
conditions or events, the nature of the care provided by the substitute caregivers and the child's
attachment to those persons, the length and number of out-of-home placements, and so on. Michael
Rutter and Thomas G. O'Connor emphasize that there exists a "paucity of systematic research"
providing clear answers to guide legal decisionmaking. See Michael Rutter & Thomas G.
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parents significant independence in childrearing, and reserving state
intervention for truly exceptional circumstances in which the child's
welfare is seriously at risk, so as to protect the parent-child relationship
from ongoing interference from the state.
State protection of parental autonomy has also been viewed as a
sort of quid pro quo-a reciprocal component that goes hand-in-hand
with the weighty responsibilities of parenthood. Professor Katharine
Bartlett refers to this as the "exchange" theory of parenthood: parental
duties create parental rights and vice versa. 391 Professors Elizabeth and
Robert Scott argue that legal protection for parental discretion serves to
promote parental commitment to their children's interests by serving as
"an important inducement to encourage investment [by parents in their]
children's welfare., 392 The Scotts analogize the parent-child relationship
to that of the relationship between fiduciaries and beneficiaries. 393 They
assert that, like the responsibilities of fiduciaries, the duties of parents
are complex, not easily reducible to specific obligations, demand
monitor.394
considerable decisionmaking discretion, and are difficult to
The broad discretion granted to fiduciaries in carrying out their dutiessubject primarily to general obligations of care and loyalty-not only
allows fiduciaries to fulfill their duties more efficiently than would an
arrangement that micro-managed their day-to-day functions, but also

O'Connor, Implications of Attachment Theory for Child Care Policies, in HANDBOOK OF
ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS, supra, at 823, 830. For

additional critiques of Goldstein et al.'s writings, and summaries of competing formulations, see
Peggy C. Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 347 (1996); Peggy C. Davis, "'There is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987); Matthew B. Johnson, Examining
Risks to Children in the Context of ParentalRights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 397 (1996); Mary Elizabeth Pumick, The State as Parent: Using Attachment Theory
to Develop Child Welfare Policy in the Best Interest of the Child, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 419 (1998). Additionally, a special issue of Volume 22 (1983-84) of the N.Y.U. Review of
Law and Social Change, beginning at page 485, provides a broad range of critiques of the first two

books in the trilogy, and includes contributions from Albert J. Solnit and Joseph Goldstein.
391. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 298 (1988)
[hereinafter Bartlett, Re-ExpressingParenthood].
392. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2440
(1995).
393. Id. at 2402. Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has applied a similar concept of
"stewardship" or "trusteeship." See Woodhouse, BurningBuildings, supra note 384.
394. Scott & Scott, supra note 392, at 2419-20. Beneficiaries, like children, are presumed to
"lack the requisite information or expertise to understand or evaluate the fiduciary's performance"
thus rendering these individuals "particularly vulnerable and unable fully to protect and assert
[their] own interests." Id. at 2420.
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serves as a "reward" of sorts for their commitment to the interests of
their beneficiaries.395
Professors Scott note that parent-child relationships begin with a
powerful emotional attachment that predisposes the parents to make
their children's interests paramount, and in an intact family, these
predispositions together with "internalized informal norms about
parenting, are assumed to function effectively, mitigating potential
conflicts of interest ... ,,396 Thus, according to the Scotts, parental rights
and their concomitant broad grants of discretion enhance parents'
commitment to serving the interests of their beneficiaries by promoting
parental investment in the childrearing process. Consistent with this
perspective, we presume not only that parents will generally be capable
and motivated to act in their children's best interests, but that a broad
grant of autonomy to parents in childrearing is an essential component of
the arrangement. That grant of autonomy helps parents maintain their
motivation to place the children's interests first, and is also highly
practical, because the state is unlikely to be able to manage all of the
day-to-day decisions and functions required of parents.39 7
Yet, before the law can protect the primacy of a particular family in
the upbringing of children, it must first determine which constellation of
persons form the parent-child unit to be afforded protection. While in
most instances, there is neither debate nor uncertainty as to who
comprises a child's family, the matter may be disputed in others. The
law typically privileges certain indicia of parenthood over others when
determining precisely whose relationship with a particular child is
entitled to legal protection. Formal factors, such as biology and, in the
case of men, marriage to the child's mother, weigh heavily in
determinations of parentage ordinarily trumping purely functional
factors.39 8 Thus, persons to whom we might generically refer as "de
395. See id. at 2429.
396. Id. at 2446. By contrast, the Scotts argue further that, once the family is "fractured," either
through "voluntary" actions such as parental separation or divorce, or because the state has found
parental conduct inadequate, as in the child protection context, more intrusive legal regulation
replaces the more extralegal and internalized informal norms. id
397. See The Constitution and the Family, 1980, supra note 389 at 1214 (noting that parents
are far more qualified than the state to provide "the intimacy, stability, emotional support required
for a child's healthy development .... [and to] make all of the countless detailed, subjective
decisions necessary in rearing children .. "); Buss, "Parental"Rights, supra note 386, at 656
(observing that the law's placement of childrearing responsibility with parents serves as a means of
"ensuring the effective satisfaction of [the] important responsibilities" that include "intense day-today involvement of nurturance and long-term investment that instills values and fosters skills").
398. See, e.g., Smith v. Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977)
(holding that "[w]hatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution,
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facto," "functional," or "psychological" parents, but without formal
claims to parental status, may not be accorded legal recognition despite
those
having assumed the responsibilities of parenthood and developed
"natural bonds of affection" unique to parent-child relationships. 399
In recent decades, the law has had to confront a myriad of situations
in which parties with traditional claims of parenthood are pitted against
those who assert claims based on nontraditional factors, such as having
formed a functional parent-child relationship, stimulating rich debates in
the scholarly literature as to what factors should form the basis for legal
parenthood,400 and whether determinations of parenthood must
necessarily exclude legal claims to a continuing relationship with
children by nonparents with whom a child has a deep attachment.
Along these lines, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that
notions of parenthood should be "child-centered," that is, vest parental
status in those who have "earned" it by meeting children's needs for
to the
nurturance, care, and protection through unwavering commitment
4 °2
child through "life-sustaining and responsive caregiving.
that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is
to return the child to his natural parents"); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (upholding California's
conclusive presumption of legal paternity in favor of a mother's husband in face of putative
biological father's claims). For a discussion of the distinction between "formal" and "functional"
models of family relationships, see ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 367, at 20-39; David D. Haddock &
Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 15 (1996); Martha
Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out? 62 COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991).
399. For a discussion of some of those factors see, e.g., ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 367, at
655-81, 941-1035, 1063-71; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 107-134, § 2.03 (2000).

400. Compare, e.g., John DeWitt Gregory, Redefining the Family: Undermining the Family,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381 (2004) (critiquing scholarly calls for expansion of legal definitions of
family beyond traditional formal categories), with Minow, supra note 398, and Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg, supra note 385 (arguing for expansion of legal definitions of family to
incorporate certain functional parent-like relationships).
401. See, e.g., Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood,supra note 381.
402. See, e.g., Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 385, at 1749, 1752-55. Professor
Woodhouse argues that constitutional precedents protecting family privacy, such as Meyer and
Pierce,reveal their "dark side" when parental autonomy operates like a form of ownership favoring
those who have a possessory claim of parenthood but have failed to meet the child's needs for care
and nurturance. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse "Who Owns the Child? "':Meyer and Pierce and the
Childas Property, 33 WM. & MARY L .REV. 995, 1000-01, 1042 & n.209 (1992); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247 (1999). Woodhouse
argues that vestiges of traditional views of women and children as the property of husbands and
fathers continue to influence modern child-family-state jurisprudence: "Themes of individualism,
private enterprise, and parental rights of ownership mark our history and survive in our state laws of
custody and our constitutional doctrines of family 'autonomy' and 'privacy."' Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg, supra note 385, at 1809-12. In its place, she proposes a generist model, invoking
a metaphor of a "dynamic stewardship, in which power over children is .... earned through actual
care giving ... " Id. at 1814-15.
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For our purposes here, it is not necessary to confront the question of
whether certain nontraditional relationships between adults and children
should be given legal protection. In focusing on the primacy of the
family, my objective is to propose a reordering of priorities for state
intervention with troubled and troublesome youth, so that promotion of
these children's adaptive functioning within the family, and the
strengthening of the family itself become serious goals. Families of
troubled and troublesome youth, however, are often disorganized,
disrupted, and dysfunctional. Perhaps a stable or otherwise influential
force in the child's life is a grandparent, a stepparent, an aunt, an older
sibling, or a foster parent. My discussion of the primacy of the family
does not, a priori, suggest which persons might fruitfully be engaged in
family-based interventions supportive to the child. Rather, my purpose is
to speak more broadly of the central role that family relationships play in
our law, culture, and in our psychological well-being, and to redirect
state efforts toward investing in such relationships.
Consistent with this point, while much of the foregoing helps to
explain why our government employs a policy of restraint regarding
intervention in the family, it does not tell us what obligations the state
has to help families succeed in the childrearing mission. As social
changes have made family life more challenging for many, our notions
of family as a self-sustaining unit have not evolved to accommodate the
complexities that affect American families' abilities to meet the needs of
their children. Recognizing that the burdens borne by some parents in
modem American society are increasingly heavy, some observers
propose a greater governmental and community role in supporting
families by providing for a range of services.40 3 Yet, there is a lack of
agreement, perhaps even "confusion and ambivalence," as to "which
responsibilities the individual family should shoulder and which should
be assumed by other nonfamilial institutions. ' 4° 4 The resulting policy
approach to social problems is "splintered," "piecemeal or makeshift.' ' °s
The United States has "no coherent 'family policy"' and a "constricted

403.

See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND

THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 210 (1992) (arguing that the "rest of American culture should adopt
standards of childrearing that do not confine responsibility to parents" and stating that the "truly
dysfunctional thing about American parenting is that it is made out to be such a
frighteningly ...private and exclusive job"); see also Anne L. Alstott, What Does a FairSociety
Owe Children--andTheir Parents?,72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1941 (2004).
404. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 365, at xvii.
405. Id.at xvii.
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capacity" to support the family in meeting its obligations to our society's
children.4 °6
Frequently, as in the case of troubled and troublesome youth, our
society swings between solutions that are polar opposites of one another.
Families are either left to their own devices exclusively-to deal with
troubled and difficult youth, to finance interventions, and to struggle to
provide adequate and safe homes and environments against sometimesoverwhelming odds-or children are removed from the family home
under the auspices of the mental health, child welfare, or juvenile justice
systems. American policies should focus first and foremost on
strengthening and supporting families so that they are best equipped to
confront the challenges of raising children in today's society, which
places many "socially-toxic" influences in children's developmental
paths. 40 7 This conclusion follows logically from the constitutional
importance of the parent-child relationship, the primacy of the family in
American culture, and the psychological evidence underscoring the
importance of healthy parent-child relationships for children's futures.
While some troubled and troublesome children must be removed from
their homes for their benefits or for the safety of others, the research
findings discussed in Part VII suggest that such removals are typically
not necessary to achieve the goals of state intervention discussed
immediately below.
B. Justifying State Intervention in the Lives of Children andFamilies:
The Government's Interests in the Welfare of Children
The law governing state regulation of children and families is
unique because of the state's distinctive relationship to children.
Although American law clearly protects parental authority in most
aspects of childrearing-creating a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter"--parental discretion is not absolute."' It must
yield when its exercise interferes with the state's interests, and
occasionally, when it interferes with the children's interests. The

406. Demos, supra note 361, at 60.
407. See, e.g., JAMES GARBARINO, RAISING CHILDREN IN A SOCIALLY Toxic ENVIRONMENT
(1995) (emphasizing factors such as the availability of guns and school and community violence,
domestic violence, the prevalence of divorce and absent fathers, poverty and racism); see also
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Refraining the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An
Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 85-92 [hereinafter, Woodhouse,
Socialization of Children] (discussing the potentially negative impact of media and marketing
influences on children).
408. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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Supreme Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts, best articulated the state's
dual parens patriae and police power interests in the children's
development, and how those interests are balanced against the rights of
parents to control their children's upbringing:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest .... Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in
many other ways .... [T]he state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare.
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like
actions of adults .... A democratic society rests, for its continuance,
upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against
impeding restraints and dangers, within a broad range of selection.
Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects
of child employment, more especially in public places, and the
possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse
influences of the street .... [L]egislation appropriately
designed to
police power ....
reach such evils is within the state's

The term parens patriae is translated literally as "parent of the
country," 1 ° and refers to the traditional role that the state has played,
much like a guardian or benevolent parent, in safeguarding and serving
those who cannot protect their own interests because of incapacity or
youth.4 1 In the context of children, the state's parens patriae power
409. Id. at 166-68 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court stated further: "Parents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances,
to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
410. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
411. The origins of the doctrine of parens patriae are fairly obscure, which is surprising in
light of the expansive range of state interventions that this doctrine currently justifies. Justice
Marshall recounts the doctrine's heritage in a case concerning a state's right to sue for economic
injuries attributable to a violation of the federal antitrust statutes:
The concept ofparens patriae is derived from the English constitutional system. As the
system developed from its feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and
powers, which were referred to as the "royal prerogative." ... These powers and duties
were said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as "father of the country."
Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves. For example, Blackstone refers to the
sovereign or his representative as 'the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and
lunatics," and as the superintendent of "all charitable uses in the kingdom." In the United
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authorizes its regulation of children and their families, for the purpose of
protecting the children's welfare. Thus, under this limited power, "the
state may pursue ends that would be impermissible under the police
are unrelated to any harm to third parties or to the
power because they
4 12
public welfare.
The state's police power interest, by contrast, justifies regulations
that seek to "secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and
prosperity of' the society as a whole,41 3 thus permitting the regulation of
children and families where doing so is deemed necessary to promote
the general welfare. The distinction between two subtypes of police
power justifications is of particular relevance to our discussions of state
intervention with troubled and troublesome youth.414 The first subtype,
States, the "royal prerogative" and the "parens patriae" [sic] function of the King passed
to the States.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil of California, 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). Yet, in the context of juvenile
justice and modem America's reach into the lives of children via the juvenile justice system, Justice
Fortas clearly appeared unconvinced that it formed an appropriate basis for unchecked discretion on
the part ofjuvenile court judges:
The Latin phrase [i.e., parens patriae] proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from
chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act
in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the
child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). For further discussion of the origins of the doctrine in English
law, see Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "ParensPatriae,-22
S. C. L. REv. 147 (1970); Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
412. The Constitution and the Family, 1980, supra note 389, at 1199. Yet, there are a range of
notions as to the appropriate purposes, justifications, and reach of the parens patriaepower-none
of which is universally accepted in legal theory. Natalie Loder Clark, ParensPatriaeanda Modest
Proposalfor the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's Welfare, 6
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381 (2000). At one end of the spectrum is a position that the doctrine of
parens patriae should be abolished, because government intervention under this best interests
justification is not morally acceptable; child protection functions, therefore, would be products of
"community control with norms and standards informally enforced." Id. at 389. At the other end of
the continuum is a position that grants the state expansive and unchecked authority to intervene in
its subjects' lives. Id. at 391-92. More characteristic of modem American jurisprudence is the view
that parents are the "primary protectors and nurturers of their children, but the state may interfere by
assisting them in these tasks or by supplanting them as mandated by rules made with majority
consent and limited by built-in safeguards against government injustice." Id. at 390-9 1.
413. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 410, at 1041.
414. 1 do not suggest that these two types sweep within them all forms of police power
intervention. Rather, these two types are of most relevance to the population that is the focus of this
Article. Other interventions justified by the police power include, for example, zoning, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and regulation of morality, Raymond Ku,
Swingers: Morality Legislationand the Limits of State Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 5-9
(1999). See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, The Power to Govern Men and Things: Patriarchal
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which I refer to as policies justified by public safety-oriented purposes,
seeks to regulate the conduct of particular individuals who present a
danger to others so as to protect society from this danger. Clearly, our
criminal justice system and law enforcement apparatus are in place
primarily to further these police power goals.4 15 In the case of juveniles,
government intervention in the lives of youth who endanger the public
by committing violent acts would fall under this subtype of the police
power.4 16
The police power however, extends to "all aspects of the public
welfare," 417 and is not limited solely to restricting the dangerous conduct
of some for the protection of others. Given that children are the future
adult citizens of our nation, their socialization and positive development
is critical to the well-being of the rest of us in society, and perhaps even
to our democratic form of government.4 18 Thus, the socializationoriented dimensions of the police power, as exercised in relation to
children, authorizes fairly broad governmental intervention including,
but not limited to, state requirements for school attendance and
prohibitions against child labor.419
Thus, while the parens patriae and police power justifications for
regulating children's lives are theoretically quite distinct, many
regulations of children's and families' lives are justified by both sets of
interests. To the extent that an intervention authorized by the police
power seeks to further the common good by promoting the child's
healthy development into well-educated, productive, and well-adjusted
adults, that intervention may also be justified under the parens patriae
power, in that such positive development is likely to be in the children's
own best interests as well as those of their community. Furthermore, the
convergence of these two sets of justifications in particular contexts has
allowed the state to forge some of its most expansive interventions in the

Originsof the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1277 (2004) (discussing the history

of the police power in Anglo-American law); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police
Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 429 (2004) (analyzing of the constitutional basis and limits of the

states' police powers).
415. Among those purposes served, in theory, by the criminal justice system are incapacitation,
deterrence, and retribution. See, e.g., BLOCH & MCMUNIGAL, supra note 121, at 28-60.
416. For a rich and provocative analysis of the independent role of "preventive detention" (i.e.,
incapacitation) in public safety-oriented police power confinements, see Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudenceof Dangerousness,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2003).
417. The Constitution and the Family, 1980, supranote 389, at 1198-99.
418. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1994).

419.

As noted below, however, these two types of regulations are also justified by parens

patriae purposes. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
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lives of children and families, 420 such as universal compulsory
education, child labor restrictions, and the
development of state-based
421
child welfare and juvenile justice systems.
Our government has generally relied first on parents to guard,
secure, and provide for children's welfare. Twentieth century
constitutional jurisprudence has clarified that family privacy, of which
parental autonomy is a core component, is a fundamental constitutional
right, thereby shielding parental autonomy from state interference except
where state intervention is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest. 422 Protection of children's welfare, either under parenspatriae

or police power theories, is generally viewed as compelling,4 23 and thus
substantive scrutiny of regulations intervening in the family will focus
on whether the means chosen by the state are sufficiently narrow. Yet,
this particular allocation of authority between the parents and state
leaves us with a bit of a dilemma:
[I]f the state must assume some responsibilities for children, how can it
discharge those responsibilities when childrearing is still considered a
private responsibility? The dominant solution ever since the early
nineteenth century has been to allow the state to intervene
into
4 24
childrearing only when families are considered to have failed.

420. For example, we compel parents to obtain vaccinations for their children and to insure that
their children attend school because we believe these mandates are in the joint interests of the
children and society. Arguably, it is the convergence of societal and individual interests that gives
the state its legitimacy in mandating compliance with these particularly intrusive directives, because
either interest alone would be insufficient. We do not compel children or adults to participate in
medical research, even though universal participation might make as significant contribution to
societal public health goals as does obtaining required vaccinations. In our political system, the
police power interests of such a policy alone does not justify the intrusion on personal autonomy
that coerced research participation would entail. Likewise, generally, we do not compel individuals
to undergo medical procedures that are for their benefit only. Here, parenspatriaemotives alone do
not outweigh individual autonomy interests. When the parens patriae and police power interests
operate in concert, however, there exists greater justification for particularly intrusive social
policies.
421. The notion of "rehabilitation," central to the creation of the juvenile justice system,
reflects converging parens patriae and police power goals, in that such rehabilitation, in theory,
benefits the offender and the public. For a fresh perspective on the concept of rehabilitation within
the juvenile justice system, see Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructingthe Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299 (1999).
422. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-67 (2000).
423. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417,443 (1990).
424.

GRUBB & LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 6

(1998).
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Generally, families are left on their own or with limited assistance
to provide for their children's caregiving and support. The state stands
ready to intervene, typically with removal of children from the home,
when the family is viewed to have failed their children. That failure may
manifest in any of several ways. Law enforcement, school personnel, or
others may respond to the troubled and troublesome behavior of children
which may be viewed as disobedient, dangerous, or as symptoms of
emotional disorder. Child welfare personnel or others may focus on
suspected parental inadequacies or maltreatment. Children's exit from
the home may follow, either through state action, parent-initiated
removal (which is often grounded in inability to access or afford
appropriate assistance), or child-initiated departure.
A broader vision of the state's converging parens patriae and
police power interests, as articulated in Prince, however, arguably
extends beyond mere protection of children from immediate dangers in
the face of alleged parental inadequacy. 425 The frequently-quoted
statement that "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies ' 426 suggests that the state would be wise to
make an investment in children, viewing children as the raw material out
of which tomorrow's citizenry will be formed.427 Failure to promote the
"healthy, well-rounded growth of young people" will squander society's
human capital to the detriment of this and future generations. Failure to
make such an investment is, of course, very short-sighted, when a

425. See, e.g., Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae,and a
State Obligation to ProvideAssistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 534-36 (1996) (arguing that modem
application of the parens patriaedoctrine via the child welfare system intervention in impoverished
families fails to achieve children's best interests and recommending that the state has affirmative
obligations to assist the family so that minimal intrusion in the family unit is required in the
protection of children's well-being); Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, "Let them Starve":
Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607 (1995) (arguing for an
affirmative government obligation to assist children in poverty, relying on the doctrine ofparens
patriae and other sources of law, acknowledging that "it may be difficult to use existing legal bases
to impose an affirmative obligation on government to support poor children"). Id. at 1647.
426. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
427. For a thoughtful analysis of the notion of investing in society's children, see Donald B.
Tobin, Investing in Our Children: A Not So Radical Proposal,73 U. CIN. L REv. 457 (2004). For
other discussions of this notion, see Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 385, at 1815-16;
Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failurein the Marketfor Children 's Human Capital,
81 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1993); Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1453 (2004); Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American CorporateGovernance
and Children: Investing in Our FutureHuman CapitalDuring Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
1258 (2004).
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society cares about its future and has the resources to promote children's
healthy development and growth.
American jurisprudence frequently characterizes interrelationships
of parents, the state, and children as adversarial, as these parties struggle
for control of children's destiny. Yet, such a characterization is rarely
appropriate. Most of the time, the interests of the state, parents, and
children are in harmony. The state values parental autonomy, for all of
the reasons set forth above, including that such autonomy is most likely
to promote the children's best interests, and thus also, the common good
of society. It is in the interest of the community that families succeednot fail-in their childrearing function. Thus, a model that emphasizes a
parent-state partnership formed around common concerns in childrearing
and socialization, rather than as a struggle over adverse interests, is most
likely to meet the needs of children, parents, and the larger
community.4 28 Such a model, however, will require a greater investment
by the state in promoting children and families' long-term welfare, along
lines to be elaborated in Part VII of this Article. While the costs of doing
so at the front-end may require more early investment in the process, it is
highly likely that the ultimate costs, human and financial, will be
substantially less than if we respond with state intervention or support
only after circumstances have led to a crisis which the state cannot
ignore.429
C. Avoidance of UnnecessaryRestrictions ofLiberty-Evenfor
Children
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
guarantee that no one shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. .,430 In addressing the question of what
process is due one whose liberty the state seeks to restrict, courts,
legislatures, and scholars have focused overwhelmingly on criminal
428. See Woodhouse, Socialization of Children, supra note 407, at 85-92 (discussing how a
parent-state partnership can benefit children in the face of deleterious influences from the media and
marketing strategies); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family:
The ParentalRights andResponsibilitiesAct andthe Politics of ChildProtection and Education, 57

OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 394-95 (1996).
429. See, e.g., ANNETTE U. RICKEL & EVVIE BECKER, KEEPING CHILDREN FROM HARM'S
WAY: HOW NATIONAL POLICY AFFECTS PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 89-146 (1997); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS (1993);
RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY: ADAPTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHILDHOOD ADVERSITIES
(Suniya S. Luthar ed., 2003); INVESTING IN CHILDREN, YOUTH, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES:
STRENGTHS-BASED RESEARCH AND POLICY (Kenneth I. Maton et al. eds., 2004).
430. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.
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defendants. This follows logically from the textual emphasis on the
criminal justice context in the Constitution, 43 and from the practical
reality that the most sizable group of persons at risk from state
deprivations of their physical liberty are criminal defendants.
Not until the mid-twentieth century did courts and legislatures
begin to address the procedural and substantive due process rights of two
other groups of individuals whose physical liberty was systematically
restrained by the state pursuant to various statutes: minors incarcerated
432
(or at risk of incarceration) under the authority of the juvenile justice
or mental health 433 systems, and adults hospitalized (or at risk of
hospitalization) in facilities for the mentally disordered or mentally
disabled.434 Restrictions of liberty in the context of civil commitment
and juvenile justice system intervention frequently involved a mixture of
parens patriaeand police power motives. When the regulation involved
minors, socialization-oriented police power goals were inextricably
intertwined with parens patriae goals because both envisioned shaping
children into healthy, well-adjusted members of society. 435 Given the
benevolent purposes asserted to underlie such exercises of state power,
government overreaching was somewhat less apparent than it was in the
criminal justice context, where the state impairments of liberty were
fueled solely by public safety-oriented police power goals.436 Minors'
431. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (setting forth protections against double jeopardy in
criminal trials and the right against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (setting forth rights
to speedy and public trial, trial by jury, notice of charges, confront witnesses, and assistance of
counsel); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and
unusual punishment). The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments have guided the
development of procedural rights of criminal defendants, and the Eighth Amendment has provided
some substantive limits on criminal punishments that restrict liberty, such as whether and under
what circumstances the death penalty is permissible, and whether there must be some form of
proportionality between one's offense and the length of one's sentence of incarceration. See, e.g.,
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-23 (2003);
see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment. "Proportionality"Relative to What?, 89 MiNN. L. REV. 571 (2005).
432. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (determining that certain due process
protections are constitutionally required "in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed...").
433. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) ("It is not disputed that a child, in
common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment.").
434. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (noting that "[t]his Court
repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 571,
573 (1975) (holding that hospitalization in a psychiatric facility, despite its allegedly benevolent
purpose, implicated "every man's constitutional right to liberty").
435. See supra Part V.B.
436. But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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constitutional rights are generally limited by the state's special interests
in guiding children's lives, 437 and traditional state deference to parental
autonomy in childrearing.438 Here, I examine legal support for the notion
that minors and persons viewed as mentally disordered have protectible
rights to be free from unnecessary restrictions of their liberty. I begin
with an examination of the constitutional parameters of the right to be
free from physical restraint. Next, I consider sources of law that support
a right to be free from unnecessary physical restraint-that is, in
contexts where state intervention is justified by parens patriaeor police
power goals, the preference for less restrictive intervention modalities.
1. The Constitutional Parameters of Minors' Interests in Freedom
from Physical Restraint
Beginning in the mid-1960s, a line of cases established that minors
were entitled to certain due process protections in the context of juvenile
justice system adjudications. The new constitutional doctrines were
foreshadowed by the Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. United States.4 39
Holding that the District of Columbia juvenile court had failed to
comply with its governing statute prior to waiving its jurisdiction and
transferring a minor for prosecution in adult criminal court, the Court
uttered its now-famous indictment of the juvenile justice system:
"[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.""
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.
437. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 635-39 (1979) ("We have recognized three
reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."). For a general
discussion of state's police power and parens patriaeinterests in children's welfare see supra Part
V.B.
438. The Court is particularly hesitant to extend constitutional rights to minors when doing so
restricts parental autonomy. In exceptional circumstances, such as where an important constitutional
interest of a minor is at stake, the Court has balanced the interests of the state, parents, and minor
children. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (balancing the interests of children, parents,
and the state in the context of parent-initiated and state-initiated psychiatric hospitalizations);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (balancing the interests of children, parents, and the state in
the context of minors' access to abortion).
439. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
440. Id.at 556. The Court in Kent declined to address the constitutional questions raised by the
petitioner, grounding its holding on the juvenile court's failure to provide those protections required
in the applicable Juvenile Court Act. Id.
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In 1967, announcing that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone," the Court extended various due
process protections to juveniles, such as the right to notice of charges,
and representation by counsel. 44 Subsequent cases established that the
juvenile court must also prove its case against minors using the most
demanding standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-consistent
with the requirements in adult criminal court," 2 and that the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects minors against
prosecution for the same offense in both juvenile and criminal court.443
With its holding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by
jury does not extend to juvenile court, the Court stopped short of
molding the juvenile court into a replica of criminal court. 444 In 1984,

when the Court upheld a New York statute authorizing pretrial detention
of juveniles charged with offenses, it reminded us that the constitutional
441. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that alleged delinquents are constitutionally
entitled to rights to counsel, notice of charges, confrontation of witnesses, as well as rights against
self-incrimination).
442. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
443. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). The due process protections applicable to juvenile
court apply in delinquency cases, but not necessarily to status offense adjudications. The Supreme
Court has not decided any cases on point. See Jan C. Costello, "Wayward and Noncompliant"
People with Mental Disabilities,9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 233, 235-36 & nn.12-13 (2003). The
extension of various procedural protections to status offenders is primarily a matter of state law, and
rarely approaches the level of protection required for delinquents. See, e.g., Alecia Humphrey, The
Criminalizationof Survival Attempts: Locking Up Female Runaways and Other Status Offenders,
15 HAST. WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 168-69 & nn.15-19, 172 (2004) (discussing court decisions denying

status offenders the same rights as are due delinquents and reporting findings that substantially
fewer status offenders are represented by counsel than are delinquents); Erin M. Smith, In a Child's
Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve ProceduralDue Process, 10 LAW & INEQ. 253,
256-71 (1992); Cheryl Dalby, Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A PaternalisticAgenda
CarriedOut Through the JJDPA, 12 LAW & INEQ. J.429, 438-40 & n.74 (1994); Evelyn C.
Knauerhase, Note, The Federal Circle Game: The Precarious Constitutional Status of Status
Offenders, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 31 (1990). Litigation as to the due process rights of status offenders
was forestalled, to some extent, by implementation of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"), id. which required states to separate status offenders from
delinquents and adult offenders, and to remove them from secure confinement. See infra note 650.
Yet, as discussed below, status offenders are frequently placed in some form of confinement. See
infranotes 447-73 and accompanying text.
444. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The Court in McKeiver concluded that
the imposition of a jury trial on the juvenile court would not strengthen its factfinding function and
would eliminate the benefits for the juvenile and for society of the remnants of a "unique" juvenile
justice system. Id. at 547. Professor Emily Buss argues that, despite its asserted goal of retaining a
juvenile justice system that addressed minors' special needs, the Court
adhered to this narrow and nonsensical framing. Because neither adult rights nor no
rights are well designed to secure fairness for children, the Court has waffled between
the two, creating a patchwork better understood as an attempt to split the difference than
to develop a coherent set of due process rights for children.
Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003).
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rights of minors are not identical to those of adults, even where
confinement in a juvenile justice facility is concerned.4 45 Justice
Rehnquist wrote that: "The juvenile's.. . interest in freedom from
institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is
undoubtedly substantial ....But, that interest must be qualified by the

recognition46 that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
4

custody."

A second line of cases addresses the constitutional limits on state
authority to hospitalize and retain custody of individuals alleged to be
suffering from mental disorders or mental disabilities. Although arising
in the criminal justice context, the Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson
v. Indianais one of its earliest statements interpreting the Constitution as
protecting the liberty interests of mentally disordered or disabled
persons.447 In Jackson, the Court held that a defendant committed to a
psychiatric facility for the purpose of evaluating and restoring his
competency to stand trial could not be incarcerated under the authorizing
statute once it was determined that he was incompetent and would not
become competent in the foreseeable future." 8 While the state could
seek his commitment under other statutorily permitted bases, his
continued detention under the initial statute was constitutionally
impermissible. 449 The Court asserted: "At the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the person is committed. 4' 50 Although
445. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The statute in question permitted detention of the
juvenile if the court determined that there was a "'serious risk' that the child 'may before the return
date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime."' Id. at 255.
446. Id. at 265. In Schall, the Court justified New York's preventive detention policy, in part,
on the state'sparenspatriaeinterests in the welfare of the child:
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.
They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae ....In this respect, the juvenile's
liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parens
patriaeinterest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child." Id.
447. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Jackson concerned a "mentally defective deaf mute with a mental
level of a pre-school child" who "cannot read, write, or otherwise communicate except through
limited sign language." Id. at 717. He was charged with the thefts of four and five dollars
respectively, and hospitalized in an Indiana psychiatric facility for a determination of his
competency to stand trial. Id.The defendant was found to be incompetent and committed until such
time as he was determined to be competent, despite psychiatric findings that he would never be able
to develop the necessary communication skills to participate adequately in his defense. Id. at 71820.
448. Id.at 718.
449. Id.at 738. The Court cited Indiana's civil commitment statutes as alternative bases under
which the state could proceed. Id.
450. Id.
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the Jackson Court addressed fairly limited questions, the language of the
unanimous opinion 451 underscored that even severely mentally disabled
individuals are entitled to some form of due process protection of their
liberty interests. Furthermore, the Court held that due process required
that such a person's continuing commitment be justified by its purposes.
Three years later, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court considered
the claims of a civilly committed psychiatric patient, Kenneth
Donaldson, who alleged that hospital personnel were obligated to
provide him with treatment or to release him.4 52 The Court declined to
address the question of whether there is a constitutional right to
treatment attendant to involuntary hospitalizations,4 53 or to examine the
constitutionality of the grounds set forth in civil commitment statutes.45 4
Rather, it characterized the case as raising "a single, relatively simple,
but nonetheless important question concerning every man's
constitutional right to liberty. ''4 S Noting that the jury below had found
that Donaldson's continued confinement was not justified by any of the
criteria set forth in current commitment statutes (i.e., protection of the
public or of "his own survival or safety," or "to alleviate or cure his
illness"), the Court held that there was no constitutionally permissible
basis for the continued restriction of Donaldson's liberty.456 The Court
uttered the powerful words: "Mere intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty,"
and answered negatively the question of whether "the State [may] fence
in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to
those whose ways are different .... ,

Thus, despite the Court's failure

to address certain questions raised below, it clarified that even those
persons determined to be "mentally ill" by the courts that civilly commit
them retain cognizable liberty interests.

451. Justices Powell and Rehnquist "took no part in the consideration or decision of this case."
Id. at 741.
452. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
453. Below, the Fifth Circuit held that such a constitutionally based right to treatment existed:
"[R]egardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against his will at
a state mental institution has 'a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give
him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."' Id. at 573 (citing
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974)).
454. "[T]here is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves
or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the
State may compulsorily confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of
treatment." Id. at 573.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 574-75.
457. Id.
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In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered the standard
of proof constitutionally required in civil commitment hearings. 458 It
asserted that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. ' 4'5 9 The
Addington Court held that states must apply a standard of proof no lower
than "clear and convincing evidence" in civil commitment proceedings.
It concluded that this standard struck the proper balance between
protecting prospective committees' liberty rights and the state's parens
patriaeand police powers.46 °
Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence addressing the physical
liberty rights of adults for whom civil commitment is sought, and of
juveniles processed through the juvenile court for alleged violations of
criminal statutes, clearly holds that both classes of individuals are
entitled to various procedural and substantive protections before those
liberty interests are infringed, although the nature and extent of those
protections vary across settings, populations, and in light of particular
state purposes. 461 The state's paternalistic purposes in restricting these
individuals' liberty distinguish these restrictions from those that occur
pursuant to adult criminal proceedings, as do the state's police power
goals of socializing children. These purposes do not extinguish the
individuals' physical liberty interests, but they do reduce the procedural
protections or substantive showings necessary to obtain a
462
constitutionally-permissible commitment.
458. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
459. Id.at 425.
460. Id.The parenspatriaepower authorized the state to assist those persons unable to care for
themselves because of emotional disorders, while the police power authorized the state "to protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill." Id. at 426.
461. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350-60 (1997). In Hendricks, the Supreme
Court held constitutional the standards and procedures authorizing long-term "civil" commitment of
sexually-violent predators under Kansas statutes. An individual who had been convicted of a
sexually violent offense could be so committed after serving his sentence, if found to have a "mental
abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that "makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to
control his dangerous behavior." Id.at 358. Such commitments would be impermissible for other
classes of offenders who have served their sentences. Arguably, therefore, the state's authority to
seek and obtain continued detainment of sexually violent predators, but not other offenders who
might also be dangerous to the public, hinges on the determination that the dangerousness of
sexually violent predators is linked to their "mental abnormalities." For an analysis of these
decisions and of scholarly commentary, see RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 641-64 (4th ed. 2004).

462. Of course, until the constitutionalization of the juvenile court in the 1960s and 1970s,
parens patriae and socialization-oriented police power considerations justified unchecked juvenile
court discretion. And, prior to the articulation of due process protections for those viewed as
needing psychiatric hospitalization during those same decades, asserted parens patriaejustifications
likewise facilitated expansive state intervention into such persons' lives.
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In 1979, the Supreme Court determined what procedural and
substantive requirements are constitutionally adequate if a child's
parents or guardians seek that child's admission to a state mental
institution. Parham v. J.R. was framed as a parent-child conflict. 463 In

response to J.R.'s argument that Georgia's procedures did not
adequately protect his liberty interests, the Court asserted: "[W]e assume
that a child has a protectible interest ... in being free of unnecessary
bodily restraints .... ,464 Thus, even a minor whose parents and the state
concur in seeking his admission to a mental hospital for purportedly
benevolent purposes 465 has a protectible interest in his physical liberty.

The Court, however, declined to provide extensive due process
protections in the context of collaborative decisions by parents and
doctors to admit children to inpatient facilities, and held that the
determination of a physician employed by the admitting facility as to the
child's "need for treatment" would protect sufficiently against the "risk
of error inherent in a parental decision to have a child institutionalized
for mental health care., 466 The grounding of the Court's decision so
heavily in deference to parental autonomy implies that the Court might
have been more aggressive in its protection of minors' liberty interests if
the child and parents were joined in a claim against a state's procedures
for committing minors to psychiatric hospitals.467
One of the most articulate expressions of the rights of minors to
freedom from physical restraint appeared in a concurrence by Justice
O'Connor in the case of Reno v. Flores.6 8 Speaking of alien juveniles
detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice
O'Connor opined:
[I]n my view these children have a constitutionally protected interest in
freedom from institutional confinement. That interest lies within the
core of the Due Process Clause, and the Court today does not hold
463.

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).

464.

Id. at 601. For an analysis of the Parham decision, see Weithom, Skyrocketing

Admissions, supranote 16, at 808-13.

465. The state's willingness to accept the child for admission to the state hospital is the manner
of concurrence I refer to here.
466.

Parham,442 U.S. at 606-08.

467. While the Court has not had occasion to determine what standards and procedures it
would require if a child and parent were joined in opposing the child's civil commitment, some state
statutes do mandate legal requirements similar to an adult civil commitment to such cases. See
Weithom, Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16, at 831-35.
468. See 507 U.S. 292, 315-19 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter joined Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence. This case challenged an Immigration and Naturalization Service
regulation that permitted the release of detained juvenile aliens only to their parents, close relatives,
or legal guardians, and not to other "responsible adults." Id. at 294-99.
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otherwise. Rather, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
because the INS program challenged here, on its face, complies with
the requirements of due process.
"Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action." (quotifig Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992)). "Freedom from bodily restraint" means more than freedom
from handcuffs, straitjackets, or detention cells. A person's core liberty
interest is also implicated when she is confined in a prison, a mental
hospital, or some other form of custodial institution, even if the
conditions of confinement are liberal. This is clear beyond cavil, at
least where adults are concerned .... Children, too, have a core liberty
interest in remaining free from institutional confinement. In this
respect, a child's constitutional "freedom from bodily restraint" is no
narrower than an adult's. Beginning with In re Gault... we
consistently have rejected the assertion that "a child, unlike an adult,
has a right 'not to liberty but to custody."'

Our decision in Schall v. Martin ....makes clear that children have a
from institutional
protected liberty interest in "freedom
labeled
absent the stigma of being
restraints,."., even
"delinquent,". . . or "mentally ill".... In Schall, we upheld a New
York statute authorizing pretrial detention of dangerous juveniles, but
only after analyzing the statute at length to ensure that it complied with
substantive and procedural due process. We recognized that children
"are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens
patriae"....But this parens patriae purpose was seen simply as a

plausiblejustification for state action implicating the child's protected
liberty interest, not as a limitation on the scope of'due process
protection ....It may seem odd that institutional placement... even
where conditions are decent and humane and where the child has no
less authority to make personal choices than she would have in a
family setting, nonetheless implicates the Due Process Clause. The
answer, I think, is this. Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual
event. "The consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are
more tragic where children are involved. Childhood is a particularly
vulnerable time of life and children erroneously institutionalized
during their formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their
lives." (Parham, 442 U.S. at 627-28 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Just as it
is true that "in our society liberty [for adults] is the norm, and
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detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception,".., so too, in our society, children normally grow up in
469
families, not in governmental institutions ....
This brings us to the question at the heart of this Section: Are high
rates of institutionalization of troubled and troublesome youth under the
authority of the juvenile justice, mental health, or child welfare
systems-for reasons falling within the state's police power authority to
promote children's healthy socialization or the state's parens patriae
authority to protect minors for the minors' own benefit- 4 70 compatible
with American legal traditions protecting these minors' physical liberty
interests? They clearly are not, despite language or results in cases such
as Parham and Schall that permit parens patriae commitments of
minors with fewer procedural requirements and less stringent substantive
standards than are required for similarly-situated adults. These
precedents underscore that individuals retain constitutionally protectible
interests in physical liberty which survive diagnosable mental
disorders,47 1 community disfavor of these individuals' presence in its
midst, 472 and circumstances in which minors' parents are joined with the
state in seeking their incarceration. Justice O'Connor's analysis of the
constitutional precedent accurately understands the import of decisions
to remove children from their homes, even where these children may be
placed in a location which provides them with no less "freedom" than
they had in their own family's custody. As she points out:
"Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event ....[I]n our society,
children normally grow up in families, not in governmental institutions"
and thus placement of children in institutions implicates their interests in
freedom from restraint of their physical liberty.4 73 The challenge
remaining, therefore, is to discern precisely what standards and

469. Flores,507 U.S. at 315-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
470. As Part III examines in greater detail, the population of troubled and troublesome youth
who are the focus of this Article are not those whose incarceration follows primarily from the state's
exercise of its police power authority to punish, incapacitate, or deter those who have endangered
the public. Rather, the focus here is on those minors whose incarceration is grounded primarily on
the state's interests in promoting the minors' own welfare, for the benefit of the minors themselves
or for general welfare of society-at-large. For elaboration on this distinction, see supra Part III.
471. But see supra note 462.
472. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (analogizing
institutionalization of the "harmless mentally ill.., whose ways are different" in order to protect
those in the community from exposure to these individuals to incarceration of the "physically
unattractive or socially eccentric" for the same purpose).
473. Flores, 507 U.S. at 318.
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procedures are required
permissible.
2.

to render impairments of those rights

The Preferencefor Less Restrictive Alternatives in Responding to
Troubled and Troublesome Youth

The view that there is, or should be, a constitutional right to the
least restrictive alternative when restrictions of physical liberty are
implicated is grounded in application of that mode of constitutional
analysis that requires strict scrutiny of policies that impair fundamental
constitutional rights. If a court determines that the right in question is
fundamental, the court may uphold a statute infringing that right only if
the statute's purpose serves a compelling government interest and the
means used to achieve that purpose are the most narrowly tailored, or
least restrictive of the underlying right.4 74
Constitutional jurisprudence relating to restraint of physical liberty
focuses to a greater degree on procedural rather than substantive
requirements of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 475 Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion in Reno v.
Flores, distinguishes between procedural and substantive restrictions on
liberty interests:
[Our cases interpret] the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee
of "due process of law" to include a substantive component [as well as
a procedural component], which forbids the government to infringe
certain "fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
is narrowly tailored to serve a
provided, unless the infringement
476
compelling state interest.
Some scholars assert that the Supreme Court does not consistently
apply its own doctrine, in that it identifies freedom from bodily restraint
as a fundamental right, but then does not apply strict scrutiny to statutes
authorizing incarceration.4 77

474. See id at 301-02.
475. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is This Right Different from All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781, 785-90 (1994); Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan,
Substantive Due Process andthe Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,35 CONN.

L. REV.319, 336-70 (2003).
476. Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02 (emphasis in original).
477. This argument is made with respect to criminal statutes, see generally Colb, supra note
475, and commitment authorized by post-conviction institutionalization of sexually-violent
predators. See generally Janus & Logan, supra note 475. If the Court did apply strict scrutiny to
criminal sentencing laws, most cases of criminal sentencing would not be affected. The states'
interests in deterring, incapacitating, or punishing serious or violent lawbreakers are clearly
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Despite the infrequency with which the Supreme Court has spoken
of the fundamental nature of the right to be free from confinement,
several cases underscore that such a characterization is correct. For
example, in Foucha v. Louisiana, a case that concerned the standards
and procedures for continued hospitalization of persons found to be not
guilty by reason of insanity, the Court stated:
"[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars
certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' Freedom from
bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action. "It is clear
that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty that requires due process protection." We have always been
careful not to "minimize the importance and fundamental nature" of
the individual's right to liberty. 47
In United States v. Salerno, a constitutional challenge to the Bail
Reform Act, the Court labeled the right to liberty implicated by pretrial
detention as important and "fundamental. ' ' 79 If the right to be free from
bodily restraint is fundamental, and therefore triggers strict scrutiny,
states would be required to show that the state purposes served by
compelling. By contrast, the application of a strict scrutiny to certain non-violent offenses could
lead some to question whether incarceration is the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the
criminal justice system's goals.
478. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990)); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (citations omitted); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982). This language in Foucha was cited with approval most recently by the
Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004) ("It is beyond question that
substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case, Hamdi's 'private interest ...affected
by the official action,' is the most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being free from
physical detention by one's own government.") (citation omitted). Hamdi challenged that he had
been provided with a constitutionally inadequate opportunity to contest the factual basis of his
detention as an "enemy combatant." Also see Justice O'Connor's characterization of the
fundamental nature of the right to be free from physical restraint in her concurrence in Reno v.
Flores.See supra note 469 and accompanying text.
479. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987). The Salerno Court, however,
upheld the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a statute that requires courts to detain
arrestees prior to trial "if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an
adversary hearing that no release conditions 'will reasonably assure.., the safety of any other
person and the community."' Id. at 741. In a stinging dissent, Justice Marshall (joined by Justice
Brennan) challenged that the statute was "incompatible with the fundamental human rights
protected by our Constitution." Jd. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it allowed indefinite confinement of individuals not yet convicted of
crimes on the basis of judicial findings of future dangerousness. Id.Thus, while the Salerno Court
clearly articulated that the right to physical liberty is fundamental, it also revealed a willingness to
impair that right in the face of certain legislative concerns.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

114

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble
2005]

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

statutes impairing that liberty were compelling, and that the means used
to achieve these ends are necessary-that is, that they are the least
restrictive, least intrusive, or least drastic means possible.480 The inquiry
is particularly relevant here. If strict scrutiny of state regulations
infringing minors' physical liberties is constitutionally required, then the
state must select the least restrictive among effective means to achieve
compelling police power or parens patriae interests in the welfare of
minors who would otherwise be confined under the auspices of the
juvenile justice, mental health, or child welfare systems.
Despite the logic of a constitutional analysis that requires states to
consider, and perhaps even create, less restrictive alternatives to
institutionalization in the mental health context, the Supreme Court has
never explicitly recognized such an obligation under the federal
Constitution. 481 The Court has had the opportunity to require greater
scrutiny of statutes and practices authorizing commitments, and has not
done SO. 4 82 Yet, elements of the "least restrictive alternative doctrine"
shape several areas of modern mental health law. This is due, in part, to
the role that sources of law other than the federal Constitution-such as
480. The Court enunciated the principle of the least drastic alternative in Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), a case that challenged the constitutionality of a state statute requiring
teachers to disclose their organizational affiliations. Focusing on the means chosen by the state to
achieve its goals together with the fundamental nature of the underlying liberties (of speech and
association), the Court held that even where "the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Id (footnotes
omitted). Since then, the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine has become well-established in First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 592 U.S.
803, 813 (2000), the Court stated that "a content-based speech restriction... can stand only if it
satisfies strict scrutiny ....If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative." Accord Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2791
(2004).
481. For a discussion of legal theories supporting various notions of constitutionally based
rights to treatment, see, for example, Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic ofIdentity and the Politics of
Justice: Establishing a Right to Community-Based Treatment for the Institutionalized Mentally
Disabled, 18 NEw ENG. J.ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (1992); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 113-23 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN
PREJUDICE].

482. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). In this case, a class of involuntarily
committed "mentally retarded" individuals challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky's statutes
authorizing their commitment. The Court upheld the statutes, applying rational basis review. The
Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny because the plaintiffs did not raise the question of the
level of scrutiny below. It did, however, state: "We have applied rational-basis review in previous
cases involving the mentally retarded and the mentally ill," and "a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity."
Id. at 321,319.
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legislation,48 3 common law,484 and state constitutional law 48 5-play in
determining prevailing legal policies. For example, Professor Bruce
Winick, in a review of the civil commitment statutes of all fifty states
and the District of Columbia, determined that thirty of these statutes
make explicit reference to less restrictive alternative treatments, and
most of those require that the court choose the least restrictive of the
appropriate treatments. 486 Federal and state case law interpret various
statutory provisions, 4 87 and scholarship reinforces the doctrinal
consistency and the practical and clinical benefits of identifying and
selecting less restrictive alternatives prior to institutionalizing an
individual.48 8
483. See, e.g., REISNER ET AL., supra note 461, at 751 (asserting that "the constitutional status
of the [least restrictive alternative] doctrine may not be an important issue [in] evaluating the impact
of the doctrine on the dispositional decision made by the committing authority" because so many
states have embedded the doctrine, in some form, in their commitment statutes).
484. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Bach, Note, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient
Deinstitutionalization:Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE
L.J. 1153 (1989).
485. State constitutional law has become particularly important in the recent spate of litigation
challenging state restrictions on same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
789 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993). Several commentators have suggested that state constitutions provide a rich, and as
yet untapped, source of rights-including rights to community-based services-for persons seeking
or needing mental health treatment. See, e.g., Katie Eyer, Litigatingfor Treatment. The Use of State
Laws and Constitutions in Obtaining Treatment Rights for Individuals with Mental Illness, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2003); Antony B. Klapper, Finding a Right in State
Constitutionsfor Community Treatment of the Mentally 111, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1993); Michael
Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last
Frontier?,20 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1249 (1987).
486. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 71-72,
Table 3.6 at 94-97 (2005).
487. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-25 & nn.15-16 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(construing 1964 amendments to D.C. Code, affirming Lake v. Cameron, citing to the least
restrictive alternative doctrine set forth in Shelton v. Tucker, and holding that the least restrictive
alternative doctrine applies not only to the state's action in committing an individual to a mental
hospital, but also to its decisions to place an individual in a more, rather than less, restrictive unit
within the hospital); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 659-61 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (construing the
District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, to hold that the District was obligated
to investigate less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization and to determine whether the appellant
and the public would be sufficiently protected by such alternatives).
488. Scholarly commentary has underscored, however, that the parameters of the doctrine of
the least restrictive alternative are somewhat blurry. For example, does the doctrine merely require
the state to explore the availabilityof less restrictive alternatives, or does it impose upon the state an
obligation to create and provide such alternatives? What evidence of efficacy is necessary in
determining which treatment type will be ordered? On what dimensions should restrictiveness be
evaluated? For scholarly discussions of these and other dilemmas see, for example, P. Browning
Hoffman & Lawrence L. Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in
Search of its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100 (1977); David L. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill. PracticalGuides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.
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One very clear example of such clinical benefits can be found in an
article by Professor Michael Perlin.4 89 In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme
Court determined that states need not comply with the same level of due
process protections attendant to adult commitments when considering
the petitions of parents who seek their minor children's admission to
mental hospitals.490 In Parham, former Supreme Court Chief Justice
Warren Burger characterized due process protections as "timeconsuming procedural minuets." New Jersey law, however, provided
children with more protections than were constitutionally required under
Parham. The New Jersey Mental Health Advocates Office, at that time
headed by Professor Perlin, represented children whose parents sought
their institutionalization in psychiatric facilities. Perlin studied effects of
legal advocacy for the children, and found that advocates who served as
guardians ad litem or amicus curiae for the children were able to open
many doors for children and their families. These advocates obtained
independent clinical evaluations of the children, investigated alternatives
less restrictive than hospitalization, opened funding channels, and
facilitated family contact with community agencies.49' Many of the
children in the study actually required certain special educational and
other noninstitutional services, provision of which was likely to avert the
need for a restrictive and potentially inappropriate intervention such as
psychiatric hospitalization.
The least restrictive alternative doctrine has also been invoked "as a
device for regulating treatment imposed on persons after they have been
committed or otherwise subjected to state intervention. 'A92 The
constitutional basis for a post-commitment right to the least restrictive
treatment modalities is weak. This follows from the failure of the Court
to hold that committed patients have a broad constitutionally-based right
to treatment while in state custody.49 3 In Youngberg v. Romeo, an
1107 (1972); David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the
Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 375 (1981); Ingo Keilitz, David
Conn & Andrea Giampetro, Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating
Concepts into Practice,29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 (1985).
489. See Michael Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An EmpiricalResponse to Chief Justice
Warren Burger's 'Time-Consuming ProceduralMinuets' Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981).
490. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 779 (1999). For a detailed discussion of Parham, see
Weithorn, Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16, at 808-13.
491. See Perlin, supra note 489, at 156-62.
492. REISNER ET AL., supranote 461, at 746.
493. Arguably, the Court was presented with at least two opportunities for finding such a right.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

See supranotes 452-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'ConnorCourt's conclusion
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institutionalized developmentally disabled man-who had been
repeatedly injured by his own and his fellow residents' actions and who
had been shackled and otherwise restrained by the hospital for his own
and others' protection--claimed that he had a "liberty interest in safety,
freedom of movement, and training within" the Pennsylvania state
institution to which he was committed.49 4 The Court held that Romeo
was entitled to "minimally adequate training.. . in light of [his] liberty
interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints."4 95 This
holding is generally viewed as recognition of a fairly narrow postcommitment right to treatment in light of the low standard articulated
(i.e., minimal adequacy), and the caveat that the right is triggered only
when provision of such treatment is necessary to serve the goal of
protecting the individual's physical safety in the least restrictive
manner. 496 Furthermore, while the Court held that involuntarily
committed residents enjoy "constitutionally protected interests in
conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these
interests, 497 it instructed reviewing courts to grant substantial deference
to the judgments of reasonableness of the treating professionals.49 8 Thus,
the Court did acknowledge a liberty interest in freedom from
unnecessary physical restraint within the hospital setting, but did not
elaborate on the parameters of that right, if any, beyond the
circumstances presented in Youngberg.499
The third context in which the right to the least restrictive
alternative is invoked concerns the obligations of states to create and
that it need not address the question of whether an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient had a
constitutional post-commitment right to treatment within the hospital.
494. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
495. Id. at 322.
496. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 481, at 120-23; Christopher Slobogin,
Mark R. Fondacaro & Jennifer Woolard, A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of
Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 212-13 (viewing Youngberg as an

endorsement of a constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily committed persons to the extent
that it entitles them "to the care necessary to prevent unnecessary restraint"). Slobogin and
colleagues also argue, however, that this holding "could easily be parlayed into a robust right to any
treatment necessary to reduce prolonged confinement." Id.
497. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
498. Id. at 322-23.
499. In a different context, in a case challenging the administration ofantipsychotic medication
to a criminal defendant during his trial, the Court appears to have adopted a doctrine analogous to
the least restrictive alternative principle. In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court held that the state of
"Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if... treatment with antipsychotic medication
was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential" to the safety
interests the Court found to be compelling. 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
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fund community-based treatment alternatives. While there is scant
evidence for a constitutionally based right to such treatment, 500 statutory
bases for such rights have been recognized under, for example, the
ADA, IDEA, and under state and federal Medicaid provisions.f °
During the 1990s, an innovation referred to as "outpatient
commitment" or mandated community treatment began to appear in the
statutes of an increasing number of states. 50 2 Policies and practices
grouped together under the rubric of outpatient commitment arose in
response to a variety of social concerns.50 3 These statutes allow states to
experiment with an alternative mechanism to achieve state police power
and parens patriae goals in a less restrictive context. States may
authorize mandated community treatment as an arguably least restrictive
alternative to hospitalization for persons who otherwise meet state
commitment criteria; as a preventive intervention, applying criteria less
stringent than those needed for inpatient hospitalization; or posthospitalization, as a condition of discharge after inpatient treatment.0 4
Professor John Monahan and others point out that mandated community
treatment actually subsumes a range of legal, clinical, and social welfare
approaches to promoting psychiatric patients' adherence to treatment
regimens. 50 5 In fact, empirical research reveals that court-ordered
participation in outpatient treatment as a form of civil commitment is not
500. But see Jan C. Costello & James J. Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative. A
ConstitutionalRight to Treatmentfor Mentally DisabledPersons in the Community, 20 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1527, 1542-43 (1987) (stating that Youngberg may have created a right to community-based
treatment with its holding of a constitutional right to "minimally adequate treatment" necessary to
reduce unnecessary restriction of liberty),
501. See supra Part 1II.
502.

See generally COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER

IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996) [hereinafter DENNIS &
MONAHAN].

503. As detailed in Part VI, deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals was not accompanied by
a commensurate increase in services that would have given persons viewed as seriously or
chronically mentally ill the best chance of functioning adaptively outside of the hospital. Problems
associated with the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, such as homelessness and commission of
criminal violations, triggered enactment of various outpatient commitment policies.
504. REISNER ET AL., supra note 461, at 755-56..
505. See, e.g., John Monahan et al., Use of Leverage to Improve Adherence to Psychiatric
Treatment in the Community, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 37 (2005) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Use of
Leverage]; John Monahan et al., Mandated Treatment in the Community for People with Mental
Disorders,22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28 (2003) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Mandated Treatment]; John
Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment, 52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1198 (2001) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment];
NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH: IS COERCION THE
available at
SERVICES?
ISSUE
BRIEF
#
757
(2000),
PRICE
OF
COMMUNITY

http://www.nhpf.org/index.cfmfuseaction=Details&key-363);
REISNER ET AL., supra note 461, at 755-58.
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50 6
the most common mechanism used to secure treatment compliance.
Cooperation with treatment regimens may also be required by

governmental and community agencies providing various social services
(such as Social Security benefits or federally subsidized housing). 50 7 In
addition, criminal court judges may mandate community treatment

compliance as a condition of probation and alternative to a jail or prison
sentence.50 8 To the extent that the concept of mandated community

treatment serves to compel cooperation with outpatient treatment
it reflects
regimens by individuals who would otherwise be hospitalized,
50 9
influence of the least restrictive alternative doctrine.
In conclusion, the state's parens patriae and socialization-oriented

police power goals in intervening in the lives of children and families do
not negate those children's rights to be free from unnecessary restraint.
In some respects, these dual goals may heighten the importance of

avoiding unnecessary deprivations of these children's liberty. To the
extent these interventions are intended to benefit the minors for their
own sakes or for our sake, incarceration and other out-of-home
placements should be justified by empirical data demonstrating the
efficacy of such interventions in achieving the goals of removal.

506. Monahan et al., Use ofLeverage, supra note 505, at 43-44.
507. Id.; Monahan et al., Mandated Treatment, supra note 505, at 31-32.
508. Monahan et al., Mandated Treatment, supra note 505, at 32-33; see Monahan et al., Use
of Leverage, supra note 505, for findings of recent empirical investigation examining the forms of
leverage used to induce psychiatric outpatients to comply with the recommended treatment regimen.
509. "Requiring adherence to community-based mental health treatment is now the single most
contested human rights issue in mental health law and policy." Monahan et al., Mandated
Treatment, supra note 505, at 29. Yet, most of the debate focuses on formal judicial outpatient
commitment orders as contrasted with other forms of leverage. Monahan et al., Use of Leverage,
supra note 505, at 43. Recent empirical findings reveal that such formal judicial orders constitute
"the least prevalent form of leverage," with access to housing, avoidance of criminal penalties, and
other forms of leverage far more common. Id. at 43-44. Thus, they argue, debates about these
phenomena should expand to encompass the range of forms of coercion used to promote psychiatric
patients' compliance with treatment regimens in the community. Id
For debates relating to efficacy of outpatient commitment, patients' perceptions of
coerced outpatient interventions, net-widening effects, the constitutionality of various forms of
coerced outpatient interventions, and a range of other issues, see generally the contributions to
Symposium: Preventive Outpatient Commitment for Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 9
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3 (2003). See also DENNIS & MONAHAN, supra note 502; NAT'L

CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS., OUTPATIENT CIVIL COMMITMENT, ISSUE BRIEF (DEC. 31, 2002);
John Petrila, M. Susan Ridgely & Randy Borum, Debating Outpatient Commitment: Controversy,
Trends, andEmpiricalData, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 157 (2003); M. Susan Ridgley, Randy Borum &
John Petrila, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Outpatient Treatment: EmpiricalEvidence and the
Experience of Eight States (2001); Richard O'Reilly, Why are Community Treatment Orders
Controversial?49 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 579 (2004); Christopher Slobogin, Involuntary Community
Treatment of People Who are Violent and Mentally Ill: A Legal Analysis, 45 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 685 (1994).
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Constitutional precedent, utilitarian policymaking, and clinical wisdom
converge in adherence to the principle that "the nature and duration" of a
deprivation of liberty must "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which" it is undertaken.51 °
The legal grounding of the least restrictive alternative principle,
developed with reference to the Due Process Clause and rights to be free
from unnecessary restraints of liberty, is clearly distinct from that of the
least restrictive environment and most integrated setting principles
grounded in the IDEA and ADA, as discussed immediately below. Yet it
is striking that the potential practical effects of the doctrines are parallel,
in that they strive to provide services in the least restrictive, or most
integrated, setting possible. And, as noted in Section D below, legal
theories grounded in the IDEA and ADA demonstrate greater practical
promise of leading to the provision of such services.
D. Inclusion in the Mainstreamof Community Life
The IDEA and ADA signaled dramatic paradigm shifts in legal
characterizations of the rights of persons identified as having mental
disorders. First, in contrast to the legal rights discussed in Part V.C,
immediately above-which are rooted in substantive and procedural due
process formulations and statutory embodiments of those principlesthe IDEA and ADA's integrationist themes borrow from equal
protection jurisprudence. Second, the IDEA and ADA reflect weakening
reliance on the medical model conceptualization of the challenges and
needs of persons identified as having mental disorders. The medical
model sees these conditions as manifestations of individual pathology,
the disability model focuses on individuals' specific functional
impairments in particular settings and/or in performing particular life
activities (such as learning, working, gaining access to a building).
The third shift is the replacement of themes of "custodialism" with
themes of "integrationism" in American legal policy toward disabled
individuals. 511 "Custodialism is the idea that persons with disabilities are
to be sheltered-that they should be kept separate from the population at
large and given charity to compensate for their inability to survive in the
world on their own. 51 2 Arguably, however, the separation of mentally

510. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
511. Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-IntegrationistExamination,
2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 889-99 (2000) (drawing on Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The
Disabledand the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966)).
512. Id. at 899.
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disabled persons from the rest of the community exists less for the
protection of those with disabilities, and more for the comfort of those in
the community.5 3 Furthermore, custodialism deprives mentally disabled
individuals of countless opportunities to learn and to develop their
capacities to the greatest extent possible and fuels stigmatization of those
institutionalized as inferior, defective, dangerous, unfit for514 social
interaction, and incapable of meaningful participation in society.
Integrationism, by contrast, views disabilities as "socially
constructed"5 1 5 to the extent that places of learning, employment, and
social discourse are structured in ways that allow the participation of
non-disabled persons but exclude disabled individuals. 51 6 Because the
structure of these settings is not immutable, changes can be made to
permit greater participation by disabled individuals. In addition, the
integrationist perspective encompasses an equality principle mandating
equal opportunities for disabled and non-disabled individuals to
participate in society. In order to promote this latter goal, government
intervenes less to protect disabled persons and more to enable their
"independence and self-reliance."51 7 Within this framework, the failure
of government and private actors to construct settings in a manner that
promotes disabled individuals' adaptive functioning is characterized as
discrimination because "government and society facilitate the ablebodied population's achievement of the good life and refuse the same
treatment to people with disabilities. 51 8
The first major move in American legal policymaking toward the
integrationist model for children with mental disabilities occurred in the
1970s. In 1972, a federal district court interpreted Brown v. Board of
Education's5t 9 desegregation mandate to require that public school

513. Id. at899-900.
514. See, e.g., id.at 899-901; John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental
Disability,39 Hous. L. REV. 1231, 1241-45 (2003). For a general discussion of what Perlin refers to
as "sanist" biases, see PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supranote 481, at 3-58.
515. Weber, supra note 511, at 901-04; Jacobi, supra note 514, at 1244-46.
516. See also, Laura L. Rovner, Disability,Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 105 155 (2004) (referring to this model as the "socio-political model of disability").
517. Jacobi, supra note 514, at 1244.
518. While the integrationist or equality model has become increasingly influential in formal
American legal policy, many unsettled questions remain, such as what types of accommodations are
required, by which government and private entities, and with respect to which types of disabilities.
Id.For further conceptualizations of "models" within disability law, and discussion of the
limitations of the modem formulations, see generally Weber, supra note 511; Rovner, supra note
516, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability",86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000);
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of DisabilityLaw, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004).

519. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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districts provide a free and appropriate public education to children with
special educational needs. 520 Brown's mandate was grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The court in Mills v.
Board of Education quoted with approval the following language in
Brown:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it,521is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.

According to the Mills court, children with special educational needs
could not be excluded from public schools entirely, nor could they be
unnecessarily segregated from the mainstream of the student population.
Special needs children, according to the court, have the same rights to
equal educational opportunities as the Brown plaintiffs, whose access to
an equal education had been denied on account of race.52 2 This case and
Pennsylvania Associationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania1 3 led
to important settlement agreements that paved the way for a new
conceptualization of children with mental, learning, and emotional
difficulties. These two cases were followed by many others.524
Congress acted in response to a growing understanding of the role
that discrimination plays in denying those individuals with disabilities
equal opportunities in our society. Congress passed the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Section 504 of which prohibited discrimination against
disabled persons by programs or entities that receive federal funding.52 5
Two years later, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act 52 6 to assist the states with the economic burden of meeting
children's special educational needs and to create consistent policies
520.

See Mills v. Board of Education 348 F. Supp. 866, 868, 874-75 (D.C. 1972) (ordering

relief for a class of children labeled as having "behavioral problems, mentally retarded, emotionally
disturbed or hyperactive").
521.

348 F. Supp. at 875.

522. Id. at 874-76.
523. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (approving consent agreement between parties,
enjoining certain practices that prevented certain mentally retarded, brain damaged, or other
exceptional children from attaining an adequate public education); see also Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that alleged denial of
education to mentally retarded children raised a colorable equal protection claim).
524. Forty-six such cases were pending or resolved by the time Congress passed the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975. See, e.g., Daniel H. Melvin II, The Desegregation of
Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 608 & n.64 (1995).
525. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
526. Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
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nationwide for the implementation of students' substantive and
procedural special education rights.527 As discussed in Part III, prior to
the passage and implementation of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act in 1975, substantial numbers of children with disabilities
were excluded from the public school system; still others were in public
schools, but excluded from the regular classroom.528 This Act, like its
successors, such as IDEA, sought to integrate disabled children into the
public educational system and into regular classes to the greatest extent
possible. Its goals were several. First, Congress sought to insure that
disabled children would not be deprived of a free, appropriate, public
education, an obligation owed by government to all American children.
In addition, however, Congress recognized that exclusion of children
from public schools and regular classes within those schools was a form
of segregation that deprived these children of more than just a formal
education. It also deprived them of the opportunity to participate in
society. This integrationist perspective spawned its own variant on the
mandate for service provision in the least restrictive alternative; the
"least restrictive environment" requirement.529
School participation constitutes children's earliest and most
significant connection with the larger community. It serves as the
training ground in which basic skills for working cooperatively in the
larger society develop. Children are schooled not only in the formal
curriculum, but in how to interact and work with others who are part of a
potentially diverse and large student body. 30 School is, therefore, an
important tool in the state's achievement of its police power interests in
preparing children to be citizens in a democracy. 53 1 Inclusion of children
who are "different" in the mainstream of public education also promotes
our educational goals for non-disabled children, who will emerge from
their exposure to disabled peers with greater understanding of, and
tolerance for, such differences.

527. LAURA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 551 (3d ed. 2002).
528. See supra Part III and accompanying text.

529.

For a discussion of the concept of the least restrictive environment, see, for example,

Patrick Howard, supra note 217; Monserud, supra note 211, at 695-97; Melvin, supra note 524, at

623-24. For specific language in the governing legislation, see supra note 217 and accompanying
text.
530.

In school, in addition to the formal subject matter, children learn to "speak articulately, to

listen carefully; [and] to learn to participate in the give-and-take of group discussion ..

" AMY

GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 13 (1987) (quoting Diane Ravitch, A Good School, in THE
SCHOOLS WE DESERVE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EDUCATIONAL CRISES OF OUR TIME 277 (1985)).
531. GUTTMAN, supra note 530, at 13 ("A democratic society is responsible for
educating... all children for citizenship.").
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53 2
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The purpose of this legislation was to provide a "national mandate,"
"enforceable standards," and federal leadership in eliminating and
redressing the pervasive discrimination against persons with disabilities
existing in the United States.533 The ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, is
a nondiscrimination statute. It is broader, however, in its application to
various non-educational contexts (such as employment settings, public
buildings, transportation providers) and to private as well as public
schools, irrespective of whether the non-public entities receive federal
funds.534
The ADA's definition of disability is sufficiently broad to include
535
mental disorders if the condition and its effects meet certain criteria.

532. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2005).
533. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2005). Prior legislation, i.e., the 1975 Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, had "stated in aspirational terms that 'the treatment, services, and
habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities ... should be provided in the setting that is
least restrictive of the person's personal liberty,"' but had not mandated such policies. See Olmstead
v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 599 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976)).
534. The ADA "strengthened" rights Congress had created under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005), particularly through extension of rights to the
private sector. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 527, at 552. Rothstein describes the distinctions among the
IDEA and the ADA/Section 504 as follows:
While [Section 504 and the ADA] mandate reasonable accommodation as part of
nondiscrimination, they do not require schools to carry out activities that would be
unduly burdensome or that would fundamentally alter the program. The IDEA mandates
more than basic nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation. The IDEA
contemplates special education and related services that may be much more expensive
than a reasonable accommodation would require.
Id. at 552. The federal government provides the states with funding to assist them in achieving their
IDEA mandates. On the other hand, the IDEA is not only limited to providing services to children,
but restricts the categories of covered disabilities to specified categories. The IDEA's emphasis is
on providing educational services, as well as some related services that may be necessary to the
child's ability to benefit from the educational opportunities. By contrast, Section 504 and the ADA
apply to adults as well as children, both within and outside of educational settings. In addition, these
statutes address disabilities that create "substantial impairments" in one or more "major life
activities," and are, therefore, broader than the IDEA. Id. Case law has addressed certain questions
raised when an individual qualifies for coverage under both the IDEA and Section 504 or the ADA.
See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
For further comparison of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA, and
the IDEA (and its successors), see, for example, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO DISABILITY

RIGHTS LAWS (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/cguide.htm; NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY AND NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, GUIDE TO DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS (2000), available at

http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/pdf/disabilityrights.pdf; Melvin, supra note 524,
at 612-43; Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178 EDUC. L. REP.
629 (2003).
535. A disability is defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
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Recognizing that "historically, society has tended to isolate and
citing
and
disabilities,, 536
with
individuals
segregate
"institutionalization" as a context in which discrimination against those
with disabilities has manifested itself, 537 the legislation sought to
promote "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency for" persons with disabilities. 538 The ADA
was lauded as offering "breathtaking promise" for persons with mental
disabilities because of its mandate to provide equal opportunities to
disabled individuals in a broad spectrum of contexts of community life,
and because of the sheer power of the message conveyed in
Congressional findings and the statutory language.53 9
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled
54 1
54 °
individuals by governmental entities. In 1999, in Olmstead v. LC.,
the Supreme Court interpreted the reach of Title II in adjudicating the
claims of two mentally disabled women. Specifically, according to the
Court's report of the facts, L.C. and E.W. were both diagnosed as
42
mentally retarded, and L.C. had also been diagnosed as schizophrenic.
Both women had been admitted voluntarily to Georgia Regional
Hospital, where they had received treatment.543 After a period of
hospitalization, the treating professionals determined that each woman's
condition had improved sufficiently to justify her transfer to a
community-based program. 544 Yet, there were no appropriate
community-based services available for either woman, and thus, both
remained institutionalized for substantial periods of time beyond the
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2004). For a review of
those case law addressing the treatment of mental disorders under the ADA, see Mark DeLoach,
Note, Can 't We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of "'Interactingwith Others " as a Major Life
Activity in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Jonathan R. Mook,
Dealing with PsychiatricDisabilities Under the ADA, VPCI 108 A.L..-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
RES. 179 (2001); Darrell S. Gay, Defending a Mental Disability Case, 586 PRAc. L. INST. 383
(1998); Peggy R. Mastroianni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of PsychiatricDisorders Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42 VILL. L. REV. 723 (1997).
536. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2005).
537. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2005).
538. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2005).
539. See Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A BreathtakingPromise
for People with Mental Disabilities,24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240, 1240-41, 1247 (1991).
540. Specifically, the prohibition reads: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2005).
541. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
542. See id at 593.
543. See id.
544. Id.
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point at which their discharges had been recommended. 54 5 The women
filed suit in federal court, claiming that their continued confinement in
institutions, after they were determined to be capable of functioning in
impermissible segregation, and
community-based programs, constituted
546
thus discrimination, under the ADA.
Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg agreed with
the plaintiffs, holding that: "Unjustified isolation... is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability. 5 47 The Court cited the
regulations promulgated to implement Title II, noting that each state is
required to administer its services and programs "in the most integrated
548
setting appropriate to the needs of ... individuals with disabilities.,
The regulations further specify that "the most integrated setting" means
"a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible. 54 9 It cited language from
the ADA noting that 'historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements,
such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."' 550 The Court
further elaborated upon the judgments inherent in Congress' passage of
these provisions of the ADA:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons
with disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident
judgments. First, institutional placement of persons who can
handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable
or unworthy of participating in community life ....

Second,

confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday
life activities of individuals, including family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment ....

Dissimilar treatment

correspondingly exists in this key respect: In order to receive
needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must,
because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in
community life they could enjoy given reasonable

545. Specifically, LC.'s discharge was recommended in May 1993, yet she was not released
until February 1996. E.W. remained in the hospital for approximately a year after her discharge was
recommended. Id.
546. See id. at 593-94.
547. Id. at 597.
548. Id. at 592 (citing 28 CFR § 35.130(d)(1998)).
549. Id. (citing 28 CFR pt. 35, app. A450 (1998)).
550. Id. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)).
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accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar
sacrifice. 551
The Court noted that the state's obligation to provide communitybased services to persons such as L.C. and E.W. however, exists only if
the individuals in question are judged to be capable of managing in
appropriate community-based settings. 552 In the instant case, this
criterion had been met. Furthermore, the individuals in question must not
oppose their discharge to community-based settings.553 Neither woman
had opposed the transfer in Olmstead. Finally, the Court underscored
that the obligation of the state to provide community-based services for
institutionalized persons is not limitless. Consistent with the language of
the governing regulations, the Court emphasized that the state is required
to make "reasonable modifications" but not "fundamental alterations" in
its programs in order to avoid discrimination.5 54 Of course, the question
of what constitutes a reasonable modification as contrasted with a
fundamental alteration is open to debate, and the Court's guidance on the
distinction leaves room for varying interpretations. Specifically, the
Court held that:
the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications
regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of
available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be
inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the
care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with
mental disabilities .... [T]he ADA is not reasonably read to impel
States to phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close care at
risk.

If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list
that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors
551.
552.

Id. at 600-01 (citations omitted).
Id.at 601-03.

553. Id.
554. Id. at 592. The pertinent regulation reads: "A public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 CFR
§ 35.130(b)(7) (2004).
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to keep its institutions 555
fully populated, the reasonable-modifications
standard would be met.
Following the Olmstead decision, President George W. Bush issued

an Executive Order reinforcing the principles of the ADA and of its
interpretation by the Supreme Court in Olmstead,and calling for federal
agency cooperation with the states in implementing these mandates. 6
Cognizant of their liability under Olmstead, some states have enacted
legislation to respond to their Olmstead obligations and many have
developed "state plans" for Olmstead implementation (that is, the

transfer of qualified persons from institutions to appropriate communitybased services).5 57 Yet, in the several years since the Olmstead decision,
very little progress has been made nationwide in moving inappropriately
institutionalized individuals to appropriate community placements.558
Lawsuits have been filed in many states by those individuals seeking to
obtain appropriate community-based services under Olmstead's
mandate. 559 Litigation-which is both costly and slow-appears
necessary to prod states to comply with the mandate. 560 This is perhaps
not surprising, given the public's historic preference to avoid those who

are different, and the state's intransigence in the face of innovative
policy approaches and initial outlays of funds. There exist, however,

many sensible proposals as to how states and the federal government can
to comply with Olmstead while not
restructure existing service programs
5 61
unduly burdening state coffers.

555. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604-06.
556. George W. Bush, Executive Order: Community-based Alternatives for Individuals with
at
2001,
available
July
19,
Disabilities,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010619.html.
557. Good summaries of state responses to Olmstead include, for example, NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, OLMSTEAD: RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES (abr. ver. 2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/reclaimabridged.pdf; WENDY FoX-GRANGE
ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG., THE STATES' RESPONSE TO THE OLMSTEAD DECISION:
available
at
COMPLYING?
(2003),
How
ARE
STATES

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/olmsreport2003.pdf.
558. See, e.g., MATHIS, supra note 257 at 582; see also NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra
note 557.
559. For a summary of these lawsuits, see Jennifer Mathis, Where Are We Five Years After
Olmstead?, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan-Feb. 2005, at 561, 562-64.
560. See MATHIS, supra note 257.
561. Much attention is focused on the need to restructure the Medicaid program, which has
traditionally favored institutional rather that community-based services for persons diagnosed as
having mental disorders. For a discussion of proposed changes in the structure of Medicaid funding
and their importance to the success of Olmstead implementation, see, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, supra note 557, at 3; Sara Rosenbaum et al., Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications for
Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 93 (2002); Jacobi,
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Together, the IDEA and ADA hold promise for troubled and
troublesome youth who, with appropriate community services, could
avoid institutional placements.56 2 There is no question that high rates of
juvenile placement in detention centers, psychiatric hospitals, and other
institutions is inconsistent with these statutes' recognition that
unnecessary isolation of these individuals from their communities is
stigmatizing, in that it deprives institutionalized persons of "everyday
life

activities"

including

"family

relations.,, 564

From a practical

standpoint, however, the promise of both of these statutes is as yet
unrealized for troubled and troublesome youth. As noted in Part III,
many such youth, particularly those with conduct disorders and other
behavior problems, are excluded from IDEA coverage in many
jurisdictions, and the types of services delivered often fall short of those
needed to meet the complex demands of troubled and troublesome youth
and their families. 65 And, as noted immediately above, states are
making slow progress in their implementation of Olmstead's mandate.
That said, these legislative enactments clearly disfavor unnecessary
removal and exclusion of youth from the community.
E. The Spirit of These Core Legal Traditions
In summary, the spirit of these legal traditions is clear. The family
is the setting of first resort for the upbringing of children, including, and
perhaps even especially, for children with special needs. Removal from
family and home should be a last resort, limited to circumstances when a
family environment or a child's conduct requires removal in order to
protect the welfare of the child or others. Even then, removal should be

supra note 514, at 1281-90; Sandra L. Yue, A Return to InstitutionalizationDespite Olmstead v.
L.C.? The Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement in Minnesota and the Failure to
Deliver Home- and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAW & INEQ. J. 307 (2001).

562. One interpretive question regarding the reach of Olmstead is: When is a state obliged to
offer community-based services to those who are not yet institutionalized, but are at risk of
institutionalization? Courts addressing this issue in the past several years typically interpret the
ADA's mandates as creating rights to avoid institutionalization in those who are not yet
institutionalized. Mathis, supra note 257, at 562-64. There remain, however, a range of unresolved
issues regarding the scope of that right. Id. For a discussion of the ADA's "promise" for those with
mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise": Will Olmstead v. L.C.
Resuscitate the Constitutional "LeastRestrictive Alternative" Principlein Mental DisabilityLaw?,

37 HOUS. L. REV. 999 (2000); Milstein et al., supra note 539.
563. "[I]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings
perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in the community life." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
564. Id. at 601.
565.

See supra Part III.
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short term, unless it is determined that the family home will never be a
suitable place for the child. The tradition of favoring a family upbringing
for children derives not only from parents' constitutional rights, but also
from the psychological and sociological importance of supporting and
strengthening the family and encouraging healthy and stable parent-child
relationships. Furthermore, the states' parens patriae and police power
interests in children's welfare are most likely to be promoted through
creation of a stable, adaptive, and functional family unit. State
investment in helping problem families achieve such functioning is in
the interest of the children, the families, and the greater society.
Unnecessary restrictions of children's liberty, and unnecessary
separation of the child from the broader community are also inconsistent
with core American legal traditions. Some policymakers have already
recognized the importance of bringing policies toward American
children in line with these legal traditions. During the twentieth century,
various policy initiatives were implemented with the goal of reducing
institutional use in the child welfare, juvenile justice, and mental health
systems. Yet, these initiatives have had limited success with respect to
troubled and troublesome youth. An analysis of these trends is in Part VI
below.
VI.

UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES OF AMERICAN RESPONSES TO
TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

In this Part, I examine the limited success of policy reforms in
achieving the deinstitutionalization of troubled and troublesome youth
and persons with mental disorders. Although most deinstitutionalization
policies did strive to create alternative mechanisms to meet the
underlying social needs traditionally served by institutions, few did so
successfully. Sometimes, the alternatives were poorly funded, sometimes
they were poorly conceived, and sometimes they were no more faithful
to the core legal traditions discussed in Part V than were institutional
options. In Part VII, I present proposals for more effective
of effective
policies.
But formulation
deinstitutionalization
deinstitutionalization policies requires an understanding of the forces
that promoted the creation and use of institutions, as well as those that
interfered with the success of reforms. The functionalist perspective,
described immediately below, aids both of those inquiries.
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The FunctionalistPerspective

The functionalist perspective advanced by various sociologists
underscores the importance of examining the functions that particular
aspects of the social system-in our case, institutions-serve. 566 In
applying this perspective to policies leading to the construction, use, and
attempted depopulation of various institutions, it is critical to distinguish
between "manifest functions" (that is, those functions that are intended
and acknowledged by policymakers and social participants) and "latent
functions" (that is, those functions that are unintended, unanticipatedor
participants).56 7
and social
unacknowledged by policymakers
Policymakers may devise and implement strategies to achieve particular
manifest policy goals, such as treating mentally disordered individuals
and protecting those individuals and others in the community from those
persons' dangerous conduct. At the same time, however, the institutions
may serve the latent functions, such as removing persons who behave in
odd or disturbing manners from public view, or shifting the cost of
sustaining such persons from one governmental entity to another.
Manifest and latent functions can operate concurrently. Sometimes, the
line between these functions blurs. Policy reforms directed at those
institutions, however, cannot succeed without confronting the
institutions' latent functions. Whether we call functions manifest or
latent, if these institutions serve important social functions, such as
providing food and shelter to those incapable of meeting these needs
independently, or temporarily removing an adolescent from a violent
home, policy reforms must create alternative mechanisms to meet these
needs. Failure to do so dooms the reforms to whole or partial failure and
568
may lead to various unintended consequences.

566. For elucidation of the functionalist approach in sociology, see generally ROBERT K.
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 73-138 (rev. 1968). For an application of this
perspective to deinstitutionalization, see LEONA L. BACHRACH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: AN
ANALYTIC REVIEW AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 18-21 (1976).
567. See BACHRACH, supra note 566, at 18-19; see also MERTON, supra note 566, at 114-15.
568. See BACHRACH-,supra note 566, at 18-19.
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B. The CreationandPerpetuationof Child Care and Control
Institutions in the United States
The story of troubled and troublesome youth in American society is
a story of the proliferation of a variety of child care and control
institutions,569 and of children's removal from their homes and
placement in these facilities. It is also the story of several waves of
policy initiatives aimed at deinstitutionalizing some subsets of children
from these facilities. Institutions were not always America's preferred
response to troubled and troublesome children, or for any persons
perceived to be deviant or dependent. 570 The use of institutions was
fairly limited in the Colonies and United States prior to the nineteenth
century.5 71 Only then did the country experience a substantial boom in
the growth of specialized total institutions intended to address the
perceived needs of various groups.572 During the nineteenth century, use
of total institutions was widely embraced, with some measure of this
enthusiasm
continuing
well
into
the
twentieth
century.
Institutionalization was no longer a last resort for exceptional situations;
it became a favored response to manifest dependence and deviance.573
Institutionalization was seen as a preventive intervention to socialize
children whose life circumstances were less than optimal, or as a form of
early intervention when adults evidenced the first symptoms of mental
disorder. 574 In the words of one historian: "A cult of asylum swept the
country. 575
569. Paul Lerman refers to those residential facilities relevant to our analyses as "care and
control institutions." LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 1-12. Lerman proposes
the following definition of a care and control institution:
A civilian institution is a private or public establishment which furnishes (in single or
multiple faculties) food and shelter to about four or more persons unrelated to the
proprietor and, in addition, provides one or more of the following:
I. Medical and/or personal and/or social care.
2. Treatment and/or skills training and/or habilitation.
3. Supervision and/or custodial control.
4. Protection and/or social welfare.
5. Diagnostic assessment and/or background investigation.
Excluded from this definition are: [foster family homes]; all military establishments;
educational dormitories and rooms, except for schools for the mentally and
developmentally disabled; and religious training institutions.
Id.at 8. Lerman distinguished between "traditional" and "nontraditional" institutions, and
intentionally swept nontraditional institutions into his definition, despite the relatively small size of
facilities housing as few as five or six persons. Traditional institutions, such as mental hospitals,
state institutions for the developmentally disabled, juvenile detention facilities, and prisons, have
often housed hundreds of persons at any given time, are self-contained, and are typically set off
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from the community so as to minimize-or completely prevent-interaction of the residents with
community members. Such facilities, referred to by sociologist Erving Goffman as "total
institutions," are characterized by separation from the community, restrictive conditions of custody
regulating the activities and movement of residents, requirements of conformity and attendant
reduction in individuality, and a lack of privacy. "Their encompassing total character is symbolized
by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the
physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire,.....'.GOFFMAN, supra note 27, at 4.
First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single
authority. Second, each phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in the
immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required
to do the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly
scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole
sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings
and a body of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a
single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution.
Id. at 6. See also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM xxiv (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM]. As contrasted with total or traditional institutions,
nontraditional institutions are typically smaller and are not necessarily set apart from the
community. Examples of such facilities are nursing homes, shelter-care facilities, or newer juvenile
correctional facilities such as "ranches, camps and schools." Although these nontraditional living
arrangements are often regarded by observers and residents as "freer places to live than traditional
institutions," some are quite large, custodial in nature, and introduce significant restrictions and
limitations on the residents' privacy and activities. LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note
20, at 8-11. Lerman also included halfway houses and group homes in the category of nontraditional
institutions. Id.It is noteworthy that some of these latter facilities, depending upon size, location,
program, and level of integration into the community, may maximize the opportunities for social
participation for some individuals for whom residence with a family is not possible. The various
options available for those who cannot reside with their families are examined below. See infra Part
VII.C.2.b.
570. The terms "dependent" and "deviant" refer to different social characterizations that might
lead to institutionalization. Those persons who are viewed as both dependent and deviant are
particularly likely to be candidates for institutionalization. Dependency in this context refers to
one's reliance on others for care or support. Such reliance may derive from an individual's actual
psychological or physical limitations, or from the limitations imposed by social roles. Thus, while
many adolescents could engage in some adult-like daily tasks relatively independently, their
socialization and the legal restrictions on their activities allow for-and at times require-greater
dependence during the teen years than may be required strictly by an assessment of their intellectual
and physical capabilities.
Deviance can be viewed primarily as a statistical variation from a norm of some type, which
does not carry with it positive or negative connotations, or it can derive from the perception that an
individual is violating some social norm or rule. Some deviance designations are formally defined
by the law. For further discussion of sociological perspectives on deviance, see generally HOWARD
S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 1-39 (1963); EDWIN M. SCHUR,
THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE: STIGMA CONTESTS AND THE USES OF POWER 1-25 (1980).

571. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 30-31; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 212-218 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW]; Leland V. Bell, From the Asylum to the Community in U.S. Mental Health Care:
An Historical Overview, in HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 89, 90

(David A. Rochefort, ed. 1989).
572. See supra Part V.B.
573. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 130-31.
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The development of institutions serving children was part of larger

"systemic attempts to purify the environments of the young, to withdraw
them from debasing community temptations, and to immerse them in
networks of good influence. 576 The institutionalization movement
focused on youth with deceased, absent, ill, or impoverished parents, as
well as those whose parents had allegedly failed in adequately
socializing their children. 77 Orphanages and houses of refuge became
increasingly common ways of dealing with these children. 578 Although
the name orphanage implies that these facilities served children whose

parents were deceased, admission policies were flexible, casting a
relatively wide net that extended beyond parentless children. From the

perspective of these facilities' administrators, "there was no reason to
penalize the unfortunate child for the fact of his parents' survival. 579
Thus, children were removed from parents ostensibly to reduce their

chances of becoming
of. .. prisons. 58 °

"pests

to

society"

or

future

"tenants

What motivated this urge to place children and those adults labeled

as insane in institutions? Historians quarrel as to the particular
contributions of various humanitarian, sociopolitical, economic, or other

influences. But it is fair to say that a complex range of factors converged
to promote the development and use of these facilities in the United
States.581 The manifest functions of the institutions included treatment,
574. There is evidence that these facilities swept in substantial numbers of persons who were
not suffering from debilitating mental disorders. Paul Lerman reviews data gathered by census
reporters and social historians suggesting that large proportions of mental hospital inmates in the
early 1900s were committed for "odd, peculiar, or simply immoral" behavior, unaccompanied by
"symptoms indicating serious disability, or violent or destructive tendencies." LERMAN,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 33 (quoting R.W. Fox, So FAR DISORDERED IN MIND:
INSANITY IN CALIFORNIA 1870-1930, 148 (1978)).
575. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 130.

576. Barbara Finkelstein, Casting Networks of Good Influence: The Reconstruction of
Childhood in the United States, 1790-1870, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND
HISTORICAL HANDBOOK 111, 117 (Joseph M. Hawes et al. eds., 1985). Thus, for example, many of
the same motives that led to the invention of total institutions serving certain groups of children also
led to the creation of networks of schools for noninstitutionalized children. Id. at 117-18.

577. See id.at 117.
578. See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, 8
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 23, 25 (1998),
available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/pcn; Finkelstein, supra note 576, at 118-19.
579. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 207.

580. Id.at 210.
581. Historian David Rothman, in particular, argues that a mixture of motives led to the
creation and maintenance of institutions in the United States, urging readers to reject "simple moral
judgments" as to these phenomena and their causes. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569,
at 294-95. See also Finkelstein, supra note 576, at 111-16 (contrasting the perspectives of historians
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rehabilitation, education, reform, and achievement of other benevolent
goals. Yet, as is often the case with attempts at social engineering,
altruistic agendas are only part of the story. Grossberg emphasizes the
"fundamental tension in American beliefs and policies toward the
young," as we are "torn between a fear for children and a fear of
children. 582 Americans wished to inculcate children with "American"
values, not only because they expected that doing so would benefit the
children-they also expected that doing so would benefit the general
welfare.
Rothman suggests that a sense of desperation in the first half of the
nineteenth century propelled reformers to take dramatic steps by
constructing networks of "well-ordered" institutions:
Americans experienced a crisis of confidence in the social organization
of the new republic, fearful that the ties that once bound citizens
together-the ties of community, church, and family-were loosening
and that, as a consequence, social disorganization appeared imminent.
Their fears were confirmed and exacerbated by the extent of the crime,
poverty, delinquency, and insanity that they saw around them. In
response to these perceptions, to an anxiety about the stability of the
social order and an alarm about the
58 3 extent of deviancy and
dependency, they discovered the asylum.
Ironically, despite this nation's historical roots-which had often
led it to be cautious about broad-based unchecked state authority over
individuals-the Progressive Era584 ushered in even greater expansions
of governmental power. The public placed "unbounded trust" in the
"benevolence of the state." 585 What made these expansions palatableeven welcome-was that these interventions were not focused on the
general populous, but rather, on dependent and deviant subgroups.
who view social intervention in children's lives as either a product of humanitarian or social control
objectives).
582. Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 18201935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 3 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Grossberg, ChangingConceptions].

583. Id. at xxiv.
584. Historians have generally referred to the period of time between 1885 through 1915 as the
Progressive Era. During these years, "reformers" expressed pervasive concerns about social and
economic conditions in the United States, and particularly those that affected children, and sought
comprehensive social and legal change. For a thoughtful and balanced historical analysis of this era,
see Cohen, supra note 103; Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in Modern America, 1870-1990s, in
CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMERICA: HISTORY, CONCEPTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, 3-31 (Roberta

Wollons ed., 1993).
585. JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1992).
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Grossberg characterizes social reforms of this era as propelled by a kind
of "moral panic"-that is, fear "that urbanization, industrial capitalism,
and massive immigration were undermining the nation's homes and
thus, the republic itself. 5 86 "Adults worried about children-everyone's
children, not just their own-for their own sake and also out of fear for
the country's future., 587 Thus, the public was unwilling to challenge
seemingly benevolent governmental action in the face of its
overwhelming concerns. And, indeed, the ideology of this era and the
language of humanitarianism made it almost impossible to disentangle
the myriad of functions served by the highly5 88intrusive governmental
interventions given ever-increasing legitimacy.
The creation of the juvenile court was the single most dramatic
development relating to institutionalization in the twentieth century.
While the establishment of the juvenile court was an extension of the
organized child welfare and child reform interventions commenced in
the prior century, it was, in many ways, more far-reaching. The child
welfare movement, with its proliferation of orphanages, was the product
of private, nonprofit organizations and societies, which operated with
tacit legal approval. 589 By contrast, the juvenile court at once

586. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family
Law, 1890-1990,28 IND. L. REV. 273, 275 (1995).
587. See Cohen, supra note 103, at 274.
588. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 10 (rev. 2002) [hereinafter CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE]. Rothman suggests that state actors and others working in the service of state goals
asserted full confidence about the correctness of their approach:
[T]hey were convinced that... the same person and the same institution could at once
guard and help, protect and rehabilitate, maintain custody and deliver treatment. They
perceived no conflict between these goals, no clash of interest between the deviant and
the wider society, between the warden and his convicts, between the hospital
superintendent and his patients, between the keeper and the kept. The "friend" or social
worker who did probation work could simultaneously be an "officer"; the juvenile court
judge who was charged to protect society could also be a parent to the delinquent. This
belief was among the most fundamental in the reformers' canon, and in retrospect,
perhaps the most dubious.
Id
589. For a discussion of the growth, power, and functioning of these private, nonprofit child
welfare agencies as sort of "quasi" agents of the state, see Weithom, Protecting Children, supra
note 77, at 45-51. While the state did not oppose, and often ratified, these private efforts, these
interventions were not formal state actions. The advent of the juvenile court, therefore, expanded the
reach into the family by outside forces and formalized the role of the state as the intervener.
Grossberg notes that, given the "relatively weak state and decentralized and underdeveloped
bureaucracy" in the United States of the nineteenth century, the nation "became a fertile host for an
expansive and expanding civil society." Grossberg, Changing Conceptions, supra note 582, at 9. He
defines "civil society" as "the social space between the family and state-a space of public

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

137

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
1442

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 33:1305

consolidated legal authority over all children perceived to be in need of
some extrafamilial intervention in one state agency. Beginning with the
initiation of the first juvenile court in Illinois in 1899, the juvenile justice
movement formalized state intervention
in the lives of troubled and
5 90
troublesome youth and their families.
The state-acting through the juvenile court and under the authority
of its parens patriae authority-substituted itself for those parents who
were absent or perceived to be inadequate or harmful. 591 These reforms
incorporated a treatment philosophy, emphasizing the needs of each
individual child, rather than the acts or circumstances that triggered the
court's authority, as determinative of the court's disposition. 592 Thus, in
theory, a child falling into any of the three primary categories of youth
within the court's jurisdiction-delinquents, noncriminal disobedients
(today's status offenders), or dependent children 593 -- could, and often
did, receive similar dispositions.59 4 The numbers of children
institutionalized in child welfare and juvenile justice facilities under the
authority of the juvenile court mushroomed during the twentieth
century. 595 By contrast, admission of children to mental hospitals, while
not unheard of, was less common until the 1970s.
Placement of adults in mental institutions, however, continued to
expand throughout the twentieth century, despite awareness of

discourse and action carried on by individuals who band together in nongovernmental or quasigovernmental organizations, institutions, and movements." Id.
590. Most writers cite 1899 as the date of the juvenile justice system's creation because in this
year, the Juvenile Court Act in Illinois became effective, marking the first formal appearance of the
juvenile court model in a state statute. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9-10 (2d ed. 1977); Mack, supranote 102.
591. See LaMar T. Empey, Introduction: The Social Construction of Childhood and Juvenile
Justice, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-4, 16-28 (LaMar T. Empey ed.,
1979).
592. See Weithorn, Protecting Children,supra note 77, at 48; Mack, supra note 102, at 107.
593. During the Progressive Era, and even up until the 1960s, most children classified as
dependent were children perceived to be neglected. Although cases of child abuse were part of the
juvenile court's docket, such cases typically constituted a small proportion of the caseload. Some
scholars attribute this phenomenon to the agendas of those in the child welfare and juvenile court
movements and to historically contingent evaluations of which family circumstances were most
problematic rather than the prevalence of different forms of child maltreatment. For an analysis of
these historical developments and summary of relevant commentary, see, for example, Weithom,
Protecting Children,supra note 77, at 48-50, 52-60.
594. LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 107, 113-14. For example, in
1923, 50% of the minors in secure detention facilities in this country were labeled "dependent." Id.
The author of a 1923 census noted: "The dividing line between dependency and delinquency is
often so vague that in practice both types of children may be found in the care of organizations
intended primarily for the care of a single class." Id. at 114.
595. Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 82-87.
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overcrowding, abuses, and poor conditions within most such facilities.596
While there was clearly enthusiasm and optimism regarding new
perspectives in medicine and psychology on the part of many, there was
also a willingness to accept the system's failings in exchange for the
benefits to the community of segregating the mentally disordered. Over
time, these facilities admitted
and sustained increasing numbers of
597
cases.
severe
and
chronic
Despite all of the enthusiasm for the use of mental hospitals to treat
the afflicted, most observers agree that conditions were often
deplorable. 598 Given inadequate appropriations by state legislatures,
conditions deteriorated to the point that custodial care was all that was
offered by the end of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding
Progressive attempts to tinker with the way in which the institutions
functioned. 599 Furthermore, reports revealed that patients were
frequently physically abused, neglected, and subjected to a range of
experimental procedures, such as drugs, electroshock therapy, and
lobotomies. 60 0 Despite several sustained efforts to create alternatives to
mental institutions in the early twentieth century, these institutions
remained. Indeed, they admitted increasing numbers of patients and
became the cornerstone of American mental health policy, a testament to
society's reliance on the latent functions served by these facilities. In
other words, total institutions housing the deviant and dependent served
a popular sense of social order, achieved by controlling the day-to-day
lives of persons from certain undesirable segments of society. 60 1 Thus,
even after optimism regarding the curability of insanity and the ability to
reform wayward children waned and the idealism of the institutions'
founders gave way to disillusionment, institutional populations
increased. This occurred despite scandals revealing repressive practices,
overcrowding, and deteriorating conditions within these facilities, a
phenomenon historian Michael Grossberg cites as "testimony to ' 6an
02
unflagging readiness to keep the deviant out of sight and out of mind.
596. ROCHEFORT, supra note 59, at 30 (noting that between 1880 and 1940, the number of
residents in state mental hospitals increased almost five times as fast as the general population).
Officials often justified the continued existence of these facilities by comparisons to the past. For
example, asylums were certainly preferred over approaches that chained and confined the "insane"
in attics and cellars. CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supranote 588, at 29-31, 40.
597. See generally DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supranote 569.
598.

See id.

599. See CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, supra note 588, at 293-375.
600. Id.
601. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supranote 569.
602. Id. at xxxix; xlvii. Grossberg states that by the 1850s and 1860s, "overcrowding and
mismanagement had undermined the therapeutic goals of the Houses of Refuge."
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Rothman concludes that the "convenience" of total institutions allowed
them to continue well past society's belief in their rehabilitative
up the asylums; the
potential: "The promise of reform had built
60 3
functionalism of custody perpetuated them.9
Overwhelming proportions of institutional residents were
immigrants or from the lower socioeconomic classes. 604 Some historians
argue that institutions were tools used by the dominant classes to
maintain social control over other groups.60 5 Or, perhaps these less
powerful groups simply were less able to repel the state's authority than
606
were those with more secure standing in the community mainstream.
Possibly, the institutionalization of substantially greater proportions of
the poor and immigrant classes reflected a more generalized "[f]ear of
community disintegration and... social pollution [magnified by an]
strangers and destitute and dirty
increasingly visible class of cultural
607
children [in the city and country]."
Finally, any functional analysis of the growth and use of institutions
housing dependent and deviant persons must examine financial
incentives. At the level of the family, the financial and human cost of
caring for dependent and deviant members was often overwhelming.
These individuals tax the financial and social capital of their families.
Not only are they frequently not contributing to the financial assets of
the social units that maintain them, but they also drain communal
resources by occupying the time and services of those who would be
engaged in remunerative activities but for the demands on their time to

[T]he institutional movement spread across the republic .... in various states for the rest
of the century. Institutionalization had acquired its own appeal; if nothing else, it took
children off the streets and out of failed families. The reformatories became a
fundamental way of dealing with disorderly and other dependent youths.
Grossberg, Changing Conceptions,supra note 582, at 18.
603. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 240. While some subgroup of
incarcerated persons might have been dangerous to themselves or to others, many more were not.
But, to the extent that Americans feared, or were otherwise disturbed by, contact with members of
various dependent and deviant groups, containment of these groups in institutions added value to
these facilities and perpetuated their existence.
604. For example, Rothman reports that in 1890, 40% of state mental institution residents were
either immigrants or children of immigrants, with higher percentages in the cities. Most patients
were of working-class backgrounds, and others were impoverished. CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE, supra note 588, at 24.
605. Finkelstein, supranote 576, at 112-13.
606. DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569, at 286-87. Those with greater financial
resources, those with stronger ties ot the community, those whose unconventional conduct might be
interpreted as "eccentricity" rather than "insanity" were more likely to avoid institutional solutions
to their problems.
607. Finkelstein, supranote 576, at 116.
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serve as caregivers. In addition, the family must often expend funds to
obtain needed professional services. In the decades before governmental
financial assistance to the poor, ill, or the emotionally disturbed, family
members bore the cost of care. Many reluctantly shifted the cost of care
of their dependents-their young, aged, physically infirm or emotionally
disturbed family members-to the state.6 °9 Making use of the
institutional system may have been the only palatable response to the
harsh circumstances in which many working class and impoverished
families found themselves. And while government subsidies do assist
some people today, many families still find themselves in a situation
analogous to those nineteenth century and early twentieth century
families whose energies and financial resources were depleted by the
demands and expense of caring for relatives with special needs. Costshifting in the care of certain dependent and deviant individuals also
occurred among levels of government during the eighteenth, nineteenth,
and twentieth centuries. Historian Gerald Grob points out that local
communities, which bore the cost of alms-houses, were only too glad to
shift the responsibility and expense of caring for dependent and deviant
individuals to the specialized institutions developed and financed by the
states. 610 The depopulation of state-funded mental institutions during the
twentieth century was assisted by the availability offederal subsidies for
the daily sustenance of the mentally infirm in the community or in
private residential facilities. 6 1' Other economic considerations, such as
the provision of local employment opportunities, also promoted the use
of certain facilities.6 12 To the extent that these latent functions and the
benefits of particular patterns of institutional use are not addressed in
reform efforts, such efforts are likely to have only limited success.

608. Martha Fineman discusses this theme in a more generalized way when examining the
impact of caring for dependent persons on those who care for their children or their elder or ill
relatives. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitabilityof Dependency and the Politics
of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89 (1998).
609. For example, Grob points out that families of severely disturbed individuals suffered two
forms of financial hardship in that the "afflicted individual was usually unable to work," and
someone in the family was required to provide intensive care, removing that individual partially or
fully from the labor market. GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1875-

1940, at 10 (1983). For a discussion of some of the psychological conflicts experienced by families
around the decision to commit a relative to an institution, see NANCY TOMES, A GENEROUS
CONFIDENCE: THOMAS STORY KIRKBRIDE AND THE ART OF ASYLUM-KEEPING, 1840-1883, at 90128 (Charles Webster & Charles Rosenberg eds., 1984).
610. GROB, supra note 609, at 116-24.
611. Cost-shifting may also occur between sectors of the same governmental entity, as when
the closure of state mental hospitals leads to increased use of correctional facilities.
612.

DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 569.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

141

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33:1305

Furthermore, such failure may lead to unintended consequences that
create new and equally or more challenging policy dilemmas.6t 3
C.

Understandingthe Failuresof DeinstitutionalizationMovements

The term "deinstitutionalization" can refer to a fact, that is,an
actual reduction in the use of particular institutions, effected either by
discharge of persons confined in those facilities and/or by discontinued
use of such placements for persons not yet confined.6 14 Or
deinstitutionalization can refer to a policy, process, or goal. Sociologist
Leona Bachrach defines deinstitutionalization as involving two key
components: "(1) the eschewal of traditional institutional settings...,
and (2) the concurrent expansion of community-based services for [care
of and intervention with] these individuals. '' 615 Her definition implies
intentionality, such as that often sought through purposive lawmaking,
and envisions the development of alternative services or interventions in
noninstitutional settings to address the needs that fueled the
establishment and maintenance of the institutions. Policies that go no
further than preventing or discouraging continued use of the institutions
and do not serve the needs of the institutionalized, their families, and
their communities are incomplete. Needs, be they individual, familial, or
societal, do not evaporate at the will of policymakers. Policymakers
must plan to meet the underlying social needs in an alternate manner that
is sufficiently accessible and attractive to be preferredover institutions.
Thus, a formal policy of deinstitutionalization with a promise of success
is likely to involve: (1) discharge of persons from institutional settings;
(2) reduction or prevention of new admissions and readmissions to
institutional settings; and (3) creation or expansion of suitable alternative
interventions or services in noninstitutional settings.
Yet, deinstitutionalization, as a fact, may also occur in the absence
of legal policies directed at achieving depopulation of institutions. For
example, many circumstances other than formal policymaking have been
cited as promoting the deinstitutionalization of adult psychiatric patients
from mental hospitals in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as

613.

See supra Parts IV-V.

614. See, e.g., LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that "a broad
view of [deinstitutionalization] would refer primarily to reduced reliance on ...traditional
institutions [as] counted institutions... [as] counted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census").
615.

BACHRACH, supra note 566, at 1.Professor Bachrach's definition was specific to the use

of mental hospitals; it was modified above to serve as a more generic definition suitable also to
child care and control institutions.
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the development of antipsychotic medications.6 16 More recently, the
advent of managed care and its attendant restrictions on availability of
third-party payment for inpatient psychiatric treatment has further
reduced rates of hospital use.6 17 Historian Gerald Grob points out that
deinstitutionalization can be an unintended consequence of a policy that
was enacted for other reasons. 618 For example, Social Security disability
insurance and Medicaid have played a major role in the
deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients from mental hospitals, even
though this result was not the purpose of those policy innovations.61 9
Deinstitutionalization, as a phenomenon, cannot be discussed
phenomenon
of
associated
the
also
examining
without
transinstitutionalization,that is, the movement of persons or groups
from one institutional system to another.6 2 ° While policymakers may, at
times, seek or encourage transinstitutionalization,621 most commonly
transinstitutionalization is an unintended result of incomplete
deinstitutionalization policies. It typically results from insufficient
attention to the third prong of the definition of deinstitutionalizationthat is, the creation or expansion of suitable alternative interventions or
therefore,
settings.
Frequently,
noninstitutional
services
in
transinstitutionalization is predictable. And while it is not always
possible to predict precisely what needs formerly institutionalized
individuals or their families and communities will have once
deinstitutionalization policies are implemented, transinstitutionalization
has occurred frequently enough throughout the history of institutional

616. LA FOND& DURHAM, supra note 585, at 128.
617.

See David S. Mechanic, Key Policy Considerationsfor Mental Health in the Managed

Care Era, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1996, at 1, 1(Ronald W. Manderscheid & Mary
Anne Sonnenschein eds., 1996).
618. GROB, supra note 609, at 265-69.
619. Id.
620. Sociologist Carol Warren introduced the term "transinstitutionalization" into the scholarly
literature. See, e.g., Carol A.B. Warren, New Forms of Social Control: The Myth of
Deinstitutionalization,24 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 724, 726-30 (1981). For a discussion of the
origins of the term "transinstitutionalization," see Weithom, Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note
16, at 805 & n.198. Paul Lerman's classic 1982 work, Deinstitutionalizationand the Welfare State,
is the first text to describe and demonstrate, theoretically and empirically, processes of
transinstitutionalization at work across a range of institutional settings in twentieth century
American society. No better exposition of this phenomenon, as it relates to children, older
Americans, or persons identified as mentally disabled, exists in the professional literature. See
generally LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20.

621. For example, they may seek to move a population from a more restrictive to a less
restrictive institution, or from a less appropriate to a more appropriate setting. Thus, policymakers
sought to remove juveniles adjudicated as delinquents from adult correctional facilities and to place
them instead in juvenile correctional facilities.
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use to place policymakers on notice as to the possibility or probability of
its occurrence. And, not surprisingly, trends in the use of the three
primary systems of care and control affecting troubled and troublesome
youth in the twentieth century confirm a strong relationship between
formal policies promoting and achieving some level of
deinstitutionalization of one system's facilities and the increased use of
those of another system.
There were five key deinstitutionalization movements in the
twentieth century which affected the placement of troubled and
troublesome youth. Two involved child welfare facilities (removal of
first impoverished children, and then maltreated children, from child
care institutions), two involved correctional facilities (removal of
juvenile offenders from adult correctional facilities and status offenders
from juvenile justice facilities), and one involved mental health facilities
(removal of adult patients from mental hospitals).
From their outset, the primary child service and intervention
systems justified their forays into the lives of children and families on
the basis that they were serving the state's parens patriae and police
power interests in promoting the welfare of the child-for the child's
own sake and for the welfare of the society in which these children
would ultimately take their place as adults. These were the manifest
functions that the institutional placements were to serve. And yet, a
review of the policies governing institutionalization of children and the
mentally disabled over the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth
centuries reveals that various latent functions were served as well.
1. Deinstitutionalization and the Child Welfare System
During the nineteenth, and to some extent, the early twentieth
century, there remained enthusiasm for placing in institutions large
numbers of children perceived to be in need of governmental aid or
intervention. 622 Not only were delinquent, disobedient, "wayward,"
homeless, neglected, abandoned, abused, and orphaned children placed
622. One of the harshest critics of this institutionalization trend was Charles Loring Brace, a
New York City minister who created the Children's Aid Society. Priscilla Ferguson Clement, The
City and the Child, 1860-1885, in AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL
HANDBOOK 235, 257-62 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985). Loring did not question the
appropriateness of intervention in these children's lives but argued that what these children needed
was not placement in institutions,but in homes with Christian families in the rural Midwest. Schene,
supra note 578, at 25. Reportedly, over 150,000 such children were sent by train to live and work on
family farms. Id. In the late nineteenth century, states also developed programs for reimbursing farm
families for caring for these wards. Id. These models were precursors to modem concepts of foster
care. Yet, apart from Loring's objections, institutionalization was the norm.
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in these facilities, but children of impoverished families were placed in
these facilities as well. The Progressive movement, however, introduced
new notions about child development, including the importance of
mothers to the healthy upbringing of their children. The Progressive
reformers were concerned about those children separated from their
mothers and placed in institutions solely because of maternal poverty.6 23
Encouraged by a 1909 report of the White House Conference on
Dependent Children, which emphasized the importance of maternal
care, 624 twenty states enacted what were referred to as "mothers'
pension" or "widows' pension" laws by 1913, and another twenty did so
by 1920.625 These laws provided meager stipends to "'respectable' poor"
mothers, that is, generally "white widows," to enable them to support
themselves and their children, thus avoiding their children's removal
from the home.6 26 This policy evidenced a partial return to the colonial
and eighteenth century practice of providing relief to those in need
within the community.627 Yet, despite these goals and state subsidies to
the "deserving" poor, almost half (43%) of children referred for out-ofhome care were referred by their parents.628
Even more significant than the state subsidies, however, was the
passage of the federal Social Security Act of 1935, which established the
Aid to Dependent Children program, the forerunner of the AFDC federal
"welfare" program. 629 This development not only signaled the federal
government's assumption of responsibility for support of certain needy
families, but further demonstrated a shift in ideology: children from
destitute families should be raised in their own homes, by their own
mothers, and not in institutions. These policies were among
several measures designed to dismantle residential institutions for
children by returning the inmates of orphanages to their birth families
623. See Grossberg, Changing Conceptions, supranote 582, at 32.
624. Id.; see also Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 75.
625. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 179 (2002); see also
Grossberg, ChangingConceptions, supra note 582, at 33.
626. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 625, at 179; see also Grossberg, Changing Conceptions, supra

note 582, at 32-33.
627.
628.

See FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 571, at 212-18.
Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 76. Lerman emphasizes that

while these child welfare institutions were used by impoverished parents as a means of supporting
their families, others may have used them as a way of coping with disobedient and difficult youth.
Id. at 77.
629. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (repealed 1996). In 1962, this program was renamed Aid to
Families with Dependent Children to reflect a broadened focus on providing support to the parents
or other relatives caring for the child. Public Welfare Amendment of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543,
§§ 104(a)(1)-(3), 76 Stat. 185 (1962).
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or, where these families were absent or unfit, by distributing them
among family homes by indenture or payment of board. In effect, the
reformers were building a disembodied orphanage-a set of policies
inmates of
that would accommodate the healthy, non-delinquent
630
orphan asylums without resorting to the asylum itself.
Although mothers' pensions and federal welfare subsidies made it
possible for one subset of the residents of children's institutions to
remain in their homes, "countless children continued to be placed in
reformatories, orphanages, and other public and private asylums., 631 The
child welfare system, arising out of the hodgepodge of private and public
institutions and policies of the nineteenth century, and increasingly
centralized in the juvenile courts, retained control over the day-to-day
lives of large numbers of children.6 32
The next ideological shift was one that disfavored traditional
institutional placements for most of the remaining children in the child
welfare system. 613 For those dependent children without special needs,
placements with foster families became a preferred option, offering
children the benefits of a family environment.634 Beginning in the 1960s,
federal policy initiatives sought to promote these ideals, encouraging
foster family placements, adoption, and, when necessary for children
with special needs, smaller child welfare facilities. The federal
government committed increasingly substantial infusions of funds to
promote these goals.63 5 And, indeed, Lerman's analysis of national outof-home placement rates reveals that use of child welfare institutions did
plunge 73.4% between 1923 and 1985.636 The rate increased again
between 1985 and 1997, narrowing the overall reduction (between 1923
and 1997) to 65.6%.637 Yet, despite the decrease of children in child
630.

MATTHEW A. CRENSON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE: A PREHISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 18 (1998). For an in-depth discussion of the political and social
developments contributing to the development of state and federal welfare subsidies for
at 246-83.
impoverished mothers, see id.
631. Grossberg, Changing Conceptions, supra note 582, at 36.
632. Id. at 36-39.
633. Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supranote 20, at 76.
634. Id. at 76-77.
635. See id.at 76-78. Lerman points out that many of these new facilities, labeled residential
treatment centers for emotionally disturbed children, were renovated versions of former child
welfare institutions. Id.
636. See id.
at 80. The 73.4% figure was obtained by this author by comparing the rate of 88
per 100,000 youth in these facilities in 1985, reported in Lerman's Figure 3.1, with the rate of 331
per 100,000 youth in 1923.
637. This figure was obtained by this author by comparing the rate of 114 per 100,000 youth in
these facilities in 1997, reported in Lerman's Figure 3.1, with the rate of 331 per 100,000 youth in
1923. Id.at 79 fig.3. 1. While 520 youth per 100,000 resided in the combined categories of out-of-
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welfare institutions as a result of these policies, national data sets
suggest that a greater proportion of American youth overall are in out-ofhome placements under the jurisdiction of the child welfare system today
than prior to these two deinstitutionalization movements.638
What accounts for this increase? In part, as the system contracted
its reach, excluding many children of impoverished families, it expanded
its reach as well. The parameters defining maltreated children shifted,
particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, ultimately
broadening the system mandate. Thus, these figures reflect increasing
awareness of the toll that various forms of child maltreatment take on the
well-being of children, as well as actual increases in the numbers of
children exposed to dangerous circumstances. 639 In addition, however,
home placements in 1923, 715 youth per 100,000 resided in such placements in 1997, an overall
increase of 37.5%. See id. These figures were calculated by this author by combining the rates per
100,000 presented in the foster family plus child care institution categories presented by Lerman in
Figure 3.1, and determining the percentage increase.
638. See supra notes 17-20. "Controlling for population, many more youths under eighteen are
indeed living away from their families in the 1990s, but the child welfare placements are less likely
to be in group homes or institutions." Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at
80. Other differences observed by Lerman are increases in older children and children of color in
child welfare placements. Id. at 81. There is a potential confound, however, in any statistics on outof-home placements under the auspices of the child welfare system. Increasingly, in the past couple
of decades, child welfare authorities have turned to extended family members as alternate caregivers
for children whose parents are found to be abusive or neglectful. See, e.g., ALLEN W. HARDEN, ET
AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FORMAL AND INFORMAL KINSHIP CARE (1997),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/cyp/kincare/toc.htm; Rob Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care
Policy and Practice, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE,
Winter
2004,
at
131,
133-35
(2004),
available
at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr-doc/vol_14_nollno_photos.pdf;
Jill Duerr Berrick, When
Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care or Kinship Care, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE OR NEGLECT, Spring 1998, at 72, 72-74 (1998),

available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr-doc/vol8nol.pdf. While kinship care has always
existed as an informal arrangement, placements with extended family members of children formally
adjudicated as dependent have become more common in recent years. Id. at 72-74. Unfortunately,
however, it is not clear how this phenomenon affects data trends in those out-of-home placements
reported by states to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which tracks and tabulates
the national statistics on child welfare placements. Some subset of the observed increase in out-ofhome placements may reflect the formalization of previously informal kinship care arrangements.
The available data on formal and informal kinship care arrangements are extremely limited and vary
greatly across jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harden et al., supra; Eugene M. Lewit, Children in Foster
Care, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: HOME VISITING 192, 198 (1993), available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/pubs-info2825/pubs-info-show.htm?doc-id=75410.
639. See Weithorn, Protecting Children, supra note 77, for a discussion of the impact of Dr. C.
Henry Kempe's work on the "battered child syndrome" in the 1960s ("Kempe's research literally
changed the entire landscape of child protection"), which was followed by the enactment of child
abuse reporting statutes in all states in the 1960s and early 1970s and strong federal involvement
beginning in 1974. Id. at 55-58. "Federal and state law succeeded in bringing more cases of child
maltreatment to the attention of government authorities," and reports of suspected child
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the figures may also include many families for whom the necessity of
state intervention can be, and has been, debated. 640 These two
deinstitutionalization movements might be viewed as partial successes,
in that the overwhelming proportion of out-of-home placements are with
foster families, that is, the child is living in someone's home, rather than
in an institution. Yet, the current rate of removals to noninstitutional
settings is inconsistent with the core American legal traditions discussed
in Part V. Not only does it deprive the child and her family of their
familial relationship, but there is substantial evidence that the lack of
continuity and dislocation process takes a heavy toll on children
removed from their homes. 64 1 The conditions in some foster homes are
substandard and unsafe, and may be more dangerous to the child's wellbeing than those in their parents' homes. 64 2 Removal from one's own
community, including school, neighborhood, and extended family, all
deprive the child of important connections and developmental
opportunities. 64 3 Thus, the population served by the child welfare system
has shifted, with certain categories of children replaced by others. In the
final analysis, however, the existing foster care system is not the
dramatic improvement over child care and control institutions that we
once thought it would be.
There is no question that many children are far better off in foster
homes than in large institutions. But, homes and caregivers are not
fungible. The relative superiority of foster homes over childcare
institutions therefore misses the point in terms of big-picture
policymaking. The critical inquiry should be whether, if the state
provided families with appropriate support and services so as to prevent
removal, children would be better off remaining with those families than
maltreatment rose sharply over the following years and decades, as did the involvement of the child
welfare system in families. Id. at 58. The widespread use of crack cocaine has been blamed as well
for an increase in formal intervention of the child welfare system in families in which parents are
substance users. Lewit, supra note 638, at 198. According to one source, reports of child abuse had
increased from 10,000 annually in 1962 to almost three million in 1992. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE
WELFARE OF CHILDREN 8 (1994). According to another, the number of children reported nationally
rose by over 347% between 1976 and 1993. Schene, supra note 578, at 29.
640. See, e.g., LINDSEY, supra note 639, at 3-5; LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF
CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA (1996).

641.

See, e.g., Brenda Jones Harden, Safety and Stabilityfor FosterChildren: A Developmental

Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE 31, 31 (2004);
PANEL ON RESEARCH ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 274 (1993).
642. Austen L. Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The Undoing of the California
Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity in Foster Care Placement and
Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268-70 (2004).
643. Harden, supranote 641, at 33-39.
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they would be if removed from them.644 Most experts believe that the
system, in its present form, has failed miserably, 645 and many argue that
there is no empirical evidence that the system's intervention actually
benefits those children for whose benefit it allegedly exists. 646 Thus,
despite the best intentions of those who "deinstitutionalized" the child
welfare system, we have replaced an institutional system with other outof-home placements that may arguably be little better than the
institutions they replaced in their long-term impact on the child's
welfare.
2. Deinstitutionalization and the Juvenile Justice System
The juvenile justice system was created, in part, to remove juvenile
offenders from adult correctional facilities. Incorporating new notions of
adolescence as a phase of child development during which children need
rehabilitative, rather than punitive intervention, the juvenile justice
647
system was formally grounded in the state's parens patriaeauthority.
Furthermore, adult correctional facilities were characterized by harsh
conditions and exposure to adult inmates endangered the physical and
psychological well-being of juveniles placed with them. Data reveal that
reformers succeeded in reducing the number of juveniles in adult
facilities, but this result was achieved at the "cost of having many more
youth incarcerated in juvenile detention than were held under the
traditional system., 648 Short-term and long-term juvenile correctional

644. Intervention in today's child welfare system consists of little more than "investigation" of
reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and removal of children where suspicions appear
justified. See U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NEIGHBORS HELPING NEIGHBORS: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN 9-10 (1993). Little in the way of organized service provision to the families or children
occurs. U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CREATING CARING COMMUNITIES: BLUEPRINT FOR AN EFFECTIVE FEDERAL POLICY ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT xi (1991). Furthermore, little is done to monitor placements, train and
support foster parents, or assist children and families if the family is subsequently reunified.
645. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, supra note 83, at vii. Among
the Advisory Board's conclusions were that "child abuse and neglect in the United States now
represents a national emergency," in part because "in spite of the nation's avowed aim of protecting
its children," there is an absence of effective preventive and intervention strategies. Id.at vii-xv.
646. See, e.g., Melton, supranote 83; Thompson & Wilcox, supra note 83.
647. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction ofAdolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
547 (2000); FELD, supranote 94, at 52, 55-56.
648. Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 82, 84. Ironically, however,
the last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of policies that lead to the mingling of juvenile
and adult offenders in the same population, as jurisdictions process increasing numbers of offenses
committed by juveniles in the adult criminal justice system. See supra note 93.
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facilities experienced steady increases in rates64 of
admission, residence,
9
and episodes throughout the twentieth century.
The overall data, however, mask certain trends, such as the
deinstitutionalization of status offenders and nonoffenders from juvenile
justice facilities. In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"). 650 A key provision of this
legislation conditioned federal grants to state juvenile justice programs
on a state's compliance with requirements to deinstitutionalize status
offenders 651 from secure short- and long-term juvenile justice
facilities. 652 The JJDPA and several state-level predecessor acts were the
products of many years of dissatisfaction with the high rates of detention
of status offenders in juvenile correctional facilities with delinquents.65 3
The juvenile courts' jurisdiction over these youth did not seem
particularly problematic when observers still held out hope that the
system could provide individualized and non-punitive treatment for
those in need.6 54 Yet, by the 1960s and 1970s, acknowledgement of and
disillusion with the gap between the system's ideals and the reality was
widespread.6 55 The basic premise of characterizing minors who engage
in status offender conduct as offenders at all was questioned by the IJAABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards in its report

649. Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 88 fig.3.5. Lerman's data
reveal that residence rates increased 128.9% during this period and that admission rates increased
over ten-fold during this period. Admission rates climbed even more rapidly, rising over ten-fold
between the 1920s and 1990s. Id. at 87 fig.3.4, 88 fig.3.5. In 1923, the episode rate per 100,000
youth in private and public correctional facilities was 226; by contrast, the rate in the mid-1990s
was 1,726, yielding an increase of 663.7%. ("Episodes" of juvenile placement are derived by
combining the one-day residency count on a given day of a year and all additional admissions
throughout the remainder of that year.) Id.
650. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1119
(2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(a)(12)-(13)).
651. For a definition of status offender, see supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
652. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1119,
§ 223 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(a)(12)-(13)). Other provisions of the Act required the
states to devote 75% of their federal funds to a range of programs designed, in part, to foster a more
community-based approach to juvenile delinquency prevention and rehabilitation. Id. at 111920(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(10) (2004)).
653. See, e.g., Julie Zatz, Problems and Issues in Deinstilutionalization:Historical Overview
and Current Attitudes, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

OF STATUS OFFENDERS 14 (Joel F. Handler & Julie Zatz eds., 1982) [hereinafter Zatz, Historical
Overview].
654. See Costello, supranote 443, at 234-36.
655. See, e.g., Zatz, Historical Overview, supra note 653, at 25-29 (discussing the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the juvenile justice system fails to provide minors either with due process or
care and treatment).
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recommending Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior.656 The
Joint Commission recommended that the juvenile court be divested of
status offender jurisdiction, and that states focus on providing a range of
community-based voluntary intervention services geared toward helping
youths and their families resolve their conflicts.657
Congress, in enacting the JJDPA, attempted to respond to various
concerns, although it did not adopt the IJA-ABA recommendations.
Critics of the juvenile justice system condemned "the excessive
intrusiveness of the juvenile justice system into the lives of youth whose
offenses were noncriminal in nature.,

658

At the time of JJDPA's

enactment, minors charged with status offenses were twice as likely as
those charged with delinquent offenses to be placed in secure detention,
despite the noncriminal-and relatively nondangerous-nature of their
conduct. 659 Reformers sought to prevent the "commingling" of status
offenders and delinquents in detention, given that many of the latter
group have committed serious crimes and might victimize or influence
status offenders. 660 Furthermore, observers argued that the experience of
institutionalization and the stigmatizing effects of the "offender" label
would increase the likelihood that status offenders will recidivate or
move on to more serious offenses. 66 1 By the 1960s, it was clear that the
656. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. - AM. BAR Ass'N JOINT COMM'N ON JUV. JUST. STANDARDS,
STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (1977); see also Costello, supra note 443,
at 242-43 & nn.44-45 (citing various objections in the literature).
657. Standard 1.1 reads: "A juvenile's acts of misbehavior, ungovernability, or unruliness
which do not violate the criminal law should not constitute a ground for asserting juvenile court
jurisdiction over the juvenile committing them." INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. - AM. BAR ASS'N JOINT
COMM'N ON JUV. JUST. STANDARDS, supra note 656, at 23. Parts II and III of the Standardsaddress
limited circumstances in which the court or law enforcement can take custody of such juveniles,

such as placement or temporary placement of runaways in nonsecure detention. Id. at 23-26. Parts
IV through VI address the role of the state in offering a range of voluntary services to juveniles and
their families. Id. at 26-34.
658. Zatz, Historical Overview, supra note 653, at 26. The procedural informality of the
juvenile court, already a concern as it related to the incarceration of those accused of violating
criminal statutes, was even more disturbing relative to noncriminal offenders. Id.
659. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100, at 207 (revealing that in 1975, approximately 40%
of status offense cases involved the use of secure detention, compared with approximately 20% of
delinquency cases).

660. Zatz, Historical Overview, supra note 653, at 29, 31. Some worried that status offenders
might become "hardened" as a result of their exposures to serious offenders. Costello, supra note

443, at 239.
661. Julie Zatz, Problems and Issues in Deinstitutionalization:Laws, Concepts, and Goals, in
NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 41,

48 (Joel F. Handler & Julie Zatz eds., 1982) [hereinafter Zatz, Laws, Concepts, and Goals]. Still
today, many argue that institutionalization injustice system facilities only exacerbates these minors'
problems and creates new difficulties. Tina Chiu & Sara Mogulescu, Changing the Status Quofor
Status Offenders: New York State's Efforts to Support Troubled Teens, in ISSUES IN BRIEF: VERA
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juvenile justice system had failed to restrain the rising rate of violent
crime by juveniles. In light of these statistics, the commitment of a
substantial proportion of the system's resources to incarcerate
noncriminal offenders seemed misguided.662
In the decades following the JJDPA, there were substantial
reductions in the number of status offenders placed in detention under
the auspices of the juvenile justice system.663 By the year 1988, the GAO
reported that states "had cumulatively reduced their status offender
detention about 95 percent below their base years, 664 with 38 states in
compliance with the legislation's requirement that states reduce their
status offender detention by at least 75 percent.665 Since 1988, the
overall rates of incarceration of status offenders have continued to
decline, with the exception of a slight increase between 1999 and 2001
(the last year for which data are available). Using the base-year data
provided by the GAO as the point of comparison, there was a 94.7%
666
reduction in the absolute numbers of incarcerated status offenders
from 186,996 in the base year, to 9849 in 1988.667 The Office of Juvenile
INST. OF JUST.: YOUTH JUST. PROGRAM, Dec. 2004, at I (concluding that the status offender system
"created to help parents, schools and communities get.., disobedient, but not delinquent, children
back on track" has had "the opposite effect," when removing the child from the home, aggravating
"family tension, reduc[ing] engagement in school, and increas[ing the] likelihood
of... involvement in criminal behavior"). Furthermore, once labeled "offenders," these minors are
stigmatized in ways that may make it even more problematic for them to be treated normally and
function adaptively in the community. See Jonathan C. Juliano, Detention of Persons in Need of
Supervision. The Dilemma in Grounding the Flight of the Fleet-Footed Status Offender, 13 J.
SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 95, 113 (1999).

662.

See Zatz, HistoricalOverview, supra note 653, at 25-26.

663. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-65, NONCRIMINAL JUVENILES: DETENTIONS
HAVE BEEN REDUCED BUT BETTER MONITORING IS NEEDED, REP. TO CONG. COMMS., 19-22 (Apr.

1991) [hereinafter GAO, 1991]; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100, at 207.
664. GAO, 1991, supra note 663, at 19. "When states enter the program, they are required to
identify a 'base year' number of status offenders [and nonoffenders] held in secure detention for
longer than 24 hours." Id.at 19 & n.2. Thus, despite the enactment of the legislation in 1974, states
commenced participation in the grant program during different years thereafter. It is the level of use
of secure detention with status offenders during the base year against which changes over time are
measured in order to determine the state's compliance with the program's requirements.
665. Id.at 20.
666. Id. at 20-21 tbl.2.1. Absolute numbers, rather than rates for 100,000 in the juvenile
population are used because the variability in the base years in which particular states joined the
program makes it difficult to estimate the population-based rate. The population of persons under
the age of 18 in the United States did drop about 6 percent between 1975 and 1988. Thus,
depending upon the years of entry into the program, the percentage of decline in status offenders
may reflect a slight overestimate when corrected by changes in the population.
667. Id. at 21 tbl.2.1. The figure reported is 9,849, although this statistic is an underestimate
because of missing data from North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming. Id. Subsequent data
obtained by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention revealed the following
absolute numbers in more recent years: 6,877 in 1997; 4,694 in 1999; and 5,116 in 2001. Melissa
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Justice and Delinquency Prevention concluded in 1999 that "[f]ederal
requirements to deinstitutionalize status offenders have been effective,"
pointing to data comparing status offender incarceration in 1996 with
1975 statistics.66 8
And while these data suggest that states have successfully
implemented the Congressional mandate to deinstitutionalize status
offenders from juvenile justice correctional facilities, a more cautious
interpretation of the Act's achievement is appropriate if we look at
impact more broadly. The filing of status offender petitions by parents
and law enforcement personnel is higher today than when the JJDPA
went into effect.669 In 1975, state status offense petitions were estimated
to be at approximately 144,000 nationally. 670 In the year 2000, the
estimate was 165,000.671 This increase of 14.6% is slightly greater than
the 8.0% increase in the national population of minors during that period
of time. 672 Yet, the changes over time have not been linear. Petitioned
status offense cases dropped to 62,000 in 1982, down 56.9%, but then
gradually increased throughout the 1980s, and began to rise rapidly in
the 1990S. 6 7 3 According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, "[b]etween 1987 and 1996, the juvenile court's
formal status offense caseload more than doubled., 674 Increases in all
categories of status offenses were observed, with truancy and violations
of liquor laws accounting for the highest number of cases.6 75 One
Sickmund, Juveniles in Corrections, NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL.: JUV. OFFENDERS & VICTIMS, June

2004, at 3 (reporting 1997 and 1999 data); OFF. OF JUV. JUST. DELINQ. PREVENTION, DETAILED
OFFENSE PROFILE BY PLACEMENT STATUS FOR UNITED STATES, 2001, CENSUS OF JUVENILES IN
at
available
DATABOOK,
PLACEMENT
RESIDENTIAL

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp/asp/OffenseAdj.asp (last visited June 15, 2005) (reporting 2001
data). Thus, the numbers continued to decline until 1999, despite increases in the population of
children in the United States. Adjusted for changes in the population, however, the 2001 rate
reflects an increase above 1999 of 8%. The rate per 100,000 in 1999 was 6.52; the rate per 100,000
in 2001 was 7.04. It is not clear whether this increase is an indication of a trend toward greater use
of residential placements for status offenders, or is merely a nonsignificant fluctuation; the next
available data set-which is not available at the time of this writing-will likely provide insight as
to this issue.
668. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100, at 207.
669. Hunter Hurst, Status Offenders: "Where Have They Gone and Wo Cares?", JUV. & FAM.
JUST. TODAY, reprinted in Hunter Hurst, HUNTER OF DELINQUENCY, Winter 2003, at 1, 3.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. These percentage increases were tabulated by this author, applying population statistics
obtained from Figure POPI: Number of Children Under Age 18 in the United States, 1950-2001
and Projected 2002-20 found at http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/pdf/ac2003/pop.pdf.
673.
674.

Hurst, supra note 669, at 3.
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100, at 166-67.

675. Id. at 166.
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juvenile justice expert attributes the rise in the 1980s to the Valid Court
Order Amendment of the JJDPA, discussed immediately below, and the
rise in the 1990s, in part, to the "ravaged" public and private human
service budgets, which dramatically reduced states' abilities to provide
alternate services to those who, without such assistance, would fall into
the status offender category.676
Pressure from the states to provide a mechanism to incarcerate
particularly recalcitrant status offenders led to an amendment to the
JJDPA in 1980 creating the "valid court order" exception.677 This
amendment provided authority for a practice already in place in some
jurisdictions.6 78 Under this provision, if a status offender is ordered by
the court to do something (such as participating in counseling or
attending school), or to stop doing something (such as running away),
and she violates that order, the court is permitted to commit her to a
secure placement. 679 This, of course, opens the door fairly wide for
incarceration of status offenders, since noncompliance and refusal to
cooperate with authority are hallmarks of status offender conduct.6 8 °
In addition, several trends have emerged that suggest that law
enforcement, court personnel, and parents have used alternate
constructions of status offender behavior to find ways to remove these
minors from their homes and communities. For example, some juveniles,

676. See Hurst, supra note 669, at 3. The other factor to which Hurst attributes the rise of status
offender petitions in the 1990s is the proliferation and enforcement of curfew laws. Id.
677. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)( 11)(A)(ii) (2005).
678. See Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, IncarceratingStatus Offenders: Attempts to
Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv, 41,
58-61 (1981); Gwen A. Holden & Robert A Kapler, DeinstitutionalizingStatus Offenders: A Record
of Progress, JUV. JUST., Fall/Winter 1995, at 8.
679. See Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 58-60; Holden & Kapler, supra note 678,
at 7; see also Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing:
Implications of the JJDPA Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1162, 1167 (1992). Observers are
particularly critical of one variant of this procedure. In some states, courts have used the court's
criminal contempt authority to characterize a status offender's defiance of the court's order as a
criminal and, therefore, delinquent offense. Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 58. This
practice, described by authors as "nightmarish" or "vicious," is referred to as "bootstrapping."
Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 58-59; Harry J. Rothgerber, The Bootstrappingof Status
Offenders: A Vicious Practice, I KY. CHILD. RTs. J. 1, 1-2 (1991). Official interpretations of the
JJDPA's Valid Court Order Amendment do not permit the court to transform the case from a status
offense to delinquency adjudication on this basis. Holden & Kapler, supra note 678, at 7-8.
680. See Costello, supra note 443, at 237 ("[U]ngovemable, incorrigible, stubborn, and
rebellious minors tend not to defer to authority-no surprise-including that of the courts. They
frequently do not comply with the terms of probation, run away from nonsecure placements, and
constantly test whatever rule or authority is asserted-but try to stop short of committing a true
criminal offense."); Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 58; see also Holden & Kapler,
supra note 678, at 7.
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who cannot be placed in secure confinement in compliance with the
JJDPA if labeled as status offenders, have been "relabeled" as
delinquents.6 8' Costello and Worthington observe that "[o]ften the facts
available to the intake officer or police could be interpreted to support
either a status offense or juvenile delinquency charge., 682 They note, for
example, that many runaways carry weapons to protect themselves and
engage in conduct such as prostitution and sale of illegal drugs. These
facts could support a finding of delinquency.683 Using the discretion
inherent in their roles, law enforcement and court personnel can treat the
case as a status or delinquency offense. The same is true when police
find a runaway child sleeping at night in an unoccupied building. She
could be treated as a status offender who has run away from home or
violated a curfew, or as a delinquent who has violated a trespassing
statute684 because the facts fit either offense category.685 The juvenile
court's status offender and delinquency jurisdictions represent alternate
social constructions of the norm-violating conduct.686 Furthermore,
evidence exists that many juveniles meeting the criteria of status
offenders are admitted to psychiatric inpatient and residential facilities.
Scholarly analysis and empirical investigation published in the 1980s
indicated that reductions in rates of institutionalization of status
offenders in juvenile justice facilities were offset by increased
admissions of minors to mental hospitals, 687 and more recent data reveal
681. See Steinhart, supra note 323, at 91 (noting empirical research findings); Bishop &
Frazier, supra note 679, at 1167 & n. 19 (summarizing empirical research findings and commenting
that "[tihe line between status offenses and delinquency offenses may be easily manipulated by
justice officials"); Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 72-75; Malcolm W. Klein,
Deinstitutionalizationand Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments, in I CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 145, 176-77, 183-84 (Norval Morris & Michael
Tonry eds., Phoenix ed. 1980) (summarizing empirical studies); Wesley Krause & Marilyn D.
MeShane, A DeinstitutionalizationRetrospective: Relabeling the Status Offender, XVII J. CRIME &
JUST. 45, 51-62 (1994) (reporting empirical findings of relabeling patterns in California); MAXSON
& KLEIN, supranote 119, at 34-35 (1997) (summarizing empirical studies).
682. Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 73.
683. Id.
684. Id.Other examples include children who have run away and engage in petty theft to
sustain themselves while living on the streets, or who steal cash from their parents before leaving.
Krause & McShane, supra note 681, at 51; Zatz, Historical Overview, supranote 653, at 47.
685. See Zatz, Problems and Issues, supra note 653, at 47.
686. See supra Part lI.D.
687. See LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 125; IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 131-46 (1989); Carol
A. B. Warren & Patricia Guttridge, Adolescent PsychiatricHospitalization and Social Control, in
MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119, 122, 124-25 (Linda A. Teplin ed., 1984); Weithor,
Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16 at 805; MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & RANDALL G. SHELDEN,
GIRLS, DELINQUENCY, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 187-88, 191 (2d ed. 1998).
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that the admission rates to mental health facilities have climbed still
higher during the late 1980s and the 1990s. 688 The admissions of these
minors may be initiated by parents 689 or the juvenile court. 6 9 0 The data
have been interpreted as indicating that some proportion of potential
status offenders has been transinstitutionalized-i.e.,institutionalized in
the mental health system when secure juvenile detention became
unavailable-rather than deinstitutionalized.
Some status offenders may be relabeled as dependent (that is,
abused or neglected). Prior to 1977, when the JJDPA was amended to
specify that nonoffenders (such as "dependent, neglected, or abused"
children) could not be placed in secure detention, 691 law enforcement
and court personnel sometimes relabeled status offenders "downward"
as dependency cases in order to access secure detention. 692 Furthermore,
even today, a finding of dependency gives the courts jurisdiction over
the child and substantial authority to order the child's family to follow
through with court-ordered intervention, and it permits the court to order
any of a range of nonsecure out-of-home placements for juveniles. Thus,
juveniles labeled as status offenders or dependents can be placed in
foster care with families or, as is more typical with troublesome
dependent children, in foster care facilities. Many formally adjudicated
status offenders end up in private correctional facilities, most of which
are defined as nonsecure placements that comply with JJDPA
restrictions for such children. 693 Youth in these facilities are a mix of
adjudicated delinquents, status offenders, and several categories of
nonoffenders; children found by the juvenile court to be dependent,
688. See Lerman, Twentieth-CenturyDevelopments, supra note 20; see supra Part IV.E.
689. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 167-68.
690. See, e.g., Costello & Worthington, supra note 678, at 62 & n.91, 64, 67.
691. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(1 1) (2005).
692. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 94, at 177-79 (discussing the strategy, used in some states, to
relabel status offenders, individually (by the courts), or collectively (by the legislatures) as
dependents, thereby emphasizing "their vulnerability rather than offensivity"); Klein, supra note
681, at 176-77, 183-84 (discussing the "downward" relabeling of status offenders as dependent and
reviewing empirical findings demonstrating such relabeling).
693. See Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 89-90. In a series of
publications, Paul Lerman has demonstrated that many former child welfare institutions reinvented
themselves when the deinstitutionalization of the child welfare system reduced their livelihoods and
threatened their continued existence. Id.; see also LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note
20, at 126-30. See generally Paul Lerman, Child Welfare, the PrivateSector, and Community-Based
Corrections, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1984) [hereinafter Lerman, Community-Based Corrections];
Lerman, supra note 119. Lerman has characterized these nontraditional institutions, such as
community-based shelters, halfway houses, and group homes, as a "'kinder and gentler' type of
correctional facility" serving a broader range of youth than public correctional institutions. Lerman,
Twentieth-Century Developments, supra note 20, at 90.
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children identified as emotionally disturbed or developmentally disabled,
and youth "voluntarily" admitted by their parents for any of a range of
reasons. 694 Because these facilities are privately owned (despite
receiving public funds for the placement of children who are in state
custody), adjudicated delinquents can be placed with status offenders
and nonoffenders, a blend that would not be permissible in public
facilities under the JJDPA. And while such facilities certainly seem
more appropriate for status offenders than do secure juvenile facilities,
these nonsecure placements are still out-of-home and most likely require
the child's removal from her school, her friends, her relatives, and her
greater community as well.
There is also concern that increasing numbers of status offenders
who would have been confined in secure facilities prior to the JJDPA's
mandate are now on the streets, either as runaways or children evicted
from their homes by their families.695 Thus, while the JJDPA's goal of
deinstitutionalizing status offenders from juvenile justice correctional
facilities has been implemented successfully from a technical
perspective, minors who would likely have been placed in secure
detention as status offenders prior to the passage of the JJDPA may still
be securely detained, albeit under the authority of an alternative statutory
provision. Or, these children may be in nonsecure correctional facilities,
mixed with a range of other youth, may be in inpatient psychiatric
facilities, or may be on the street. Although the JJDPA planned for and
funded a network of community-based diversion programs, the services
appear to have been inadequate to meet the underlying needs.6 96
Consistent with the functionalist perspective, 697 one would expect
that, in the absence of incarceration as an accessible response to status
offenders, various actors (parents, police, juvenile court intake
personnel, and judges) would seek some alternative means of addressing
694. Lerman,

Twentieth-Century Developments,

supra note

20,

at

90;

LERMAN,

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 128-30; Lerman, Community-Based Corrections,

supranote 693, at 11-13 & tbls.4-5.
695. Holden & Kapler, supra note 678, at 8; Steinhart, supra note 323, at 92-94; Teitelbaum,
supra note 95, at 169; Juliano, supra note 661, at 96. For a discussion of empirical and policy
analyses addressing these "runaway" or "thrownaway" children, see supra Part IV.D.
696. See Steinhart, supra note 323, at 91; Hurst, supra note 669, at 4; NEITHER ANGELS NOR
THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 209 (Joel F. Handler &

Julie Zatz eds., 1982). It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine all of the reasons why the
community-based services failed adequately to meet the needs of status offenders, their families,
and their communities. For comprehensive evaluation of status offender deinstitutionalization
policies, see NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS
OFFENDERS, supra; MAXSON & KLEIN, supra note 119.

697. See supra Part VI.A.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

157

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 33:1305

the underlying needs that had been addressed by secure incarceration. In
particular, the status offender jurisdiction of the juvenile court has
provided parents and law enforcement officials 698 with a mechanism to
deal with what they experienced as difficult, disobedient, and
noncompliant children who violate rules in homes, schools, or
communities. 699 "While status offense jurisdiction and residential
placement of youths who had not committed criminal acts were sharply
curtailed [by the JJDPA], the social circumstances giving rise to such
jurisdiction remained in place." 70 0 Incorrigibility, also referred to as
ungovemability, habitual disobedience, or being beyond parental
control, says as much about parental needs for assistance and about the
parent-child relationship as it says about the minors-an observation that
70 1
is perhaps true of all of these categories of noncriminal misbehavior.
In fact, there is substantial overlap in the home situations that constitute
a finding of child abuse or neglect, and the family circumstances of
status offenders.70 2 Many runaways are escaping family violence or
698. Data for the year 1996 reveal that 48% of petitioned status offense cases are referred by
law enforcement, in contrast to 86% of delinquency cases. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 100,
at 166. The circumstances motivating parental referral are several:
In some families, parents resort to a status offense petition when they have few other
resources to enforce compliant behavior by their children; in others, it serves as a vehicle
for removing unwanted children from home; in yet others, it is the only available means
of securing social and mental health services for parents who, unlike their wealthier
counterparts, cannot afford to purchase those services in the private sector.
Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 163 (citation omitted).
699. Status offender behavior has been viewed in a variety of ways. Some view it as one
variation of the normal developmental process, requiring little more than appropriate parental
guidance, structure, and support. Some view many forms of status offender conduct as a
manifestation of normal adolescent rebellion which, with an appropriate parental response, would
be merely transitory. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler & Julie Zatz, Introduction to NEITHER ANGELS NOR
THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 3, 3 (Joel F. Handler &

Julie Zatz eds., 1982) (citing classical personality development theorists such as Erik Erikson and
Anna Freud for the proposition that '[s]ome people, feeling that a certain amount of adolescent
turmoil is a necessary and desirable part of the maturation process, are inclined to endure youthful
disobedience"). Others view it as a symptom of an emotional or a psychological disorder for which
therapy is needed. Robert W. Sweet, Jr., Deinstitutionalizationof Status Offenders: In Perspective,
18 PEPP. L. REV. 389, 414 (1991). It has also been viewed as a precursor of more serious lawviolating conduct that can be prevented or minimized with justice system intervention, or as merely
one component of an already generalized pattern of law-violating conduct. See MAxSON & KLEIN,
supra note 119.
700. Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 167.
701. See Randy Frances Kandel & Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring Personhood: From
Ungovernabilityto ParentAdolescent Autonomy Conflict Actions, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV.995, 105963 (2003) (reframing certain status offender petitions as parent-adolescent autonomy conflicts).
702. See, e.g., Denise Read, Deinstitutionalizationof Status Offenders: A Look at the Debate, 7
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 3-4 (1986) (stating that approximately half of runaways leave home
because of maltreatment, or are "pushed out" or "thrown out" by their families); Michele Dubowy,
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other dysfunctional family situations; some parents of status offenders
may be absent or providing inadequate supervision. Others may be
abandoned or ejected by their families.7 °3
Other conceptualizations of the core of the problem help explain the
truancy of some status offenders. Some truants have undiagnosed
learning disabilities which make academics sufficiently onerous to lead
them to do anything in order to avoid school.70 4 Conceivably, with
proper diagnosis and special educational assistance, these children's
needs might be adequately met, eliminating the need for juvenile justice
system intervention. Or, a child may be truant to avoid bullying and
teasing that occur at school. The child may stay home from school to
provide care to a family member or to protect one family member from
another. Again, intervention focusing on eradication of the underlying
problems is more likely to be effective in obtaining the child's
compliance with mandatory attendance requirements than is
involvement of a juvenile justice system that treats the child as the
problem and seeks to coerce compliance through threats of penalties. 70 5
But what of the community-based services financed with federal
grants to states that were in compliance with the JJDPA's mandates?
There is an extensive and complex literature analyzing the efficacy of
these interventions.70 6 In the final analysis, however, these interventions
can be faulted on a number of bases that undercut efficacy. One team of
authors points out that while the "negative" mandate under the JJDPA
was clear (that is, not to place status offenders in detention or
correctional facilities), the "positive" mandate regarding what was to

Testimony at Joint Hearing on Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) Conducted by [the New York

State] Assembly Standing Committee on Children and Families and Assembly Standing Committee
on Judiciary 2 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.childrensaidsociety.org/media/file/PINS.pdf

(testifying that in the year 2000, 39% of the families of those children referred for community-based
intervention as status offenders "evidenced behaviors warranting [formal reporting] related to
suspicion of child abuse or neglect"). Ms. Dubowy indicated that the state's designation of status
offenders as "persons in need of supervision" should be reconceptualized as "families in need of
supervision" to focus on the family, rather than the child, as the target of intervention. Id. at 1, 2.
703.

See Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 169; Costello, supra note 443, at 238; see also Loken,

supra note 19.
704. Gordon Bazemore et al., Boundary Changes and the Nexus Between Formal andInformal
Social Control: Truancy Intervention as a Case Study in Criminal Justice Expansionism, 18 NOTRE

DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521, 539-40 (2004); Costello, supra note 443, at 238; Steinhart,
supra note 323, at 94.
705.
706.

See infra Part VII.
See, e.g., MAXSON & KLEIN, supra note 119; Klein, supra note 681; NEITHER ANGELS
NOR THIEVES: STUDIES tN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS, supra note 653.
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replace institutionalization was anything but clear.7 °7 Individual
jurisdictions were on their own to develop alternative services, funded in
part with the federal grants available under the JJDPA. The variability
among and within jurisdictions in post-JJDPA responses to status
offenders was dramatic, and many interventions were not grounded in
theory or in empirical research.70 8 In some instances, the articulated
alternative policies consisted of placing youth in foster family and group
homes.70 9 Sometimes the youth were referred to another system (i.e.,
mental health or child welfare) and sometimes simply returned to
parents. And, as demonstrated above, often the defacto policies included
a variety of relabeling strategies that allowed for either secure detention
and incarceration in the juvenile justice system or a confinement in a
mental health facility.
In the implementation of the JJDPA, there were few evaluative
loops put in place to determine what was working and what was not, so
that jurisdictions had no real mechanism to self-correct ineffective
policies. 710 This problem reflected the overall lack of a coordinated,
well-planned intervention strategy: there was little "official" agreement
across and within jurisdictions as to what alternatives were essential or
important parts of the noninstitutionalization policy. 711 In fact, it wasn't
even clear
in most instances what outcomes would constitute
"success." 7 12 Was the case a "success" if the child didn't run away from
the foster home in which she was placed, if she seemed relatively
"happy and reasonably adjusted, 713 or if she stayed off the juvenile
court's radar for some predetermined period of time?
Typically, to the extent the interventions were grounded in
theoretical models, the approaches were characterized by the theories of
the day, which viewed these youth as mentally disordered, as products of
inadequate or problematic family and social circumstances, or as
disobedient youths requiring justice system intervention to prevent
escalation of their conduct to criminal violations.714 Programs placed

707. NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS
OFFENDERS, supra note 653, at 202-04.

708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
programs
note 119,

Id. at 200-07.
ld. at 219-22.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maxson and Klein characterize the dominant models around which community diversion
were framed as falling into these three broad categories. See MAXSON & KLEIN, supra
at 42-58.
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little emphasis on discovering and addressing the problems that might
underlie or accompany status offending conduct such as family
dysfunction, emotional trauma, academic challenges, or substance abuse.
Programs did not focus on strengthening and supporting the family
members or developing a child's ability to function adaptively within her
multiple social systems. The community-based programs developed to
divert delinquents and status offenders from detention had "minimal
impact" and often "miss[ed] their mark in selecting appropriate
youngsters," frequently serving youth who would not have been
candidates for detention prior to the JJDPA.7 15
In the absence of community-based interventions that met the
underlying needs of the children, their families, and the larger
communities, deinstitutionalization policies may have reduced the
number of children officially labeled as status offenders who were
placed in secure detention and correctional facilities, but the problems
triggering the status offending conduct were rarely addressed. The
employment of alternate mechanisms to remove these children from
their homes and communities, as discussed in this section, betrays the
inefficacy of the interventions in meeting the underlying social needs
that had led to pre-JJDPA policies of detainment for these youth.
3. Deinstitutionalization and the Mental Health System
Psychiatric hospitalization of minors was not common until the
mid- and late-twentieth century. Thus, most of the history of
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of the mental health system
focuses on adults. There are lessons we can learn from these trends,
however, that apply to juveniles, whose hospitalization became more
typical in the last quarter of the twentieth century. There is vast and
diverse literature on the deinstitutionalization of the mental health
system.7 16 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to review this
715. Id. at40.
716. See, e.g., BACHRACH, supra note 566; PHIL BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE:
PSYCHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1985); DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION:
PROMISE AND PROBLEMS (H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger eds., 2001); GERALD N. GROB,
FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN AMERICA (1991); Gerald N.
Grob, Deinstitutionalization:The Illusion of Policy, in HEALTH CARE POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 48 (Alan 1. Marcus & Hamilton Cravens eds., 1997) [hereinafter Grob, Illusion of Policy];

Gerald N. Grob, Mental Health Policy in Late Twentieth-Century America, in AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRY AFTER WORLD WAR 11 (1944-1994) 232 (Roy W. Menninger & John C. Nemiah eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Grob, Late Twentieth-Century]; CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBULKIN,
MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION: MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS (1987); LERMAN,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION supra note 20; DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, FROM POORHOUSES TO
HOMELESSNESS: POLICY ANALYSIS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 1997); E. FULLER
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literature in depth, I will make a few observations that help in the
analysis of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of minors in
psychiatric facilities.
In the second half of the twentieth century, several phenomena
converged to create an environment favorable to deinstitutionalization of
adults from inpatient mental health facilities. After World War II, there
was increasing dissatisfaction with the dominant role of institutions in
American mental health policy. 717 Shifts had occurred in social attitudes
and professional perspectives on mental health problems and
treatment.71 8 Not only was there increasing concern about the deplorable
conditions in these institutions, but mental health professionals
expressed optimism about their ability to effect positive changes in
mental disorders with outpatient therapy and the new psychotropic drugs
that controlled some of the most disabling symptoms of serious
conditions such as schizophrenia.7 19
The National Mental Health Act was passed by Congress in 1946,
which established the National Institute of Mental Health and introduced
the federal role in mental health policy. Congress created the Joint
Commission on Mental Health in 1955.720 The Commission issued its
report, Action for Mental Health in 1961, which recommended the
development of a broad spectrum of mental health services, including
noninstitutional services such as outpatient clinics and aftercare. 721 In
1963, President Kennedy signed the Mental Retardation and Community
Mental Health Centers Construction Act, which led to a profusion of
federal funds in the form of state grants for the purpose of developing a
community-based infrastructure of mental health services. 72 2 The
Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 followed, providing for
federal funding for the staffing of the community mental health
centers.723 Congress hoped that the legislation would lead to the
development of a wide network of services providing humane and
TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1997);

Randall G. Krieg, An InterdisciplinaryLook at the Deinstitutionalizationof the Mentally 1ll, 38
Soc. Sci. J. 367 (2001).
717. See Grob, Late Twentieth-Century, supra note 716, at 232-35; Grob, Illusion of Policy,
supra note 716, at 48.
718. Grob, Illusion of Policy, supra note 716, at 51.
719. BROWN, supra note 716, at 149-58.
720. JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL
HEALTH: FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH V, Vii

(1961).
721. Id. at vii-xxiv.
722. GROB, supra note 134, at 257-58.
723. See Grob, Illusion of Policy, supra note 716, at 52.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/9

162

Weithorn: Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Trouble

20051

TROUBLED AND TROUBLESOME YOUTH

effective care in the community for those who would otherwise spend
Lawmakers aspired to
their lives in overcrowded state institutions.
"render traditional mental hospitals obsolete., 724
In one of the many offshoots of the civil rights movement, legal
advocates in the 1960s and thereafter sought to extend certain rights to
the mentally disabled, such as rights to treatment for those individuals
committed to inpatient settings. 2 5 Other lawsuits focused on the
procedural and substantive requirements due to patients prior to the
restriction of liberty that accompanies commitment to mental
hospitals. 726 Still, others addressed the rights of patients to refuse various

forms of treatment.727 During the 1970s and 1980s, in response to these
suits, states developed statutory protections for patients for whom civil
commitment was sought. The ultimate schema adopted in most
jurisdictions is one that allows commitment of individuals to psychiatric
facilities only when the patient is either an imminent danger to herself or
others, or is gravely disabled so as to be unable to care for herself, and
that limits the length of hospitalization to that period of time essential to
serve the state's parenspatriaeand police power goals.7 28
of
While some ascribe responsibility for deinstitutionalization 729
mental patients to these cases and subsequent statutory changes,
historian Gerald Grob suggests that these "[j]udicial decisions, however
significant, merely confirmed existing trends by providing a legal
sanction for deinstitutionalization. ' '730 Playing a much greater role in the
deinstitutionalization movement, he argues, were social welfare
programs which allowed the states to shift financial responsibility for
chronic psychiatric patients to the federal government.7 3' Many older
chronic psychiatric patients qualified for Medicaid, which paid much of
the cost of the community-based nursing homes to which thousands of

724. Id.
725. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334
F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part sub nom Wyatt v.

Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
726. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 424 (1979).
727. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981), vacated by 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
728. See WINICK,supra note 486, at 41-97.
729. The most famous articulation of this position is found in the title to one article: Darold A.
Treffert, Dying with One's Rights On, 224 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1649 (1973).
730. Grob, Illusion of Policy, supra note 716, at 55.
731. Id.
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patients were transferred.732 Medicare, Social Security Disability
Insurance, and Social Security Income for the Aged, the Disabled, and
the Blind further allowed states to shift the cost of care of many
chronically mentally disabled individuals from state-funded institutions
to federally subsidized community-based living. 733 Sadly, the quality of
care in many of these facilities was not much better than that which they
had left in state institutions.734
Most observers agree that this deinstitutionalization movement did
not turn out precisely as hoped as most who left or avoided the
institutions never obtained adequate community-based services. Grob
points to certain inaccurate assumptions embedded in the community
services model. In particular, he argues, the policy presumed that
"patients had a home ...[and] a sympathetic family or other person
willing and able to assume responsibility for their care" when, in fact,
few patients had families that could or would serve this function.73 5
Furthermore, the intervention community mental health centers typically
provided, traditional psychodynamicallyor "insight"-oriented
psychotherapy, is more appropriate for highly functioning individuals
with mild psychological difficulties than for the severely and chronically
disabled patients who were the more typical residents of mental
institutions. 736 Grob argues that the community-based services created
during this era and subsequently never provided "for the basic human
and medical needs of the severely mentally ill. '737 By the 1970s, the
federal government began to scale back its leadership role and
investment in mental health policy, and since that time, there has been
gradual erosion of public funding for mental health services of all
8
types.

73

One final glimmer of hope had accompanied the President's
Commission on Mental Health, created by and issuing its report to

732. Id. at 55-56; see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S.,
RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE

(1977).
733. Grob, Illusion of Policy,supra note 716, at 56.
734. Id. at 55.
735. Id. at 52-53. Grob points out that "[i]n 1960, however, 48 percent of the mental hospital
population was unmarried, 12 percent were widowed, and 13 percent were divorced or separated. A
large proportion of patients, in other words, may have had no families to care for them." Id. at 53.
736. See id.at53.
737. Id. at 53-54.
738. Charles G. Ray & William Kanapaux, Community Mental Health Centers at the 40-Year
Mark: The Quest for Survival, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 9, 12 (Ronald W.
Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., 2004).
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President Jimmy Carter. 739 The Report served as the blueprint for the
Mental Health Systems Act ("MHSA"), passed by Congress in 1980.740
The MHSA would have provided federal grants to fund a range of
community-based mental health programs, with an emphasis on
underserved or poorly-served populations such as the chronically
mentally ill and children, and it encouraged innovation in service
delivery. Unfortunately, upon taking office in 1981, President Reagan's
administration succeeded in repealing the MHSA,7 4' thus shortcircuiting a program that might have led to the development of
community-based services appropriate for severely emotionally
disturbed individuals and special populations such as children. Since that
time, few initiatives, state or federal, have prioritized mental health
funding. In fact, governmental expenditures on mental health services
have not increased in the past two decades, when the figures are
corrected for inflation.
So what has happened to those individuals who would have been
hospitalized in mental institutions in prior eras? Many of them still
spend time in mental hospitals, but most cycle in and out, with shorter
stays than in previous years.742 Some appear in hospital emergency

rooms during emotional crises and, like the children discussed above,
board on medical wards until a psychiatric bed becomes available.743
Others live in nursing homes, board and bed homes, and a variety of
community-based living situations, some of which offer "treatment" and
others of which are primarily custodial in nature. 744 Still, others have
turned up in relatively large numbers in the criminal justice system.74 5
Many individuals who would have been institutionalized in former

739. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH (1978).
740. Mental Health Systems Act, Pub. L. No. 96-398, §§ 201-204, 94 Stat. 1564, 1571-81
(1980).
741. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(1), 95 Stat. 357,
560 (1981).
742. See WINICK, supranote 486, at 2-3.
743. See supraPart IV.B.
744. See LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 20, at 10-11; see also Weithom,
Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16, at 805 n. 199.
745. See, e.g., Steadman et al., The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalizationon
UnitedStates Prison Populations, 1968-1978, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1984); see also
E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS
AS MENTAL HOSPITALS (1992); Paula M. Ditton, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP., DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Mental Health and Treatment ofInmates and Probationers,(July 1999); Ray & Kanapaux,

supra note 738, at 12 (referring to jails and prisons as becoming the "de facto psychiatric
institutions" by the 1990s "[i]n many parts of the country").
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decades now live on our streets.746 And, some are cared for by family
members or friends, often without the types of support services that
would help these loved ones to provide such care without suffering
devastating financial or psychosocial consequences.
Although there is debate as to whether community life under
present circumstances is "better" than long periods of institutionalization
in psychiatric facilities for those with chronic mental disorders, most
observers agree that the aftermath of deinstitutionalization of psychiatric
patients is both disappointing and disturbing. And yet, the failures make
in
that the
perspective,
functionalist
within the
sense
deinstitutionalization process was incomplete. That is, many patients
were discharged from mental hospitals and others never entered or did
not re-enter. The underlying social needs of these individuals, their
families, and their communities did not evaporate along with the
inpatient beds. Thus, many of these individuals have gone without
formal care; others have entered alternative and arguably less
appropriate service and intervention systems, while still others cycle in
and out of mental hospitals.
During this first wave of deinstitutionalization of mental health
facilities in the late 1960s through the 1980s, while adult admission and
residency counts dropped, the rates of use for minors increased, a
phenomenon discussed elsewhere in depth.74 7 Troubled and troublesome
youth who had been deinstitutionalized from other systems appeared in
mental health facilities in greater numbers during these decades. A
second "wave" of deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals began in the
1990s and continues today. This latter wave followed restrictions in the
availability of private and public insurance for inpatient treatment of
children and adults. Private insurance companies and state Medicaid
programs have either adopted managed care policies or created managed
care "carve-outs," in which they subcontracted mental health services
and/or administrative management to a managed care agency. 748 The
746. See, e.g., Leona L. Bachrach, What We Know About Homelessness Among Mentally Ill
Persons: An Analytic Review and Commentary, in TREATING THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 13 (H. Richard Lamb et al. eds.,
1992); NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH ET AL., DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION POLICY AND
HOMELESSNESS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1990).

747. See Weithorn, Skyrocketing Admissions, supra note 16.
748. Ray & Kanapaux, supra note 738, at 12 (noting that the initiation of managed care in
public programs was expected to promote the development of more cost-effective alternatives to
hospitalization, but that "cost concerns more frequently than not overrode any well-intentioned
designs to reinvest savings in further development of community services"); see also E. Clarke
Ross, The Promise and Reality of Managed Behavioral Health Care, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED
STATES, 2000, at 73 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., 2000), available at
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1471

changes thus implemented often limit the types and locus of mental
health intervention available, the length of treatment, and a range of
"qualifying" factors. These restrictions have contributed as well to
closures of (primarily public) inpatient facilities.
The financing of mental health care in the United States relies more
heavily upon out-of-pocket expenditures by consumers than is the case
for most industrialized nations. 749 These out-of-pocket expenditures are
supplemented by private insurance for some, by public insurance for
those in particular income, age, or disability categories, and by scattered
public services. Research reveals that this method of financing
frequently "leads to denial of access and a two-tiered system of care
where higher socioeconomic groups and more therapeutically promising
patients are served by the private sector and the lower socioeconomic
groups and patients and families requiring multisectoral interventions are
served by the public sector., 750 The relegation of the structure and
organization of mental health services to market forces, supplemented by
a relatively small safety net, certainly has contributed to the "de facto"
(or "nonsystem") nature of the system and its failure to meet the needs
of many 1whose functioning is deleteriously affected by a mental
disorder.

75

Mental health needs receive only a small proportion of health care
expenditures in the United States each year. According to one estimate,
only 7% of the combined private and public dollars spent on health care
in the United States in 1996 were spent on mental health care.752 Yet,
epidemiological data reveal that in any given year, one in five adult
of
Americans suffers from a mental disorder.753 In general, about half 754
impairment.
functional
significant
some
"experience
those people
While researchers have only recently begun to study the prevalence of
childhood mental disorders, data suggest that a similar proportion of
http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/publications/alpubs/SMAO I %2D3537/chapter9.asp;
MANAGED MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A SURVIVAL MANUAL (Kenneth
Minkoff& David Pollack eds., 1997).
749. See Shekhar Saxena et al., Budget and Financing of Mental Health Services: Baseline
Information on 89 Countriesfrom WHO's Project Atlas, 6 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL'Y ECON. 135,
140-41 (2003).
750. Id. at 140.
751. Saxena and colleagues emphasize that "[h]ealth and social markets do not function like
business markets; the supply and demand fundamentals of the business world may actually threaten

effective and equitable health care and may prove especially harmful to mentally ill patients with
high degree of need and limited resources." Id. at 136.
752. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supranote 22, at 416 tbl.6-6.
753. Id. at 46.
754. Id.
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children-about 20%--have diagnosable conditions, and that between
5% and 9% of children ages 9 to 17 experience severe functional
impairment, known as "serious emotional disturbance," as a component
of these conditions. 5 Despite these statistics, and other data that reveal
the substantial level of disability experienced by many persons with
mental disorders, mental health service delivery in the United States
occurs in a splintered and haphazard manner, with little or no
coordination among entities or professionals. These deficiencies in the
mental health "nonsystem" contribute significantly to the overuse and
inappropriate use of institutional interventions with troubled and
troublesome youth, who are unable to access less restrictive and more
appropriate interventions. Existing avenues to access appropriate
services are confusing and create multiple obstacles for families.
Eligibility requirements for appropriate services often exclude large
segments of children or place onerous burdens upon families, such as
requiring relinquishment of custody in order to access services.
Furthermore, few providers offer the newer evidence-based therapies
which focus on strengthening the family and equipping the child to
function more adaptively in her natural environments.
In summary, while deinstitutionalization in the mental health
system has succeeded in depopulating public and, to a lesser extent,
private mental hospitals, there is no evidence that patients, be they adults
or children, are receiving appropriate services. Rather, these individuals
are populating our juvenile and criminal justice system facilities, our
medical emergency rooms, our child welfare placements, our streets, and
are, at times, cycling in and out of the remaining psychiatric units which
operate much like a revolving door. Not only are these patterns
inconsistent with several core legal traditions discussed in Part V, they
also increase the short- and long-term burden on society and on local,
state, and federal governments. As each level of government and
particular agencies within each jurisdiction shift costs in various
directions, the overall costs to society are enormous. While the financial
burden of providing ineffective services only after problems have
reached crisis-like proportions is great, the human cost is incalculable.
Potentially productive lives are wasted as hundreds of thousands of
individuals who could have contributed to society are unable to
participate meaningfully; individuals suffer emotionally, despite the
existence of a range of effective treatments that are inaccessible; families
are burdened to the point of dysfunction and destruction; and, in the case
755.

Id.
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of those individuals whose conduct is harmful to others, members of the
community are needlessly injured in one way or another. Ironically, all
of this occurs at a financial cost far greater than that of a comprehensive
well-planned, well-coordinated, well-implemented, and well-funded
mental health system.
VII. REFORMING LEGAL POLICIES AFFECTING TROUBLED AND
TROUBLESOME YOUTH: ENVISIONING SECOND-ORDER CHANGE

At the outset of this Article, I distinguished between first-order and
second-order change. 756 While first-order change "occurs within a given
system which itself remains unchanged," second-order change "changes
the system itself" and is thus a change in the goals and process by which
change occurs, that is, "change of change., 757 Obviously, one needs to
investigate the possibilities for stimulating second-order change only if
attempts to generate first-order change are unsuccessful. This is indeed
the case with respect to our nation's legal responses to troubled and
troublesome youth. Hundreds of thousands of such youth and their
families experience serious emotional crises annually. These crises
reverberate within their larger communities-in schools, in hospitals, in
the juvenile and criminal justice systems, in the welfare system, and in
the streets-and ultimately in all of our lives. The suffering of all
affected can be enormous, as are the social and financial costs to society.
Throughout the twentieth century, policymakers have experimented
with a variety of responses to troubled and troublesome youth. The
dominant modalities of intervention employ strategies of removal,
confinement, and segregation. As we have seen, these approaches are
inconsistent with core traditions in American law, and have been
unsuccessful in ameliorating the difficulties they were intended to
address. Despite the best intentions of reformers seeking to reduce use of
specific institutional systems, each of the targeted systems has expanded
rather than contracted its overall reach into American families. Clearly,
the mechanisms by which policymakers have sought to promote change
are themselves in need of change. While determining what constitutes
second-order change is not easy, the first step is to examine what has
been tried in the past and evaluate the shortcomings of failed
approaches.
Below, I propose several changes to the ways in which we have
approached change. First, I argue that past efforts have focused on
756. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
757. See WATZLAWICK ETAL., supra note 2, at 10-11 (emphases added).
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negative rather than positive mandates. While policies have successfully
depopulated identified institutions or subgroups, they have failed at
serving their target populations adequately. I propose that policymakers
begin with the positive mandates, with negative mandates following only
after an effective alternative service system is in place.
Second, the compartmentalization of children's and families'
behavior and needs into the artificial and rigid conceptual categories
reflected by multiple service and intervention systems ignores the
overlap in the populations served by these systems, and the multifaceted
nature of these children's and families' problems and needs. Working in
isolation, the several service and intervention systems inadequately serve
children's and families' needs, operating quite inefficiently. States must
develop "metasystem" capabilities that transcend traditional system
boundaries and coordinate system efforts, transforming unintended
boundary crossings into formal interagency coordination, cooperation,
and cross-referral. One model for achieving such capabilities is
described.
Third, the philosophies guiding the primary child service and
intervention systems have not generated a nucleus of successful
intervention strategies. Traditional strategies have emphasized removal
from family, confinement in institutional settings, and segregation from
the mainstream of the community. These approaches have the dubious
distinction of blending their inefficacy with their disconnection from
core American legal principles. Below, I argue that it is possible to
intervene with troubled and troublesome youth and their families in a
manner that is substantially more effective in meeting underlying
individual and social needs and that supports families, minimizes
unnecessary restrictions of liberty, and promotes social inclusion. This
approach focuses on the commonalities in the interests of parents,
children, and the state, rather than on the conflicts, and devises
interventions that advance those shared goals.
Finally, attempts to serve troubled and troublesome youth and their
families in the community will not be successful if there are latent
functions served by institutions that are not addressed by the reforms.
The proposals below strive to confront the gamut of functions served by
institutions. In addition to those goals just enumerated, the scheme must
also address our society's fear of and intolerance for people who are
different or who violate social norms, even when those individuals are
not dangerous. While overcoming this obstacle is particularly
challenging, various groups have begun to lay the groundwork.
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Putting the "HorseBefore the Cart": Focusing on Positive Before
Negative Mandates

While there is no constitutional right to governmental services,7 58
once the government establishes a statutory right to a particular category
of services or benefits, it must fulfill those obligations in a manner
prescribed by that or other legislation such as the ADA, which mandates
nondiscrimination. 759 There are federal programs relevant to troubled
and troublesome youth which have provided funding to enable the states
to provide certain services, 76 accompanied by negative, as well as
positive, mandates.
In their attempts to deinstitutionalize various institutional systems,
policymakers have gone about their efforts a bit backwards-putting the
proverbial "cart before the horse." In their analysis of the shortcomings
of the JJDPA's implementation, Handler and Zatz distinguish between
positive and negative mandates.76 1 Deinstitutionalization policies of all
types typically focus on their negative mandate-that is, reducing
numbers of admissions or residents in particular types of institutions.
Positive mandates to create alternative services are frequently 7an
62
afterthought. Policymakers recognize the need for such alternatives
but rarely craft sophisticated blueprints for those services guided by
thorough assessment of needs and grounded in carefully developed
intervention philosophies.7 63 Where plans for positive mandates exist,
they frequently do not incorporate a program evaluation component
allowing for program modification as feedback regarding efficacy and
other effects is integrated.

758. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
759. See Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive
Rights: A PreliminaryDiscussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 269 (2004).
760. See supra note 652 and accompanying text (discussing JJDPA); see supra Part IIIB.5.
(discussing IDEA).
761. NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DENSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS
OFFENDERS, supra note 653, at 202-04.

762. Consistent with functionalist theory, see supra Part VIA, if important social functions are
served by institutions, policymakers must provide alternative mechanisms to serve the social or
individual needs met by the institutions; otherwise, the reforms are destined to fail, wholly or
partially.
763. One notable exception to this more typical neglect in the formulation of the positive
mandate is the Mental Health Systems Act, developed as a result of several years of deliberation and
reports analyzing needs and proposing a particular intervention approach. See supra note 740 and
accompanying text.
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Examining the failures of the past, it seems clear that a successful
response to the problems of troubled and troublesome youth must turn
this traditional approach on its head. In other words, rather than
beginning with a negative mandate to deinstitutionalize and hoping that
the community-based services ultimately developed meet the underlying
social needs, we should begin with the positive mandate to develop the
network of appropriate community-based services. If these services truly
meet the underlying social needs of troubled and troublesome children,
their families, and their communities, decreasing demand for
institutional interventions-whether those services are provided in
mental health, juvenile justice, child welfare, or medical settingsshould follow naturally. Gradually, layers of clientele of various
institutional systems will peel away from the institutional systems, and
many other individuals and families will be referred directly to these
new services.
Thus, in Phase One of the policy reform effort, funding with strings
tied tightly to particular models of service delivery would be dispersed
so that the infrastructure can be built and tested.7 6 If effective, the
service system will act like a magnet, attracting clientele away from
institutional and other inappropriate services. In Phase Two, once the
community-based service system is well established, additional clients
for whom these services are appropriate can be coaxed from institutions
through the use of negative mandates, such as providing incentives to
states for reductions in institutional use. Of course, the success of this
approach is tied closely to the degree to which the alternative services
and interventions meet the underlying individual and social needs served
by institutional systems. In Sections B and C below, I sketch some
essential components of a successful governmental response.
B.

Taking Charge of Boundary Crossings Through Development of
Metasystem Capabilities

In this Article and elsewhere in the scholarly and policy-based
literature, we hear much of the unintended and unanticipated
consequences of failed deinstitutionalization policies. 765 While many
764. Indeed, one of the criticisms of early state responses to Olmstead has been that too little
attention has been paid to developing the infrastructure necessary to provide services to mentally
disabled persons in the most integrated settings. See, e.g., Mathis, supra note 257, at 578-79, 582.
765. Of course, the adjectives "unintended" and "unanticipated" refer to two different
phenomena that may or may not occur in conjunction. Whereas "unintended" consequences are
those that were not the results that were the intentional object of purposive action, "unanticipated"
consequences are merely those that the actor did not expect to result from the purposive action.
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have written about these phenomena more generally, one of the most
useful expositions is a 1936 article by sociologist Robert Merton in The
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action.766 Unintended
and unanticipated consequences are not always undesirable, but to the
extent that they are, it is useful to understand what factors contribute to
their occurrence for the purpose of taking preventive or corrective
actions.

767

Clearly, the failure of policymakers to develop, fund, and

implement service and intervention systems that meet the underlying
social needs served by institutions contributed to the unintended
consequences that accompanied deinstitutionalization.
Understanding the nature of these unintended consequences,
however, is also quite revealing, and helps us to envision how we might
anticipate and reduce future policy failures. When underlying needs of
troubled and troublesome youth are not met by one institutional system,
individuals, families, and social agencies often try to meet those
underlying needs by crossing permeable intersystem boundaries. This
tendency, which has been repeated countless times in a range of
deinstitutionalization contexts, is now a fairly predictable result of
deinstitutionalization policies, and should no longer be thought of as
unanticipated. But intersystem boundary crossing by troubled and
troublesome children and their families is informative as well. It reveals
the complex and multidimensional character of the problems requiring
attention. Presently, our legal system compartmentalizes the services it
provides into the niches defined by the mental health, educational,
juvenile justice, and child welfare systems. While there is indeed some
overlap among these services, and many children and families are served
concurrently or consecutively by more than one system, the services
provided typically reflect the formulations of the child's or family's
behavior characteristic of the system through which the child or family
happened to enter.768 Yet, as discussed in Part III of this Article, children
and families do not fit neatly into the boxes that constitute the
formulations and turf of each of these systems. Rigid adherence to
system-specific notions of this population's problems often bears little
relation to the lives and needs of these multi-problem children and

766.

Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM.

SOCIOL. REv. 894 (1936). Merton cites to a range of other writers who have addressed the
phenomenon: "In some one of its numerous forms, the problem of unanticipated consequences of
purposive action has been treated by virtually every substantial contributor to the long history of
social thought." Id. at 894.
767. Id.at 896-97.
768.

See supra Part III.B.5.
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families, who often require services that might only be available across
systems.
This conclusion leads directly to the next facet of my proposal.
Rather than discourage intersystem boundary crossings, we should
facilitate such crossings. Each system reflects a lens through which the
child and family are perceived. Rather than to use only one lens, thereby
locking families into one system, we should look at the children and
families from the range of relevant perspectives, and insure that families
have access to the full spectrum of services, easily accessing those that
are most appropriate. Permeability of boundaries can be a desirable
component of a total service network-when formally coordinated and
managed-using the multiple systems' resources in a logical, planned,
and productive way. In other words, the best way to address the
problems of unintended boundary crossing is by structuring positive
opportunities for intentionalboundary crossing, thereby maximizing the
services in
chances that each child and family will receive appropriate
769
response to the unique range of needs they manifest.
Clearly, however, it will be difficult to effect such planned,
purposive boundary crossings with the current structure of the various
systems. The lack of coordination that is endemic to the various child
service and intervention systems presents a major obstacle. Not only
does the right hand not know what the left hand is doing, but also the
financing structure within these rigid administrative entities provides
incentives for shifting costs from one agency to the next. There is no
overall accountability mechanism to encourage the educational system,
for example, to provide a child with less expensive and more appropriate
services that are likely to prevent the subsequent, and far more
expensive, incarceration of the youth in the juvenile justice system years
later. Each agency operates independently of the others, and there is no
motivation on the part of agency personnel to consider the totality of
expenses the state will incur as a result of short sighted intra-agency
policies. For these reasons, I propose the legislative creation of
metasystem capabilities within state government. I use the term
"metasystem," to emphasize the need for an administrative structure that
sits above, and transcends, the individual systems, and has the capacity
to build into these systems a workable, interactive structure.
What might such metasystem capabilities look like in practice?
Depending upon the state, its agency structure, and who the players are
769. For further discussion of analogies to this somewhat paradoxical approach to altering a
undesired course of conduct by "prescribing" it, see Watzlawick et al., supranote 1, at 120-24.
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at any given point in time, different approaches may make the most
sense. The "Systems of Care" model, which is federally-funded, and on
which child mental health programs around the country have been based,
stresses the provision of "services that are integrated, with linkage
between child-serving agencies and programs and mechanisms for
planning, developing, and coordinating services.,' 770 The Systems of
Care model does not dictate what form that linkage and coordination
should take, although various approaches have been proposed and
implemented. 771 The need for collaboration among governmental
agencies and systems is not unique to troubled and troublesome youth.772
As a first step, the Legislature or Governor's Office can create a
working commission, committee, board, or panel, with representation
from each of the agencies and professional groups involved in the
policymaking and service delivery to troubled and troublesome youth.
The presence of scholars and researchers who can assist the group in
grounding their investigations on a solid empirical base is important as
well. This group would develop proposals for development and
maintenance of a metasystem response to the needs of troubled and
troublesome youth and their families. In order to maximize the
likelihood of success, however, there are three key components that are
essential: (1) establishment of an office in the upper levels of state
770.

Beth A. Stroul & Robert M. Friedman, The System of Care Concept and Philosophy, in

CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: CREATING SYSTEMS OF CARE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 3, 11 (Beth
A. Stroul ed. 1996) [hereinafter CREATING SYSTEMS OF CARE].

771.

See, e.g., Gary Macbeth, A Statewide Approach to System Development, in CREATING

SYSTEMS OF CARE, supra note 770 at 131; SHARON HODGES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., Promising Practices: Building Collaboration in Systems of Care, Promising
Practices in CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: SYSTEMS OF CARE VI (1998), available at

http://cecp.air.org/promisingpractices/1998monographs/vol6.pdf. Elsewhere, I examined a range of
state-based approaches to developing interagency coordination of responses in the context of
childhood exposure to domestic violence. See Weithom, Protecting Children,supra note 77, at 10051. In ProtectingChildren, I examined the ways in which states were responding to the exposure of
children to domestic violence perpetrated by one parent or parent figure on another. Two of the
central agencies charged with responding to these problems-that is, providers of child protection
and domestic violence services-functioned with distinct philosophies and divergent service
models. Id. at 26-41. Substantial mistrust had pervaded interagency interactions over the years. In
recent years, there have been substantial efforts in several jurisdictions to bring about productive
interagency collaboration focusing on their common concerns, with promising outcomes in those
jurisdictions that have gone about their policy reform in a thoughtful manner, examining and
planning strategies to tackle the various challenges they must confront. See id. at 109-31 (discussing
implementation of new policies in Alaska, Massachusetts, and Michigan).
772. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mark, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A
Proposalfor a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 460-65, 488-96 (1996)
(discussing the general role of the federal Office of Management and Budget in cross-agency policy
planning and program implementation, and arguing for a distinct "superagency" that will oversee
and coordinate environmental policies.
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administration to develop and implement policy directives that
coordinate services of the various child service and intervention systems
(i.e., the health, mental health, child welfare, juvenile justice, and
educational systems) to troubled and troublesome youth; (2)
establishment of triage or assessment centers within each county to
coordinate the implementation of the program at the county level,
insuring that the needs of troubled and troublesome youth and their
families are appropriately assessed, and referred to appropriate services;
(3) financial incentives to discourage cost-shifting and encourage
assumption of responsibility by those governmental agencies within
those systems charged with provision of appropriate services to troubled
and troublesome youth; and (4) training and development of expertise
and cross-agency linkages so that front-line workers are motivated and
capable of implementing the new approaches to service provision to
troubled and troublesome youth.
1. Establishing a Statewide Office to Coordinate a Multisystem
Response to the Needs of Troubled and Troublesome Youth
and Their Families
An administrative office at the highest level of state government
must be created and staffed by a team of experts familiar with the
workings of the various child service and intervention systems. 773 These
individuals must be committed to developing a coordinated system of
service delivery to troubled and troublesome youth grounded in
empirically-supported or evidence-based practices. 7 4 This office,
referred to here as the Office of Multisystem Services to Child, Youth,
and Families (hereinafter the "Multisystem Office") would coordinate a

773. There is fairly broad agreement among scholars that the coordination of cross-agency
policies, planning, and funding must be in the executive branch, and must sit at a high level of
government, given the likely intransigence of agencies to alter traditional patterns of operation. See,
e.g., Stroul and Friedman, supranote 770, at 11 (referring to "executive-level interagency entities");
Macbeth, supra note 771, at 13, 143-45 (citing several interagency coalitions, including a State
Executive Council to formulate program and fiscal policies and a State Management Team to
oversee implementation of the policies; Mark, supra note 772, at 455-496 (discussing the need for
and functions of a "superagency"); Shelly Hara & Theodora Ooms, Children's Mental Health
of the New Paradigm 19 (1995), available at
Services:
Policy Implications
http://www.uwex.edu/ces/familyimpact/reports/pin35.pdf (stating that an agency, consisting of
executives from all of the concerned agencies, would assume "responsibility for new policies, joint
planning, priority setting, service development, financing, resource allocation, and system
management"). An administrative agency is far more likely than is the legislature to maintain
continuity of staffand goals from year to year. Mark, supra note 772, at 455-96.
774. For discussion of the concepts of evidence-based or empirically supported treatments, see
infra Part VII.C.2.
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variety of functions. First, the Multisystem Office would examine
epidemiological and other statistical data regarding the numbers and
types of troubled and troublesome youth served in the state in order to
guide programmatic, training, and budgetary planning for future service
delivery. The population of relevance would be consistent with the
general definition set forth in Part III of this Article: Children who are at
risk for out-of-home placement, who are appropriate for communitybased interventions of the types described in Part VII.C below. Second,
using these prevalence data and scientific knowledge of the efficacy of
various interventions, the Multisystem Office would develop a plan for
the delivery of services to the range of troubled and troublesome youth
and their families within the various service and intervention systems.
Third, the Multisystem Office would determine the staffing and training
needs within these systems, and direct these operations. Fourth, it would
design ongoing data collection, including program evaluation, to insure
that policy is informed by empirical inquiries, allowing for ongoing
reforms to better meet the needs of the relevant populations. Fifth, and
most importantly, this agency would control a portion of the state
budgets for each of the five systems, in a manner discussed in
Subsection 3 below. Sixth, it would plan and implement permanent
linkages among the five systems' personnel, as discussed in Subsection
4, below. And seventh, the Multisystem Office would plan and
coordinate preventive interventions for those children and families
deemed to be at risk for future problems, as discussed in Section VII.C
below. The Multisystem Office, therefore, would develop and
implement policy, and serve as the conduit for the coordinated delivery
of appropriate services to troubled and troublesome youth in a manner
consistent with the principles set forth in this Part.
2. Establishing Triage Centers
Once a worker in a child service and intervention system
encounters a child or family deemed to be at risk of out-of-home
775
placement, that case should be referred to the local Triage Center
(alternatively, the Evaluation, Assessment, or Intake Center; hereinafter
referred to as the "Center"). Staffed by personnel with expertise in each
of the areas of relevance (that is, pediatrics, mental health, child welfare,
775. The term "triage" is borrowed from the field of emergency medicine. Adapted from the
French word "trier," which means "to sort," the triage process in modem emergency rooms involves
the performance of initial evaluations sufficient to prioritize cases and determine which patients
should receive which initial services. Robert Derlet, Triage, EMEDICINE, available at
http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic670.htm.
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juvenile justice, and education), the Center's role is to insure that each
child and family receive a thorough evaluation in order to develop an
Intake Plan. Depending upon the local organization of services, staff at
the Center might play a supervisory role only, insuring that the proper
evaluation is conducted at other sites (for example, the school, by child
protective services). Or, the Center staff might conduct some of the
assessment functions, particularly where centralizing the expertise is the
most sensible and cost-effective way of insuring completion of a
comprehensive assessment with a multisystem focus. Assessment staff
(at the Center and other agencies) will be guided by protocols that
require evaluators to consider a range of issues relevant to these children
and families. Macbeth refers to such entitles as Family Assessment and
Planning Teams, local panels that assess the needs of troubled and
troublesome youth and their families, and refer these individuals to
appropriate services.776
The evaluation will be multifaceted, so as to discern which services
are required in order to avoid out-of-home placement and to promote the
child's and family's adaptive functioning. Only in this context will
professionals learn which of the many possible explanations for truancy,
for example, underlies a particular child's school absence. Is a truant
child staying home from school because his father will not assault his
mother if someone else is in the house, because he has an undiagnosed
learning disability and associates school with failure, because he has
become involved with a peer group that socially rewards norm violations
of this type, or because he was being teased and assaulted at school? The
evaluation findings will guide the nature and type of interventions and
which systems will become involved in providing services.
Staff at the Center will also make an initial determination as to
whether family-based or home-based intervention is sensible, given the
family circumstances. As noted at the outset of this Article, some
families are beyond repair, at least within a time frame that is necessary
to avoid an out-of-home placement. Based on the Intake Plan set forth
by the Center, funding would follow the child and family to the various
systems in which services are delivered.7 77 In addition, depending upon

776. Macbeth, supra note 771, at 144.
777. States have begun to experiment with an innovation aptly named "Money Follows the
Person." Under this model, money that would have been available if an individual would have
received the "default" services under the auspices of one service and intervention system can use
those funds to access either different services in that system, or services in another system.
Legislation under consideration by Congress would permit greater access to community-based
options by those persons whose care is funded by Medicaid. See, e.g., S. 528, 109th Cong. (2005);
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the specifics of the case, the Center staff would identify periodic
intervals for reassessment.
One problem with existing service delivery to these multi-problem
children and families is the unavailability of the full range of voluntary
services at all points of entry.778 If a child like Donny is served solely in
the educational system, little can be done about the child abuse he
experiences, his assaultive conduct, or his mental health problems unless
he is transferred to another system. In the traditional model, a child is
likely to lose continuity of educational services as a result of an out-ofhome placement either because his move from one neighborhood to
another makes continuity impractical, or because the type of placement,
such as secure juvenile detention, denies him the opportunity for a
comprehensive school program. By contrast, the Intake Plan would
provide access to the full range of services at any point of entry.
Whether a child's or family's problems become evident to the child's
school, to a pediatrician, to an emergency room physician, to a mental
health professional, to child protective services, to juvenile justice
authorities, or to the police, the full range of appropriate services would
be easily accessed. Thus, the needs of the particularchild andfamily
would determine the nature of the intervention, not the particular system
through which the child or family first entered. Entering through the
"wrong" portal would not create barriers that lead to the provision of
inappropriate services or no services at all.
Discouraging Cost-Shifting and Encouraging Assumption of
Responsibility for Service Provision to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth
As noted throughout this Article, and emphasized in Part V, costshifting is a significant problem in the delivery of services to troubled
and troublesome youth and their families. Given the separate lines in
state budgets for services in the different child service and intervention
systems, there are no financial incentives for personnel and
administrators in the educational system, for example, to provide
relatively inexpensive early intervention services to a troubled and
3.

Suzanne Crisp et al., Money Follows the Person and Balancing Long-Term Care Systems: State
Examples, Sept. 29, 2003, availableat http://www.cms.hhs.gov/promisingpractices/mfp92903.pdf.
778. See, e.g., Ross & Miller, supra note 241, at I (discussing "cross-cutting problems");
Gardner, supra note 118, at 182-84 (speaking of a "balkanized bureaucracy"); See, e.g., Jane
Koppelman, Children with Mental Disorders: Making Sense of Their Needs and the Systems that
4,
2004,
available at
799,
June
Issue
Brief No.
Them,
NHPF
Help
=
13.
http://www.nhpf.org/index.cfm?ifuseaction=SearchCatalogue&iissueid
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troublesome child, potentially averting the need for ongoing and far
more expensive services in the juvenile justice system, and even the
criminal justice system, in the future. Furthermore, in an era of tight
budgetary constraints, personnel may seek to avoid the expense of
serving a child whose problems are not yet severe, despite the possibility
or probability that those problems will escalate and result in higher costs
within that same system at some undetermined future time. Thus, it is
unlikely that administrators and personnel will eagerly increase their
caseloads to provide more appropriate services to these children without
financial incentives to do so.
An alternative way to structure the financing of these services could
promote the provision of more appropriate services within particular
systems. Based on existing data, state financial personnel would estimate
the approximate proportion of each service and intervention system's
budget that should be dedicated to serving troubled and troublesome
youth. That portion of each system's budget would be isolated and
extracted from that system's appropriation from the state. Those funds
would be pooled and channeled instead to the Multisystem Office. Once
a child and/or family has been evaluated for services and a plan
developed at the Triage Center, the funds estimated to be necessary for
service delivery to that child and family would become available in
appropriate proportions to the systems that provide those services. Thus,
service and intervention system personnel would be motivated to serve
youth identified by the Center because referrals would be accompanied
by funds. Ideally, service and intervention systems would mobilize to
develop services appropriate for this population, in the hope of receiving
a larger portion of the pooled funds-in effect, competing with other
systems for these children, If a case proved to require more or different
services once the child and family proceeded through the system(s),
procedures would exist to facilitate additional directives and requests for
funding through the Center.
4.

Developing Expertise, Cross-Agency Linkages, and
Commitment Among Front-Line Workers
Without the commitment of front-line workers in all of the systems
and the development of expertise in the intervention modalities
discussed below, interagency coordination and improved service
delivery will not occur. The capacity for such a response must be built.
Successful capacity building, therefore, focuses on personnel and
includes, at the minimum: (1) cross-training (i.e., substantial
opportunities for personnel across agencies to share knowledge and
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experience, build liaisons and relationships, and practice working
together in interdisciplinary teams); and (2) training of all personnel in
the theoretical models and innovative practices that will be the
cornerstones of service provision, as described in Section C below.
Most critical to the success of interagency collaboration are the
people who serve as the links between and among the systems. There are
a variety of models that may be applied in conceptualizing the roles of
these "linkage" personnel. For example, the Massachusetts Department
of Social Services, upon recognizing that domestic violence in families
is detrimental to the children they seek to protect, created an in-house
position for a domestic violence advocate to serve as a consultant within
its agency. 779 The advocate worked collaboratively with the case
management teams, assisting in assessments, formulation of
recommendations in individual cases, and linking families to appropriate
resources in the community.78 ° Clearly, the placement of a trusted and
respected individual with training and expertise divergent from that of
most staff members within the agency can serve as a critical component
in the promotion of an interagency approach.
-enry Steadman emphasizes the role of "boundary spanners" in
promoting interagency cooperation.78 ' He defines boundary spanners as
individuals whose positions "'link two or more systems whose goals and
expectations are likely to be at least partially conflicting.' At each
organizational boundary there is a person whose role it is both to interact
with the people inside their own organization and to negotiate system
interchanges with the other organization.' 782 Steadman describes a range
of models of boundary spanning, as well as examples relevant to the
mental health and criminal justice system interactions. In addition, he
points out that boundary spanners may be entire organizational units,
rather than individuals.78 3 Others have pursued the boundary spanner
concept, as did Steadman, with respect to the criminal justice-mental

779. Weithorn, ProtectingChildren,supra note 77, at 119.
780. Id.at 119-20.
781. Henry J. Steadman, Boundary Spanners: A Key Componentfor the Effective Interactions
of the Justiceand Mental Health Systems, 16 L. & HUM. BEH. 75 (1992).
782. Id.at 77.
783. Id. at 77-86.
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health interface, 784 or other 7contexts,
such as with respect to school85
based mental health services.

In the final analysis, the newly structured network of service
systems will be a purposefully, rather than haphazardly, interconnected
groups of agencies. And, indeed, there is a growing consensus among
78 7 easily-accessible,
788
experts that a broad continuum 86 of coordinated,
789
79
°
79
affordable, appropriate, and primarily noninstitutiona ' services
provided within restructuredservice-delivery systems is most likely to

784. Nancy Wolff, Interactions Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement Systems.
Problems and Prospectsfor Cooperation,23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 133, 157-58 (1998); Mark
R. Munetz & Jennifer L.S. Teller, The Challenges of Cross-DisciplinaryCollaborations:Bridging
the Mental Health and CriminalJustice Systems, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 935, 948-49 (2004).
785. See also John Kastan, School-Based Mental Health Program Development: A Case Study
ofinterorganizationalCollaboration,25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 845, 848-51 (2000).
786. The concept of a continuum of services reflects the notion that a responsive service and
intervention system provides options for a range of treatment interventions, depending upon the
needs of the individual children and families. There are many variables of relevance to the continua.
For example, interventions may be more or less intensive (e.g., 24-hour individual or family-based
intervention at one end of the continuum and one hour of counseling weekly at the other); may use
any of a range of modalities (e.g., biological interventions such as psychotropic medication at one
end of the continuum and intensive family-based psychosocial intervention at the other ); may be
provided in any of a range of settings (e.g., at a clinic, in the home, at school, in a foster family
home, in a community-based residential facility, and so on).
787. The concept of coordination refers not only to interagency coordination, as discussed
above, but coordination among the various professionals and agencies within each service and
intervention system. Frequently, services provided today constitute disparate and isolated
interventions, typically provided without regard to services provided previously or expected
subsequently. It is critical that there be a coordinated plan of intervention that follows each
individual or family as they move both among and within service and intervention systems.
788. The current service systems are not user-friendly, in that families and others must
typically struggle with a range of challenges. They must wait for extended periods of time for
services, they must confront eligibility restrictions, limitations on types and lengths of service
delivery, and they must negotiate the complexities of the maze of pathways to access care.
789. As discussed earlier, many services are not available unless one has extensive financial
resources or exceptional insurance coverage. Otherwise, there are maximums, limits, eligibility
requirements, and so forth, most of which do not match the needs of those children and families
who are the focus of this Article. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss proposals for
universal health coverage more generally, there is no question that troubled and troublesome youth
will continue to cycle through the systems that cannot reject them, that is juvenile justice, child
welfare, and eventually criminal justice, if we do not implement a system of universal coverage of
the types of interventions discussed below. See infra Part VII.C.2.a-c.
790. Interventions are appropriate when they are effective in addressing both the underlying
needs and the overt manifestations of the problem conduct, and when they do so in a manner least
destructive to family relationships, least restrictive of liberty, and least restrictive of the individual's
opportunities to interact with others. Efficacy is determined with reference to the relevant body of
empirical studies.
791. The term noninstitutional reflects the preference for interventions that permit individuals
to remain in their natural settings.
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meet the needs of most troubled and troublesome children and their
families.
C. Responding to Underlying Individualand Social Needs
In Part V, I addressed the discontinuities among our society's
responses to troubled and troublesome youth and several core traditions
in American law. Empirical data reveal that these traditional modes of
intervention do not achieve results that contribute to the well-being of
minors or their families.792 The absence of such a positive impact
suggests that highly-intrusive governmental and quasi-governmental
agencies have failed to accomplish many of the purposes that provide
much of the justification for their existence.
Ironically, based on an increasingly robust body of empirical
data,793 it appears that those modes of service intervention that are likely
to be the most effective in achieving a range of ameliorative goals are
also those that are most consistent with our society's core legal
traditions. I say that this is ironic because, to some extent, the legal
frameworks of parent-child-state jurisprudence presume that adverse
interests necessarily exist. 794 Yet often, interests conflict solely because
the absence of appropriate services constricts the choices of the parties
and channels them into adversarial, rather than cooperative, interactions.
There are ways to frame the interests of parents, children, and the state
so as to reveal the underlying commonalities. Indeed, the unities of
interest among parents, children, and the state can create the cornerstone
or foundation on which intervention approaches are based. While we
give lip-service to preserving and strengthening families in our nation,
our money is rarely "where our mouth is." Below, I assert that, in order
to serve the common interests of children, families, and the state, we
must (1) address children's needs within their natural environments of
home, school, and community and (2) rely on evidence-based/
empirically-supported interventions. These approaches are grounded in
psychological theory and research and are also consistent with core
American legal values disfavoring interventions grounded in policies of
792. See the summary and analysis provided in SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22,
at 169-72.
793. See id.
at 168-79.
794. In a similar vein, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse observes that the "traditional
paradigm pitting parents against the state" in a contest for control over children's development may
be less useful than one viewing parents and the state as partners in promoting children's welfare.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate about the Socialization of Children: An
EnvironmentalistParadigm,2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 85-86.
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removal, confinement, and segregation. In addition, I argue that logic
and available data indicate that such approaches are no more expensive
than are current modes of intervention with troubled and troublesome
youth, and they are probably less expensive. Given the overall benefits
to children, parents, and society of shifting approaches, even a costneutral approach reflects a dramatic improvement over the status quo.
1. Addressing Children's Needs within Their Natural
Environments
In his book, The Ecology of Human Development, psychologist
Urie Bronfenbrenner introduced his conception of children's
development, which extends beyond examinations of the influences of
inheritance, parent-child interactions, or individual relationships between
the child and others.795 He focused instead on the myriad of influences
that derive from multiple social systems in which the child is directly
involved or through which indirectly influenced, as well as the impact of
the interactions and relationships of those systems with one another.796
Thus, for example, children engage in face-to-face interaction in a
variety of microsystems, such as home, school, playground, and day
care. 797 Not only is the child's development the product of her ongoing
interactions within each of those systems, but also of the interactions
among those systems. Thus, for example, how a child performs in school
relates not only to her interactions with her parents and at school, but
also to the interactions between her parents and the school. 798 The next
levels of systems conceptualized by Bronfenbrenner are that of
mesosystem (which "comprises the interrelations among two or more
settings in which the developing person actively participates," that is, "a
system of microsystems") and exosystem (which constitutes "one or
more settings that do not involve the developing person as an active
participant, but in which events occur that affect.., what happens in the
setting containing the developing person"). 799 Thus, while relations
between parent and school constitute a mesosystem, parents' places of
work-where a child does not participate directly--constitute an
795. URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY
NATURE AND DESIGN (1979).
796. Id. at 3-12.
797. Id. at 22.
798. Id. at 7. Thus, the "principle of interconnectedness [applies] not only within settings but
with equal force and consequence to linkages between settings, both those in which the developing
person participates and those that he may never enter but in which events occur that affect what
happens in the person's immediate environment." Id. at 7-8.
799. Id. at 25.
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exosystem. Finally, Bronfenbrenner characterized as the macrosystem
influences such as the culture, government, and other consistencies in
one's social environment, including predominant ideologies that have an
impact on the ways in which microsystems, mesosystems, and
exosystems function. 800 This definition is sufficiently broad to include
various socio-economic, legal, ethnic, or religious factors that may have
an impact on the functioning of the various "lower-order systems. 8 °1
Thus, Bronfenbrenner points out that parental efficacy is influenced not
only by the skills and capacities an individual brings to parenthood, and
not only by the child's characteristics and needs, and the interaction
between parent and child, but also by the parents' interactions with other
family members, with the "demands, stresses, and supports emanating
from other settings... [with] flexibility of job schedules, adequacy of
child care arrangements, the presence of friends and neighbors who can
help out," as802well as the "public policies and practices ...conducive to
family life."
Psychologist James Garbarino expounded upon and applied
Bronfenbrenner's social-ecological approach, providing a perspective
within which we can understand some of the risks as well as the
opportunities that affect children's development in these various nested
and interacting systems.80 3 The writings of Bronfenbrenner, Garbarino,
and others help us to appreciate the difficulties of intervention
approaches in mental health, juvenile justice, or child welfare that do not
seek to promote children's adaptive functioning within their natural
social environments, through practices that involve, coordinate, and
where necessary, effect positive change in, those environments. Policies
that lead to the incarceration of minors who run away from family
violence for commission of a minor criminal offense on the streets fail to
appreciate the importance of the child's social system in affecting her
conduct and are therefore highly unlikely to achieve positive effects.
While some of these interventions do succeed in temporarily averting
certain immediate problems (i.e., preventing a suicide attempt, avoiding
an incident of child abuse, taking a runaway off of the streets), failure to
intervene with the child in the context of her natural environments will
fail to maximize the opportunity to effect positive, lasting change.
Efficacy, which translates into improved familial, social, emotional, and
800. Id.at 26.
801.

Id.

802. Id. at 7.
803. See generally JAMES

GARBARINO,

CHILDREN

AND

FAMILIES

IN

THE

SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1992).
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academic functioning, serves the states' interests in promoting the
welfare of children, serves children's interests in maximizing their own
potentials to attain satisfying and productive lives, serves families'
interests in their children's well-being, and preserves family integrity
and survival in the face of the sometimes overwhelming needs of their
troubled and troublesome children.
Through the work of several task forces, the American
Psychological Association ("APA") has pioneered a new way of looking
at services delivered by its members to children and families. For
decades, scholars have asserted that children should be viewed within
their natural settings of family and community. Others have been
advocating a positive, strengths-based approach. Others have been trying
to promote interdisciplinary cooperation across services systems. Still
others have been focusing the field on the need to disseminate
information about treatment efficacy. Now these writers are no longer
lone voices, drowned out by those who sustain the more traditional
approaches. Scholars, researchers, and practitioners advocating these
seek to promote their
new directions now have center stage as they
80 4
profession.
their
beyond
and
within
approaches
In 1992, the APA Task Force on Innovative Models of Mental
Health Services for Children, Adolescents and Families published its
Report, which consisted of a special issue of the Journal of Clinical
Child Psychology."5 The Task Force examined the innovative service
delivery models applicable to populations who are at risk of psychiatric
80 7
hospitalization,80 6 who are processed by the juvenile justice system,
whose families come to the attention of the child welfare system, 80 8 who
are seen by medical professionals,80 9 and who are served by the

804. For a discussion of the role of APA in promoting these approaches, see Tori DeAngelis,
Children 's Mental Health Problems Seen as 'Epidemic'. Psychologists Advocate for Systems- Wide
Change With the Child at the Center, 35 APA MONITOR ON PSYCHOL,, Dec. 2004, at 38, available
at http://www.apa.org/monitor/dec04/epidemic.html.
805. Scott W. Henggeler, A Consensus: Conclusions of the APA Task Force Report on
Innovative Models of Mental Health Services for Children, Adolescents, and Their Families, 23
(Supp.) J. CLN, CHILD PSYCHOL. 3 (1994).
806. Diane L. Sondheimer et al., Alternatives to the Hospitalization of Youth with a Serious
EmotionalDisturbance,23 (Supp.) J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOL. 7 (1994).
807. Charles M. Borduin, Innovative Models of Treatment and Service Delivery in the Juvenile
Justice System, 23 (Supp.) J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOL. 19 (1994).
808. Kristine E. Nelson, Innovative Delivery Models in Social Services, 23 (Supp.) J. CLIN.
CHILD PSYCHOL. 26 (1994).
809. James R. Rodrigue, Beyond the Individual Child: Innovative Systems Approaches to
Service Delivery in PediatricPsychology, 23 (Supp.) J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOL. 32 (1994).
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educational system. 810 The Task Force addressed the need to restructure
the service delivery systems in order to provide support to families, and
to emphasize preventive and early interventive approaches. 8 11 Grounding
their analysis on the body of research and theory accumulated thus far,
the Task 8Force recommended: (1) adoption of "systems of care"
principles;

12

(2) reduced use of restrictive services, such as psychiatric

hospitalization and many other forms of residential intervention; (3)
increased use of home-based and community-based services; (4)
approaches that strengthen, empower, and support families; and (5)
availability of a comprehensive range of individualized and flexible
services that are coordinated and integrated.8 13 The Task Force's
empirically-grounded evaluation of the range of new approaches to
psychosocial intervention with children and families, as well as the
virtual explosion of scholarship continuing the Task Force's work, has
led the governance of the APA to adopt a formal Resolution on
Children's Mental Health. 814 After listing its key findings, the APA
Council of Representatives resolved, among other things, that it would
"take a significant leadership role to support and advocate that it is every
child's right to have access to culturally competent, developmentally
appropriate, family oriented, evidence-based, high-quality mental health
services that are in accessible settings."' 8 15 These general approaches
have been endorsed by panels in reports such as those issued by the
Surgeon General in 1999 and promulgated by the President's New
Freedom Commission on Mental Health in 2003.816
2.

Relying on Evidence-Based/Empirically-Supported
Interventions
Contemporaneous with the above developments, the Clinical
Psychology Division of the APA set the ball rolling for a complementary
process to inform professionals, consumers, policymakers, and others
about the existing databases addressing the efficacy of various
810. Albert J. Duchnowski, Innovative Service Models: Education, 23 (Supp.) J. CLIN. CHILD
PSYCHOL. 13 (1994).
811. Robert M. Friedman, Restructuring of Systems to Emphasize Prevention and Family
Support, 23 (Supp.) J. CLIN.CHILD PSYCHOL. 40 (1994).
812. See, e.g., BETH A STROUL & ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN: A SYSTEM OF CARE FOR CHILDREN
AND YOUTH WITH SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES (rev. 1986).

813. Henggeler, supra note 805, at 3-6 (1994).
814. APA Resolution on Children's Mental
http://www.apa.org/pi/resolution/childmentalhlth.html.
815.
816.

Health

(Oct.

2003),

available at

Id.
See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 52-54; SURGEON

GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 168-94.
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psychosocial interventions."87 Based on the quality, scope, and findings
of research addressing the efficacy of psychosocial intervention
approaches for particular problems and with particular populations, the
APA Division Panel, as well as individual scholars writing separately,
have been publishing evaluations of the levels of evidence supporting
the use of particular interventions with particular populations.
Interventions have been characterized as (1) well-established(those with
the strongest empirical support); (2) probably efficacious (those with
less strong empirical support); or (3) experimental treatments (with no
empirical evidence supporting efficacy as yet). 81 8 As noted above,
scholarly literature evaluating the empirical evidence for the efficacy of
psychosocial interventions for children and adolescents has virtually
exploded in the past several years. 81 9 Thus, the timing is excellent to
identify those intervention approaches most likely to be useful to
troubled and troublesome youth.
And indeed, many of the approaches studied do focus on troubled
and troublesome youth, although these children are more generally
referred to in this literature by the relevant system-specific labels. A
fascinating finding has emerged, which follows logically from the notion
that there is substantial overlap in the populations of troubled and
troublesome juveniles who come in contact with the mental health,
juvenile justice, and child welfare systems. It appears that whether the
children are identified as seriously emotionally disturbed, as status
offenders or delinquents, or as victims of child maltreatment, the same
cohort of intervention approaches appears to be useful. While not all
approaches have been tested in all settings, empirical findings to date
suggest that there is a core group of intensive intervention approaches
817. This trend was formally launched in 1995, with a report by a Task Force of the Division
of Clinical Psychology of the American Psychological Association. See Task Force on Promotion
and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures, Training In and Dissemination of EmpiricallyValidatedPsychological Treatments, 38 CLIN. PSYCHOLOGIST 3 (1995).
818. Thomas H. Ollendick & Neville J. King, Empirically Supported Treatmentsfor Children
and Adolescents: Advances Toward Evidence-Based Practice, in HANDBOOK OF INTERVENTIONS
THAT WORK WITH CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 3, 5-6 (Paula M.

Barrett & Thomas H. Ollendick eds. 2004).
819. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH
DISABILITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
RESEARCH (May 1, 2003); BARBARA J. BURNS & KIMBERLY HOAGWOOD, COMMUNITY
TREATMENT FOR YOUTH: EVIDENCE-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR SEVERE EMOTIONAL AND
BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS (2002) [hereinafter COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR YOUTH]; EVIDENCEBASED PSYCHOTHERAPIES FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (Alan E. Kazdin & John R. Weisz

eds., 2003); H. Stephen Leff, A Brief History of Evidence-Based Practice and a Vision for the
Future, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2002, 224 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J.

Henderson eds., 2002); Ollendick & King, supra note 818 at 3.
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that is effective in cases identified in different service and intervention
systems. That is, the intervention approaches are not necessarily systemspecific.
Common themes characterizing the range of innovative
intervention models include: (1) a view of the child within her natural
social environment; (2) a broad view of healthy psychological
functioning as relating to many important spheres (including family,
school, and peers); (3) a strategy of intervention that includes or
emphasizes family functioning; (4) a focus on the development of
strengths and capacities; (5) an individualization of the particular
services selected for each child and family; and (6) an organized
conceptual framework coordinating various levels and types of
interventions. Furthermore, every one of these approaches seeks to avoid
the child's removal from the home, restriction of that child's liberty, and
segregation of the child from the community. In fact, most of these
approaches rely on the opportunity to work with the child within the
context of the family and community. Given that these approaches have
been identified as those that are grounded in the strongest evidence of
efficacy, it appears clear that effective intervention with troubled and
troublesome youth can occur in a manner consistent with our nation's
core legal traditions. Those interventions inconsistent with those core
traditions appear to be least likely to promote positive behavior change
and healthy functioning in troubled and troublesome youth. I describe
8 20
below, two of the approaches that appear to be the most effective.
While the primary emphasis of the interventions discussed
immediately below is intervention with children already at risk for outof-home placements, I briefly discuss the notion of early intervention as
well. In addition, I touch on certain innovative approaches to addressing

820. My review of the empirical research is necessarily fairly cursory, and does not discuss the
methodological designs of the studies other than to allude to their sophistication or general
limitations. The process of evaluating the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of intervention programs
is, by itself, complex, and has been the subject of volumes of scholarship. For the interested reader,
I recommend the sources cited within for greater detail on the specifics of the empirical research
briefly summarized here. In addition, for further discussion of the strategies and challenges in
evaluating intervention programs, see, for example, CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES:
RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EVALUATION (Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 1995);
EVALUATING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: HOW DO PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN "WORK" IN THE

REAL WORLD? (Carol T. Nixon & Denine A. Northrup eds., 1997). Furthermore, Paul Lerman
presents an excellent analysis of several model programs that were developed with an eye toward
application in the mental health, child welfare, and juvenile justice systems. Lerman, Child
Protection, supra note 84. Although this review was prepared over a decade ago, it is still
instructive in the way in which it scrutinizes the programs examined within.
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the needs of children who cannot go home, at least in the immediate
future.
a.

Serving Children in their Social Contexts

Multisystemic Therapy ("MST") is grounded in the notion that "the
variables that influence the development and maintenance of [problem]
behavior in children and adolescents" are many and that intervention
approaches that narrowly seek to modify one variable or another are
unlikely to promote adequate change. 82 1 Among the facets of the child's
functioning and life that can be the focus of MST intervention if
necessary in individual cases are: "individual youth characteristics (e.g.,
weak verbal skills, favorable attitudes toward antisocial behavior),
family functioning (e.g., discipline, affect), caregiver functioning (e.g.,
mental health, substance abuse), peer relations (e.g., rejection,
association with deviant peers), school performance, indigenous family
criminal
(e.g.,
characteristics
and
neighborhood
supports,
subculture)., 82 2 Using a highly-individualized plan for each client, MST
tailors a complex set of interventions to the particular child's and
family's needs. Scott Henggeler and colleagues emphasize that the
intervention plan is grounded in a "careful and ecologically based
functional analysis of identified problems," and that interventions
incorporate strategies to develop strengths and protective factors relating
to the emotional connections among family members, the family's
connections with a meaningful social support network, development of
the youth's social, academic, and vocational skills, as well as positive
peer group alliances and patterns of interaction.8 23 Thus, while the
approach is quite comprehensive in addressing the wide range of
problematic facets of the child's life, it is also individualized-that is
tailored to each child's specific needs. While initially developed to
address the needs of serious juvenile offenders, MST has now been
applied to other populations as well, and appears to have broader
applicability to the entire gamut of troubled and troublesome youth. This
finding is consistent with the likely flexibility 824of concurrent
comprehensive, yet individualized, aspects of the model.
821. SCOTT W. HENGGELER ET AL., SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE IN CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: MULTISYSTEMIC THERAPY 5 (2002).

822. Id.
823. Id.at 5-6.
824. See also ScoTr W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF ANTISOCIAL
BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1998); Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation
Using Multisystemic Therapy: An Effective Alternative to IncarceratingSerious Juvenile Offenders,
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MST has been subjected to substantial empirical evaluations, and is
viewed as a "well-validated treatment model" by child treatment
researchers. 825 Studies have focused primarily on youth with antisocial
behavior, including serious and violent juvenile offenders. When
compared with traditional interventions, MST substantially reduced
recidivism and out-of-home placements in the offender samples.82 6 More
recently, studies have focused on children diagnosed with serious
emotional disorders, including those at risk for hospitalization.82 7 Youth
in the MST program were substantially less likely to be hospitalized or
placed in other out-of-home placements than youth in traditional
treatment, and those that were hospitalized had briefer hospital stays
than the comparison group.828 Furthermore, MST participants
demonstrated significantly greater improvement in symptomatology and
8 29
missed significantly fewer days of school than the comparison group.
One investigation examined the efficacy of MST with maltreating
families, also with positive results. 3 ° In those investigations that
compared costs, MST was more cost-effective than the traditional
interventions.8 3'
The Wraparound model was developed as an alternative to
traditional mental health interventions. It presumes that
children with severe emotional and behavioral problems will develop a
more normal lifestyle if their services and supports are family centered
and child focused, strengths based, individualized, community based,
interagency coordinated, and culturally competent.

60 CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 953 (1992); Scott W. Henggeler et al., Four-Year Followup of Multisystemic Therapy with Substance-Abusing and Substance-DependentJuvenile Offenders,
41 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 868 (2002); Sonja K. Schoenwald & Melisa D.
Rowland, Multisystemic Therapy, in COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR YOUTH, supra note 820, at 91.

825. Schoenwald & Rowland, supra note 824, at 113.
826. Id. at 113-14.
827. See Henggeler, Four-Year Follow-up, supra note 824; Melisa D. Rowland et al.,
Multisystemic Therapy with Youth Exhibiting Significant Psychiatric Impairment, in OUTCOMES
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH WITH EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS AND THEIR FAMILIES:
PROGRAM AND EVALUATION BEST PRACTICES 401 (M.H. Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH].

828. Rowland et al., supra note 827, at 410.
829. Id.
830. Molly Brunk et al., Comparison of Multisystemic Therapy and Parent Training in the
BriefTreatment of ChildAbuse and Neglect, 55 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 171 (1987).
831. Schoenwald & Rowland, supra note 824, at 114-15.
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[Grounded in] psychosocial theories of child development... [such
as] the social-ecological theory of Urie Bronfenbrenner. . ., [behavior

is seen] as developing in the context of multiple reciprocal interactions
over time: The child, the family, the neighborhood, the school, and
832 the
fashion.
continuous
a
in
another
one
affect
to
interact
community
This intervention approach focuses on the family unit, and seeks to
provide the services and supports needed to promote that family's
adaptive functioning. The intervention is individualized and, as noted
above, examines not only the child within the family context, but within
other social contexts as well. Like MST, the Wraparound model has
been expanded in its initial focus, and programs consistent with its
theory have been provided for a range of problems brought to the
attention of the mental health, education, child welfare, and juvenile
justice sectors. 833 Empirical investigations of Wraparound programs do
not provide as strong a database as those of MST, in part because the
inherent variability in the application of the program-which is highly
individualized-makes it difficult to compare with other interventions.
The program has become quite popular and has been adapted in a variety
of locations in the United States and Canada.834 While initial studies are
favorable, in terms of positive outcomes (e.g., reduced offending by
delinquent youths) and cost savings in studies with populations of
troubled and troublesome youth identified within various service and
intervention systems,83 5 the research is weakest in providing data that
compare this model of intervention with other approaches. There exist
some, findings regarding
other promising interventions, as well. 8For
36
efficacy and cost-effectiveness are mixed.
832. John D. Burchard et al., The Wraparound Approach, in COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR
YOUTH, supranote 819, at 69-70.
833. Id. at 69; see also Promising Practices in Wraparound for Children with Serious
Emotional Disturbance and Their Families, in 4 SYSTEMS OF CARE, PROMISING PRACTICES IN
CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: 1998 SERIES, 1 (Barbara Bums & Sybil Goldman eds., 1999); Jodi
Kerbs et al., Wraparoundand Juvenile Justice: Making a Connection that Works, FOCAL POINT,

Summer, 2004, at 19; John Van Den Berg et al., History of the WraparoundProcess, FOCAL POINT,
Fall, 2003, at 4.
834. Burchard et al., supra note 832, at 90.
835.

Bruce Kamradt, et al., WraparoundMilwaukee: ProgramDescription and Evaluation, in

OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 827, at 307, 317-27.
836. For example, research on the Systems of Care model has yielded somewhat contradictory
findings. Compare, e.g., Albert J. Duchnowski et al., Community-BasedInterventions in a System of
Care and Outcomes Framework, in COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR YOUTH, supra note 819, at 16,

21-26 with Leonard Bickman, A Continuum of Care: More is Not Always Better, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 689 (1996). The term "systems of care" can refer to a range of program types that
satisfy basic principles. Thus, research continues so as to identify successful program designs. The
model is widely-regarded as "promising." For example, see the monograph series published by the
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1497

Serving Children who Cannot Go Home Right Away (or
at All)

Some children's families are so dysfunctional, and some children's
behavior so difficult to manage, that remaining at home and/or returning
home are not viable options for the child in the immediate future.
Federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration on "Systems of Care:
Promising
Practices
in
Children's
Mental
Health
(available
via
links
at:
http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/cmhs/ChildrensCampaign/practices.asp)
and publications
available at the University of South Florida's Research and Training Center for Children's Mental
Health website (available via link at: http://rtckids.ftnhi.usf.edu/). For general discussion of the
Systems of Care model and implementation, see, for example, THE HANDBOOK OF CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT SYSTEMS OF CARE (Andres J. Pumariega & Nancy C. Winters eds., 2003);
CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: CREATING SYSTEMS OF CARE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (Beth A.
Stroul ed., 1996); STROUL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 812.
Similarly, evaluations of programs referred to generically as Intensive Family Preservation
Services/Intensive Home-Based Interventions have led to mixed conclusions about efficacy. These
approaches seek to prevent the removal from the home of children who might otherwise be placed
in foster care, group homes, residential treatment centers, psychiatric hospitals, or juvenile justice
facilities. Kathleen Wells, Family PreservationServices in Context: Origins, Practices,and Current
Issues, in HOME-BASED SERVICES, supra note 119, at 1. The child's family is the focus, with
services provided in the family's home "for as many hours as needed, over a relatively brief period
of time," and employing a wide range of interventions. Id. The model is grounded in four strands of
theoretical and empirical work in psychology that developed over the last three decades of the
twentieth century: social learning theory, which examines the reciprocal interaction between
individuals and their environments; family systems theory, which examines the individual within
the context of the family, and the family's interactive patterns; and crisis intervention theory, which
recognizes the unique characteristics of a crisis (as a situation in which there is "an imbalance
between the perceived difficulty and significance of a threatening situation and the coping resources
available to an individual"), and uses various strategies on a short-term basis, to assist the
individual, including development of coping skills and provision of social supports; and the social
ecological theory advanced by Bronfenbrenner, and Garbarino, which emphasizes the
"interdependence of individuals and.. . the social world" and which focuses on "multiple contexts
in which a child develops" and functions. Id. at 6-10. Yet, despite the intuitive attractiveness of this
approach, and positive findings of efficacy and cost-effectiveness by those who developed and
implemented these programs, see, for example, Jill Kinney & Kelly Dittmar, Homebuilders:
Helping Families Help Themselves, in HOME-BASED SERVICES, supra note 119, at 29, 40-48, more
methodologically-sophisticated empirical evaluations have not supported those findings, particularly
in the child welfare context. See, e.g., WESTAT ET AL., EVALUATION OF FAMILY PRESERVATION
AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 2002) available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/evalfampres94/Final/indcx.htm;
Duncan Lindsey, Preserving Families and Protecting Children: Finding the Balance, available at
www.childwelfare.com/kids/fampres.htm. Paul Lerman uses family preservation programs to
illustrate the importance of testing program innovations with randomized trial research designs.
Lerman, Child Protection, supra note 84, at 355-57. Without the use of carefully-controlled
comparison groups, researchers and others may attribute superiority to a program that has
demonstrated positive gains in the target population over time, when those gains may not, in fact, be
superior to those obtained with traditional interventions. For a discussion of the distinctions among
predominant models of intensive family services, see Nelson, supra note 809, at 26-30; Beth A.
Stroul, Home-Based Services, I COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
WHO ARE SEVERELY EMOTIONALLY-DISTURBED (Oct. 1988).
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Ideally, even with this population, it is best not to abandon the
preference for a family-based or home-based intervention strategy, even
if the child must spend some time, or perhaps the remainder of her
minority, in a setting other than her parents' home. Several alternatives
hold promise in such situations: Multisystemic or Wraparound treatment
provided within the context of "kinship care," Therapeutic Foster Care
(also known as Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care) provided by
non-relative or relative caregivers, and certain carefully-developed group
care programs with demonstrated efficacy.
In recent years, the child welfare system has increasingly
recognized the multiplicity of benefits of tapping the natural resources
inherent in the extended families of children adjudicated as dependent.837
Kinship care relies on such family members when parents are unable or
unwilling to provide safe and adequate home environments for their
children. As an informal practice, primary care of children by extended
family members, particularly grandparents, existed in many households
long before the child welfare system began to formalize such
arrangements. 838 Estimates reported for 1994 indicate that 2.15 million
children (approximately three percent of the nation's children) live with
relatives, primarily grandparents, without a parent present in the
home.83 9 Most of these arrangements are informal; one study revealed
that only 15.5 percent of these children were formally placed in
relatives' care through the child protection system.84 ° While kinship care
as a formal alternative to either parental care or foster care placement
with non-relatives in the context of child welfare intervention is not a
panacea and certainly requires more study, the intuitive benefits of
exploring such options seem clear.84' If kinship placements of troubled
837. See supra note 581.
838. See HARDEN ET AL., supra note 638, at 132-133; see also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977) (discussing the importance of extended family members in
the upbringing of children in striking an ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from sharing a
home with her adult son and two grandsons who were first cousins: "uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children [is a tradition
deserving] constitutional recognition").
839.
840.
841.
of issues

HARDEN ET AL.,supra note 638.
Id.
For a discussion of the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of such placements, as well as
requiring further study, see, for example, Berrick, supra note 638, at 77-84; Geen, supra

note 638, at 136-44. At the time of this writing, the Senate and House are considering bills that
would provide: notice to relatives when a child is removed from parental custody; financial
assistance to kinship foster caregivers; and grants to states study kinship foster care. See the Kinship
Caregiver Support Act, S. 985, 109th Cong. (2005) and the Guardianship Assistance Promotion and
Kinship Support Act, H.R. 3380, 109th Cong. (2005). For an incisive analysis of the "double-edged
relationship" of kinship care to the child welfare system, see Roberts, Kinship Care, supranote 87,
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and troublesome youth were supplemented by intensive intervention
according to the principles guiding MST, as well as financial and other
supports generally provided to foster parents, extended family members
might be able to provide adequate home-based care for troubled and
troublesome youth in some instances.
Finally, Therapeutic Foster Care provides an alternative to
institutionalization for children who cannot live with their parents.842
This program has been implemented with samples referred from the
juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems. Research
indicates its efficacy in improving functioning in a range of spheres, also
reducing the number of subsequent institutional placements.8 43 In fact, a
Task Force of the Centers for Disease Control has recommended
adoption of Therapeutic Foster Care in a range of contexts as a way of
preventing community violence. 844 While some reviewers suggest that
treatment effects may not be sustained over time, 845 the Surgeon
General's Report evaluated the research findings quite positively, noting
that "studies of treatment effectiveness showed that youths in therapeutic
foster care made significant improvements in adjustment, self-esteem,
sense of identity, and aggressive behavior. In addition, gains were
sustained for some time [i.e., at a two-year follow-up] after leaving the
therapeutic foster home. ' ' 846 Some researchers emphasize cost savings as
847
well, in comparison to more restrictive interventions.
While the therapeutic foster care model is grounded on the same
premises as generic foster care-that is, that youth removed from their
at 1622, 1642 (arguing that formal kinship foster care "exacts a high price for state assistance" in
that it forces parents to relinquish custody of their children and submit to state supervision in order
to obtain governmental aid).
842. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Shepard & Patricia Chamberlain, The Oregon Multidimensional
Treatment Foster Care Model: Research, Community Applications, and Future Directions, in
OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 827, at 551; Patricia Chamberlain & John B.
Reid, Comparison of Two Community Alternatives to Incarcerationfor ChronicJuvenile Offenders,
66 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 624, 625 (1998). For more information about this model and
its efficacy, see PATRICIA CHAMBERLAIN, TREATING CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: ADVANCES
MADE THROUGH THE OREGON MULTIDIMENSIONAL TREATMENT FOSTER CARE MODEL (2003);
Beth A. Stroul, Therapeutic Foster Care, in 3 COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS WHO ARE SEVERELY EMOTIONALLY-DISTURBED (Sept. 1989).

843. See sources cited supra note 836.
844. Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Centers for Disease Control, Therapeutic
Foster
Care
for
the
Prevention
of
Violence
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5310al.htm.
845. Patrick Curtis et al., A Literature Review Comparing the Outcomes of Residential Group
Careand Therapeutic Foster Care, 18 CHILD & ADOLESC. SOC. WORK J. 377, 385-87 (2001).
846. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 177.
847. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 177; Shepard & Chamberlain,
supranote 842, at 566.
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homes will fare better if placed in a substitute family context than in an
institution-Therapeutic Foster Care places a far greater premium on the
training and special skills of those adults serving as the foster parents
than does the traditional model.848 Like the other programs discussed
above, however, the Therapeutic Foster Care model is grounded in
social-ecological principles, and works with the child within each of the
relevant social contexts, including attempts to improve the family
situation.849 Whether improvement of the family situation occurs with
the goal of the child's eventual return home, or with the goal of
promoting a positive non-custodial relationship between the child and
parent, this orientation recognizes that families continue to influence
children's development even after day-to-day contact is severed or
curtailed. It is therefore logical that this model could be applied in the
context of kinship foster care. In other words, the non-parent caregivers
are relatives rather than non-relatives, but otherwise all of the
dimensions of the formal Therapeutic Foster Care model are unchanged.
Clearly, future research is needed to address the promise of a range of
variations on these models.

c.

Intervening Early

The preceding types of interventions focus on the troubled and
troublesome youth who are at risk of out-of-home placement, as well as
many youth who are excluded from my definition of troubled and
troublesome because they are serious or violent juvenile offenders.85 °
But, what of youth and families whose problems are less serious, at least
initially? Early intervention provides the greatest likelihood of the most
positive long-term outcomes for children and families, as well as the
greatest cost-savings. 85' Prevention programs, such as home visitation
programs, appear to reduce the development of the types of individual
and family dysfunction that lead to out-of-home placements for
children. 852 Furthermore, empirical research indicates that children
848.
551-54.
849.
850.
851.

See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 842, at 69-83; Shepard & Chamberlain, supra note 842, at
See supra note 804 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
See, e.g., LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., INVESTING IN OUR CHILDREN: WHAT WE KNOW AND

DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS 11-104

(1998), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MRIMR898/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
852. Despite several decades of urging by medical, mental health, and public health experts,
policymakers and private insurers have failed to implement home-visitation programs. Council on
Child and Adolescent Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Role of Home-Visitation Programs in
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experience long-term neurological effects from exposure to deleterious
circumstances and experiences, and that early intervention, preventionoriented, and family and individual health-promotion approaches are
most likely to enhance children's long-term social, emotional, and
intellectual functioning.853
D. Addressing "Stigma"
The Surgeon General's Report identified "stigma" (that is,
"prejudice and discrimination, fear, distrust, and stereotyping") as a
serious obstacle to the success of mental health initiatives.8 54 Children
who become involved in the juvenile justice system are also subjects of
negative stereotypes.8 55 Public education initiatives may help change
such community attitudes.856 The most powerful weapon against such
attitudes, however, is widespread availability of appropriate communitybased resources for troubled and troublesome youth. The integrationist
philosophy underlying statutes such as the ADA asserts that stigma
results, in part, from policies of isolation and segregation that
Improving Health Outcomes for Childrenand Families, 101 PEDIATRICS 486, 486-87 (1998). Such
programs provide pregnant women and parents of infants and young children with regular visits
from public health nurses, and have demonstrated efficacy in reducing child abuse and neglect,
maternal impairment due to substance abuse, and maternal criminal conduct. Id.; David Olds et al.,
Long-Term Effects of Home Visitation on Maternal Life Course and Child Abuse and Neglect:
Fifteen-Year Follow-Up ofa Randomized Trial, 278 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 637 (1997). Studies also
reveal that such programs can reduce rates of juvenile delinquency as well. David Olds et al., LongTerm Effects of Nurse Home Visitation on Children's Criminal and Antisocial Behavior: FifteenYear Follow-Up ofa Randomized Trial, 280 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1238 (1998).
853. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTEGRATING THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT,
NAT'L COUNCIL & INST. OF MEDICINE, FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000); COMM.
ON PREVENTION OF MENTAL DISORDERS, INST. OF MEDICINE, REDUCING RISKS FOR MENTAL
DISORDERS: FRONTIERS FOR PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION RESEARCH (Patricia J. Mrazek & Robert
J. Haggerty eds., 1994); 6 PRIMARY PREVENTION WORKS: ISSUES IN CHILDREN'S AND FAMILIES'

LIVES (George W. Albee & Thomas P. Gullotta eds., 1997); INVESTING IN CHILDREN, YOUTH,
FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES (Kenneth I. Maton et al. eds., 2004).

854. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 454 & 6-9; see also President's New
Freedom Commission, supra note 22, at 4 ("Stigma refers to a cluster of negative attitudes and
beliefs that motivate the general public to fear, reject, avoid, and discriminate against people with

mental illness").
855. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 806-11
(2003) (referring to perceptions of juvenile offenders as "superpredators" and contemporary
juvenile justice policy as a response to "moral panic" not justified by the reality of the public
threat).
856. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 9, 454; see also President's New
Freedom Commission, supra note 22, at 23 (asserting that public awareness education, including
media initiatives may be helpful in reducing stigma).
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communicate to the public that persons removed from the mainstream
are unfit for community life.857 Fears and prejudices are permitted to
flourish in the absence of real-life opportunities to interact with those
who are removed from public view.858 Ineffective interventions also fuel
such negative perceptions because the stigmatized individuals appear
resistant or unresponsive to society's attempts to help or change them.
Furthermore, to the extent that the manifestations of troubled and
troublesome youth's difficulties (that is, their "symptoms" or conduct)
fuel negative public attitudes, the remediation of those problems with
effective interventions may allay such concerns. Clearly, society's
resistance to having these youth within its communities must be
acknowledged and confronted if policies of the types proposed in this
Article are to succeed.

E. Financingthe Reforms
Readers who have made it through this lengthy Article may find
these ideas interesting, but impractical in light of the current political
climate in which human service expenditures are constricting rather than
expanding. Thus, one should consider the possibility that
implementation of the proposals articulated here will save, rather than
increase, costs. The measurement of cost-effectiveness of interventions
with children (and others) can proceed with any of a variety of
premises. 859 First, one can simply compare the program expenditures
encountered in providing services with one type of intervention versus
another. Along these lines, evaluations of the effectiveness and costefficacy of the various programs discussed immediately above reveal
that the provision of the initial services leads to cost savings over
traditional interventions. This makes sense when we remember that once

857. See supra Part V.D.
858. The President's New Freedom Commission cites research findings as demonstrating that
one of the most effective ways to combat stigma against those with mental disorders is personal
contact between those individuals and others. See PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N, supra
note 22, at 23.
859. See, e.g., COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES (Roger J. Stancliffe & K. Charlie Lakin eds., 2005); S.M.A.A. Evers
et al., Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Care Interventions:A Review, 6 HEALTH ECONS. 161,
165-70 (1997); E. Michael Foster & Tim Connor, A Road Map for Cost Analyses of Systems of
Care, in OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN, supra note 827, at 225, 227-31; Theodore R. Marmor & Karyn
C. Gill, The Political and Economic Context of Mental Health Care in the United States, 15 J.
HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 459 (1989); For a brief discussion of some empirical findings, see
supra note 318.
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a child is removed from the home, governmental interventions become
quite expensive.
Second, if these programs are more effective in achieving their
goals than are traditional interventions, the cost savings will proliferate
as we consider the expense of future services necessitated by the
ineffectiveness of traditional interventions. Lower recidivism for
juvenile offenders, reduced rates of psychiatric hospitalization, less need
for child welfare intervention, fewer emergency room visits, fewer
disruptive crises in the school, and so on result in overall cost-savings.
: Third, the higher the adaptive functioning of these youth, the lower
the cost to society over the long haul, not only from a reduced need for
governmental intervention, but from avoidance of a range of corollary
expenses such as losses experienced by victims of crime, burdens on
family members of these children, and avoidance of the maladaptive and
destructive functioning of the adults these children will eventually
become. 860 The "payback" to society is likely to be dramatic when one
contrasts, for example, the costs of having a law-abiding member of
society versus one who violates the law, or the costs of having an
individual who is productive and makes constructive contributions to her
family's and community's financial lives versus one who is disabled by
mental disorder and perpetually dependent on others for the basics of
survival.86 1
860. Recent studies conducted at the Harvard University School of Public Health, in
collaboration with the World Health Organization and World Bank, have developed measures of the
"global burden of disease," and have found that mental disorders account for a substantial
component of disability-related burden of diseases. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2001: MENTAL HEALTH: NEW UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE 25, box 2.2 (2001)

(citing the work of researchers Christopher J. 1. Murray and Alan D. Lopez, e.g., THE GLOBAL
BURDEN OF DISEASE: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF MORTALITY AND DISABILITY FROM
DISEASES, INJURIES, AND RISK FACTORS IN 1990 AND PROJECTED TO 2020 (GLOBAL BURDEN OF
DISEASE AND INJURY SERIES, VOL. I) (1996)). Mental disorders accounted for over 35% of the

"years lived with disability" for persons in the age range of 15 to 44 years. Id. at 28, fig.2.3. These
studies do take into account the financial burden on family members who must forego or limit
income-producing employment, as well as missed employment opportunities of the disabled
individual.
861. For analysis of the costs and benefits of various intervention programs for youth that take
into account the larger benefits to society of successful interventions with children, see, for
example, KAROLY, supra note 851; Juvenile Justice Evaluation Center, Cost-Benefit Analysis for
Juvenile
Justice
Programs
(May
2002),
available
at
http://www.jrsa.org/jjec/about/publications/cost-benefit.pdf; Arthur J. Reynolds, et al., Paths of
Effects of Early Childhood Intervention on Education Attainment and Delinquency: A Confirmatory
Analysis of the Chicago Child-ParentCenters, 75 CHILD DEV. 1299 (2004); KAY JOHNSON ET AL.,
NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, MAKING DOLLARS FOLLOW SENSE: FINANCING EARLY
CHILDHOOD MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES TO PROMOTE HEALTHY SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN YOUNG CHILDREN, PROMOTING THE EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN
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As for some of the other elements of the proposal: It is possible that
the staffing of the Multisystem Office and the Triage Center can be
implemented through shuffling of existing staff lines. While some staff
may be replaced, others may be retrained. Training expenses as well are
likely to be recouped fairly quickly in the renovated network of systems.
It is possible that it will take time for savings to be realized. Early
intervention and prevention programs will not have immediate cost
savings. Furthermore, staff training must precede the system changes,
and the positive mandate to develop and implement a broad spectrum of
community-based and home-based approaches must precede the
negative mandate to reduce institutional admission and residence counts.
The literature contains suggestions for addressing the challenges of
funding these new services in a system that allows seamless intersystem
boundary-crossings. 862 Furthermore, many writers, particularly those on
staff at the Bazelon Center, have identified ways in which current benefit
programs, such as Medicaid and the IDEA, can be utilized so as to meet
the needs of these difficult populations.86 3 Authors have also addressed
the need to reform private insurance policies so as to provide parity
between funding of physical and mental health interventions together
with a focus on more effective and cost-effective family- and
community-based interventions. 8 4 While there is no question that
carefully designed evaluations of cost-effectiveness should be built into
implementation of the types of changes discussed here, it is highly likely
that substantial cost savings will result from providing effective and
appropriate services as early as possible in (or prior to) the downward
spiral, particularly if these services reduce the need for long-term use of
expensive restrictive services and increase the chances that troubled and
troublesome youth will become constructive and contributing members
of society.
AND FAMILIES POLICY PAPER NO. 4 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.nccp.org/media/pew02d-

text.pdf. Further exciting research along these lines is forthcoming by the Committee for Economic
Development's "Invest in Kids Working Group." See the Working Group's website at:
http://www.ced.org/projects/kids.shtml (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
862. For a discussion of some these financing strategies, see Judith C. Meyers, Financing
Strategies to Support Innovations in Service Delivery to Children, 23 (Supp) J. CLIN. CHILD
PSYCHOL. 48 (1994); Friedman, supra note 811, at 42-44; Lenore B. Behar, State-Level Policies in
Children's Mental Health: An Example of System Building and Refinancing, in CHILDREN'S
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 820, at 21; Bruce J. Kamradt, Blending Funding Streams to Support
System of Care Reform. 7 BEHAV. HEALTH TOMORROW 41 (1998); Bruce Kamradt, National Center

for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice, Funding Mental Health Services for Youth in the Juvenile
Justice System: Challenges and Opportunities(Dec. 2002).
863. See supranotes 259, 307.
864. See summary by the SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 22, at 182-83, 423-39.
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CONCLUSION

Returning to the proverb with which I began this Article-"plus qa
change, plus c 'est la mime chose"-much has changed over this century
in our nation's responses to troubled and troublesome youth, and yet,
much has stayed the same. Despite many cycles of reform aimed at the
mental health, juvenile justice, and child welfare systems, we have not
yet achieved most of the underlying goals articulated by these reform
movements. The findings of recent governmental investigations that
thousands of children for whom mental health services are sought are
placed out of their homes under the auspices of the child welfare or
juvenile justice systems illustrate that, depending upon the dominant
constellation of legal policies, economic incentives, and social attitudes,
the flow of children from one set of child care and control institutions to
the others can occur in any of several possible directions. Policy
responses that do not recognize this phenomenon are unlikely to have
long-term success. Furthermore, policy responses that rely primarily on
out-of-home placements are likely to provide little more than short-term
containment of a crisis and will undoubtedly fail. A troubled and
troublesome child must learn how to live in the family and the
community, and the family and community must learn how to
incorporate the child within their midst.
The insights and recommendations emerging from the most recent
cycle of government-sponsored reports and investigations are generally
sensible and progressive. 865 Yet, there is little indication that federal and
state policymakers are planning to respond by enacting sweeping
reforms. 866 While establishing commissions, producing reports,
conducting investigations, and holding hearings can be the first steps in
shaping important changes in policy, these pursuits can also deflect
attention from governmental inaction at a time when there is no genuine
commitment to achieving real change. This leads us to one more step
that is crucial to an effective and coordinated response to troubled and
troublesome youth that is consistent with our society's core values. In
the final analysis, none of the reforms addressed here will be possible
without a financial investment in children.
865. See, e.g., supra note 22.
866. For example, President Bush's New Freedom Commission was instructed to "focus on
those policies that maximize the utility of existing resources." See John K. Iglehart, The Mental
Health Maze and the Callfor Transformation, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 507, 508 (2004) (quoting
Executive Order 13263 of April 29, 2002: President's New Freedom Comm'n on Mental Health, 67
FED. REG. 22337-8 (2002)). In other words, there are unlikely to be any new appropriations to
implement the Commission's findings.
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As noted above, it is highly likely that implementation of the
innovative service models discussed here will result in direct and
indirect cost savings by government and private parties. Yet even if
these innovative interventions are cost-neutral, there is clearly added
value in reducing the suffering of those engaging in troubled and
troublesome behavior, of their families, and of those who would
otherwise cope with the short- and long-term societal impact of these
children's difficulties. It is appropriate to return to the language in the
frequently-cited 1944 Supreme Court case of Prince v. Massachusetts:
"A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, wellrounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all
that implies.

8' 67

It is vital to our nation's future, and to the future of all

of us, that we maximize each child's opportunity to develop into a welladjusted, contributing member of society. In the final analysis, however,
we must acknowledge the importance of investing in this nation's
children, so as to secure the future well-being not only of these children,
their families, their offspring,
and the like, but also the future well-being
868
nation.
this
in
us
of all of

867. 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
868. See Tobin, supra note 427.
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